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The GenerM Rule of Section 331 (a) (1)
INTRODUOTION
IN the absence of a statutory provision prescribing its tax con-
sequences, the complete liquidation of a corporation might be
looked upon as a transfer by each stockholder of his stock in ex-
change for the liquidating distribution. His profit or loss (i.e., the
difference between the adjusted basis of his stock and the value of
the liquidating distribution) would then be reported either as capi-
tal gain or loss or as ordinary income or loss, depending upon
whether the stock was a capital asset in his hands and on whether
the transaction was regarded as a sale or exchange within the
meaning of section 1222. Another possibility, in the absence of
statute, would be to treat the liquidating distribution as a dividend
(taxable as ordinary income) to the extent of the corporation's
earnings and profits; and to treat the balance of the liquidating
distribution as a payment in exchange for the stock, with gain or
loss to be computed accordingly.
But we are not required to speculate about the possible tax
consequences of a corporate liquidation in the absence of a statu-
tory provision. Since 1924, a liquidating distribution has been
treated as the proceeds of a sale of the stock by the shareholder.
In reporting the bill which became the Revenue Act of 1924, the
Senate Finance Committee said:
The bill treats a liquidating dividend as a sale of the stock, with the result
that the gain to the taxpayer is treated not as n. [taxable] dividend .•• but
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as a gain from the sale of property which may be treated as a capital gain.
. . . A liquidating dividend is, in effect, a sale by the stockholder of his
stock to the corporation; he surrenders his interest in the corporation and
receives money in place thereof. Treating such a transaction as a sale and
within the capital gain provisions is consistent with the entire theory of the
Act and, furthermore, is the only method of treating such distributions
which can be easily administered.1
The analogy between a complete liquidation and a sale of the
stock, however, is not a perfect one. A sale of shares merely sub-
stitutes one shareholder for another, leaving the corporation's
earnings and profits account intact. The result is that the earnings
and profits will be taxed as ordinary income if and when they are
distributed to the new shareholder; the outgoing shareholder fur-
nishes the government with a surrogate, as it were, whose with-
drawal of the corporate earnings will be subjected to the graduated
individual income tax rate. But on a complete liquidation, no one
steps into the shoes of the original shareholder. The earnings and
profits account-representing, be it remembered, income which has
so far escaped the individual income tax because its distribution
has been postponed-is wiped clean. A sale of shares, then, merely
puts off the day of reckoning for the accumulated earnings and
profits; a complete liquidation guarantees that there will be no
reckoning, other than a recognition of capital gain or loss.
Liquidation may differ from a sale in another respect. If the
assets are not converted into cash but rather are distributed to the
shareholder in kind and held by him, the liquidation does not spell
an end to the shareholder's interest in the business enterprise. In-
stead of selling out, he has only changed the fashion in which he
holds title to the assets. Like the shareholder who sells out, he has
enjoyed the benefits of operating the enterprise in corporate form.
Unlike the vendor of shares, however, he is able to switch the busi-
ness unit when the corporate form becomes unattractive without
losing his investment position. Having used the corporate shell
as long as it served his purpose, he discards it at will without pay-
ing a personal tax on the accumulated earnings and profits.
Despite the arguments that might be advanced against treating
a complete liquidation as a sale, however, the principle adopted by
Congress in 1924 has been followed ever since, except for one brief
1 S. REP. No. 398, 68th Cong., 1st Sess. 12 (1924). See generally Bittker & Redlich,
Corporate Liquidations ana the Income Tax, 5 TAX L. REV. 437, 448-51 (1950); Sub.
chapter a Advisory Group, Revised Report on Corporate Distributions and Adjustments
(and comments thereon), Hearings on H.E. 4459 Before House Committee on Ways and
Means, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. (1959).
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period (1934 through 1936). Before turning to the details of sec-
tion 331(a) (1), which embodies the general rule that a distribution
in complete liquidation shall be treated as payment in exchange for
the stock, certain exceptions and qualifications should be noted:
(1) .Although the ordinary consequence of section 331(a) (1)
is that the shareholder's gain or loss on a complete liquidation
is capital gain or loss, in itself section 331(a) (1) merely requires
the liquidation to be treated as a sale or exchange of the stock:
if the stock is not a capital asset in the hands of the shareholder,
his gain or loss will be ordinary, rather than capital.
(2) Under a judicial doctrine of uncertain scope, section 331
(a) (1) is not applicable to a liquidation of a corporation whose
stock was acquired solely for the purpose of obtaining its assets
through liquidation. The two steps (pm·chase and liquidation)
will be telescoped, with the result that the transaction is treated
merely as a purchase of the assets themselves, and no gain or
loss is recognized on the liquidation.
(3) Despite section 331(a) (1), the shareholders of a corpo-
ration may elect under section 333 not to recognize their gain on
a complete liquidation. As will be seen subsequently, however,
this opportunity to avoid the recognition of gain is of limited
usefulness.
(4) Despite section 331(a) (1), neither gain nor loss is recog-
nized on the complete liquidation of a subsidiary corporation
under section 332.
(5) If a collapsible corporation is liquidated, the sharehold-
er's gain or loss is computed under section 331(a) (1), but any
long-term gain is transmuted into ordinary income by section
341(a) (2).
Finally, it should be noted that section 331(a) (1) prescribes the
effect of a complete liquidation on the shareholders; it is not con-
cerned with the corporation itself. Under principles to be exam-
ined, the corporation ordinarily recognizes neither gain nor loss on
the distribution of its assets in complete liquidation (section 336) ;
and under a 1954 statutory innovation (section 337), the sale of
property by the corporation during the 12 month period beginning
with the adoption of a plan of complete liquidation will ordinarily
produce neither taxable gain nor deductible loss.
MEANING OF COMPLETE LIQUIDATION
The Code does not de:fine the te:nn "complete liquidation," ]lor
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do the regulations under section 331. The regulations under section
332, section 1.332-2(c), however, contain this statement, which is
probably equally applicable to section 331:
A status of liquidation exists when the corporation ceases to be a going
concern and its activities are merely for the purpose of winding up its
affairs, paying its debts, and distributing any remaining balance to its
shareholders. A liquidation may be completed prior to the actual dissolution
of the liquidating corporation. However, legal dissolution of the corpora-
tion is not required. Nor will the mere retention of a nominal amount of
assets for the sole purpose of preserving the corporation's legal existence
disqualify the transaction.
The cases support this pragmatic approach to the term" complete
liquidation." See, for example, Kennemer v. Oommissioner:
It is not material that the distribution was specifically designated as a
liquidating dividend or that no formal resolution to liquidate or dissolve
the corporation had been adopted when the distribution was made. An in-
tention to liquidate was fairly implied from the sale of all the assets and the
act of distributing the cash to the stockholders. Permitting the forfeiture
of its right to do business was an additional circumstance which the ['fax
Court] properly considered with the other facts in evidence. The deter-
mining element was the intention to liquidate the business, coupled with the
actual distribution of the cash to the stockholders.2
Moreover, although this extract from the Kennemer case implies
that a sale of the corporate assets is required, it is well established
that a distribution in kind is equally efficacious.3
While a complete liquidation is ordinarily effected by a dissolu-
tion under state law, it is not essential that the corporation dissolve
for complete liquidation treatment to apply. Thus, in Revenue Rul-
ing 54-518,4 the Service ruled that retention of the corporation's
charter to protect the corporate name against appropriation was
not inconsistent with a complete liquidation under section 333; the
ruling seems equally applicable to section 331. The prompt reac-
tivation of an allegedly liquidated corporation, however, may retro-
actively vitiate the tax results of a normal complete liquidation.u
296 F.2d 177, 178 (5th air. 1938).
8 See Rev. Rul. 63-107, 1963-1 C.B. 71. For other examples of informal comploto
liquidations, see Shore v. Commissioner, 286 F.2d 742 (5th air. 1961) ; Estate of Willlam
G. Maguire, 50 T.C. 130 (1968). See also Blame, Some Tax Aspeots Of A Oorporato
Liquidation, 7 TAX L. REV. 481, 488-96 (1952).
41954-2 C.B. 142.
5 See Rev. Rul. 60-50, 1960-1 C.B. 150; Rev. Rul. 60-51, 1960-1 C.B. 169; Rov. Rul.
61-191,1961-2 C.B. 251; Lowndes v. United States, 384 F.2d 635 (4th Oir. 1967), whore
tpe corporate entit;' of a liquidatin~ corporation whose onll asset WllS cllsh WllS i1plorod
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.Although both the courts and the regulations are willing to give
effect to an informal liquidation, it is dangerous to make distribu-
tions to the shareholders before the intention to liquidate is evi-
denced by formal action. In the absence of such formalities, it may
take a lawsuit to establish that the earliest distributions in a series
were liquidating distributions, subject to section 331(a) (1), rather
than ordinary distributions, taxable as dividends under section 301
to the extent of the corporation's earnings and profits.G Similarly,
it seems unwise to leave the status of a distribution ambiguous by
failing to adopt a "plan" of liquidation, even though section 331
(a)(l), unlike some other provisions (e.g., sections 332, 333 and
337), does not insist upon such action,'t or by neglecting to redeem
the stock. The problem of characterization may also be trouble-
some if the corporation makes a series of distributions, each ac-
companied by a redemption of part of its stock. It is possible that
the shareholder's gain or loss will be computed distribution by
distribution if there is a series of partial liquidations, but in the
aggregate if the transaction is a complete liquidation.
If a business enterprise that has been taxed as a corporation is
reclassified as a noncorporate entity as a result of litigation, an
election, or otherwise, the change mayor may not be treated as a
constructive liquidation of the corporate or quasi-corporate entity.
Examples are: a professional service enterprise's shift from cor-
porate to partnership or proprietorship tax returns; and the termi-
nation of an election to report on a corporate basis under section
1361.
-in effeet, the eom treated the transaetion as a construetive, or do facto, liquidation
since there was no bnsiness purpose other than o.voidanee of fuxcs for dmy of the
liquidation distribution. This decision could cause trouble in the section 337 arca ns
well, where the liquidation distribution of cash proeeeds from the sale of eorpol'llte Wl3cta
is delayed for the purpose of deferring sharebolder eapital gains.
a:Rev. Rul. 63-107, 1963-1 C.B. 7L The regulntions under seetion 332 contain thts
statement, which seems equally applieable to seetion 331(0.) (1): "Where there is more
than one distribution, it is essentinl that 1I. status of liquidation exist at the time
the :first distribution is made ••••" :Reg. § 1.332-2(c).
If the distributee is a eorporation, the shoe may be on the other foot, since the tax
on a nonliquidating distribution may be less painful by virtue of the dividends received
deduetion of seetion 243 than the capital gain tax on a complete liquidation. Sea also
Schaefer v. Weleh, 252 F.2d 175 (6th Cir. 1958), holding that pre-191S appreciation
in value is counted in computing the sharebolder's eapital gain on a complete liquida-
tion even though it could be distributed tax-free in an ordinary distribution. Contro,
Wsllaee v. United States, 146 F. Supp. 444 (Ot. CL 1956).
'[ See Emery, Complete Liquidatum of Corporations 'Under tlu] 1954 Col1o, 32 TAXES
995 (1954), however, pointing out that seetion 392(0.), relating to the effective dnte of
the 1954 Code, assumes that there will be 1I. plan.
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LIQUIDATING DISTRmUTIONS AND SHAREHOLDER
GAIN OR Loss
In General
Section 331(a)(1) provides that amounts distributed in com-
plete liquidation of a corporation shall be treated as fuIl payment
in exchange for the shareholder's stock. If the stock is a capital
asset in the hands of the shareholder, as would normally be the
case under section 1221 (unless held by a dealer for sale to cus-
tomers in the ordinary course of business), a complete liquidation
will produce capital gain or loss since section 331(a) (1) treats the
liquidation transaction as an exchange of the stock. The amount of
the gain or loss, and its character as long- or short-term capital
gain or loss, in turn depends upon the shareholder's adjusted basis
and holding period for his stock and the value of the liquidating
distribution.
The regulations in section 1.331-1(e) require the shareholder's
gain or loss on liquidating distributions to be computed on a "per
share basis," so that gain or loss is separately calcuIated for blocks
of stock acquired at different prices and dates. For example, if A
acquired 100 shares of stock in X corporation for $3,000 in 1950,
and 100 shares for $6,000 in January of 1966, a liquidating dis-
tribution of $50 per share in June of 1966 would produce $2,000
of long-term capital gain on the 1950 block, and $1,000 of short-
term capital loss on the 1966 block.8
If a shareholder assigns his stock or dies after the liquidation
has begun but prior to final distribution, it is usually held that the
transferee is taxable on postassignment distributions.!) If the po-
tential gain is so "ripe" as to be virtually a sure thing, however,
assignability of the tax burden would seem to be prohibited by the
Court Holding Co. doctrine.
Problems of Valuation and Timing
A shareholder's gain or loss upon liquidation of the corporation
is the difference between the adjusted basis of his stock and the
fair market value of the liquidating distribution under section
8 For the computation of gain or loss when the liquidation is effected by a series of
distributions over a period of time, see Rev. RuI. 68-348, 1968-2 O.B. 141.
In J.K. Downer, 48 T.O. 86 (1967), the shareholder's gain on disposition of his stock
was computed on a. share by share basis.
9 Jacobs v. United States, 280 F. Supp. 437 (S.D. Ohio 1966), atJ'd per curiam, 390
F.2d 877 (6th Oir. 1968); W.B. Rushing, 52 T.O. 888 (1969); Keck v. Comm'r, 415 F.2d
531 (6th air. 1969).
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1001(a). Calculating the value of the distributed assets is ordi-
narily feasible, though appraisals or estimates may be necessary;
but disputed claims, contingent contract rights, mineral royalties,
business goodwill 10 and other rights may be difficult if not impos-
sible to value with reasonable accuracy. If the value of some or all
of the assets received by the shareholder cannot be ascertained
with reasonable accuracy, the computation with respect to these
assets is held"open," under Burnet 1). Logan" U until they are sold,
collected or otherwise reduced to property of ascertainable value.
Such a delay will affect the year in which gain or loss is recognized
by the shareholder, and it may also affect the characterization of
the gain or loss. This is because the gain or loss ultimately realized
on an open liquidation is part of the capital gain or loss generated
by the exchange of the stock under section 331(a) (1); if the asset
in question had been valued when received, however, any gain or
loss realized on its later collection, sale or other disposition (i.e.,
the difference between the amount ultimately realized and the as-
set's value at the time of distribution) would be ordinary or capi-
tal, depending on whether it was a capital asset in the sharehold-
er's hands or not and on whether it was "sold or exchanged"
within the meaning of section 1222.12
Example: A, the sole shareholder of X corporation, receives in
complete liquidation of X: cash of $10,000; operating assets with
an ascertainable value of $30,000; and a contingent claim against
Y in the face amount of $50,000, which may be valueless, de-
pending on later events beyond X's or A's control A's basis for
his stock in X is $50,000. If it is held that X's claim against Y has
no readily ascertainable value under Burnet 1). Logan, the liqui-
dation computation is held open until the claim is finally reduced
to money or other property with an ascertainable value. If .A
10 Goodwill is normally valued by reference to the earnings history and capacity of
the business out of which it grows. On the question of whether goodwill is distributed
to a shareholder on liquidation if it was his personal efforts fiB an employee of tho
corporation that attracted the customers, see Ruth :M. Cullen, 14 T.O. 308 (1950) i
Frank ;J. Longo, 27 T.O.M. 1075 (1968).
See generaU'1I North American Servo Co., 33 T.O. 677 (1960); Rev. Rul 06-81, 1966-1
O.B. 64; Harnack, The Commissioner Is Lo07:ing for Gooa wm, 40 TAXES 331 (1902).
For timing of gain or loss generally, see ;John E. Byrne, 54 T.O. No. 100 (1970) (gain
taxable in year of distribution of corporate assets, not when technic& title changed);
Ethel M. Schmidt, 55 T.O. No. 33 (1970) (loss not recognized untllfinnl distribution).
11283 U.S. 404 (1931).
12 See genera1l'1l Farer, Corporate Liquidations: Transmuting Ordinary Incomo into
Capital Gains, 75 HARv. L. REv. 527 (1962); Eustice, Contract llig71ts, CapitaZ Ga!ll,
ana Assignment of Income-The Ferrer Case, 20 TAX L. REv. 1, 51-76 (1964); Note,
"Open" Transactions in Federal Income Taxation, 38 U. Omo. L. REv. 62 (1909).
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subsequently collects $40,000 on the claim, this amount is deemed
to have been received in exchange for his stock, and .A's gain
of $30,000 (aggregate liquidating distribution of $80,000, less
$50,000 basis for stock) is taxable as capital gain. If .A collected
only $7,000 on the claim, his loss of $3,000 ($50,000 basis for
stock, less aggregate distribution of $47,000) would be deductible
as a capital loss when the claim was settled.
These results may be compared with the consequences of a
"closed" liquidation, based on the assumption that the claim
against Y was valued at $30,000 when it was distributed to A.
His gain on the liquidation would be $20,000 (liquidating dis-
tribution of $70,000, less $50,000 basis for stock). On collecting
$40,000 on the claim, .A would realize gain of $10,000 ($40,000
received, less $30,000 basis for claim under section 334(a» ; and
this gain would constitute ordinary income for want of a "sale
or exchange" of the claim.ls If he collected only $7,000, he would
realize a loss of $23,000 (basis of $30,000, less $7,000 received),
which might be an ordinary loss or a capital loss (if subject to
section 166(d) ).
In tabular form, the four examples just described are as follows
(dollar amounts in thousands) :
Open Closed
liquidation liquidation
(a) (b) (c) (d)
1. Amount realized-liquida-
tion
a. Cash $10 $10 $10 $10
b. Operating assets 30 30 30 30
c. Claim against Y 40 7 30 30
- - -d. Total $80 $47 $70 $70
2. Less: Adjusted basis of
stock 50 50 50 50
- - - -3. Gain (loss) on liquidation $30 ($ 3) $20 $20
4. Amount collected on claim - - - -
against Y $40 $ 7 $40 $ 7
5. Less: Adjusted basis of
claim against Y 40 7 30 30
- -





18 Hale v. Helvering, 85 F.2d 819 (D.C. air. 1936).
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It will be noted that the same aggregate gain or loss will be re-
flected on A.'s tax returns, whether the liquidation is treated as
open or closed when the distribution is made, but the character of his
gain or loss and the years of realization may differ. Thus, assuming
ultimate collection of $4:0,000 on the claim, the open liquidation
computation produces $30,000 of capital gain in the year the claim
is settled; the closed computation produces $20,000 of capital gain
in the year of liquidation and $10,000 of ordinary income when
the claim is settled. The revised assumption, viz., a settlement of
the claim for $7,000, is reflected on A.'s tax return in the year of
settlement as a loss of $3,000, assuming an open liquidation; the
closed liquidation approach produces capital gain of $20,000 in
the year of distribution and a loss of $23,000 when the claim is set-
tled. The way in which the shareholder's economic gain nets out as
just described can be seen in the above table; the sum of line 3 and
line 6 is the same for columns (a) and (c) (open and closed liquida-
tions, assuming that $40,000 is collected on the claim), as well as
for columns (b) and (d) (open and closed liquidations, assuming
that $7,000 is collected).
Because of the deferral of tax that results from holding a liqui-
dation open on a plea that the fair market value of assets is not
ascertainable, together with the possibility of thus transmuting
potential ordinary income into capital gain, the Commissioner has
ardently resisted taxpayer arguments that assets were not suscep-
tible of valuation when distributed in liquidation. Thus, Revenue
Ruling 58-402/4 states that the Service will "continue to require
valuation of contracts and claims to receive indefinite amounts of
income, such as those acquired with respect to stock in liquidation
of a corporation, except in rare and extraordinary cases." III The
14 1958-2 CoB. 15, 18.
15 See also Reg. § 1.1001-1 (a) (third sentence). If a fair market vmue can be ascribed
to the stock surrendered, United States v. Davis, 370 U.S. 65 (19G~), supports an ns·
signment of this value to the assets received in exchllDge, though this would Il::1ve 11
troublesome alloea.tion problem if there is more than one asset of unascertainable value.
The advantage to the shareholder of open liquidation treatment would be reduced if
it brought section 483 (imputed interest on delayed payments for capital assets) into
play, since a portion of the gain ultimately realized would then be tn:mble as ordinary
income. Since this possibility is not peculiar to corporate liquidations but would ariso
in the case of any tn:mble exehllDge of a capital asset if tbe amount re.'l1ized did not
have an ascertainable fair market value, an evaluation of it is beyond the scope of
this work. It may be noted, however, that section 483 was enacted to rench snlC3 of
capital assets for a consideration payable at a later time whose value was certmn or
likely to increase by reason of the delay-the functional equivalent of interest-and
open liquidations do not necessarily involve such circumstances; nor does an opro
liquidation seem to fit the statutory requirement of section 483(0)(1): "any p3j··
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shoe is on the other foot, however, if the shareholder claims a loss
on the liquidation on the ground that assets of this type should
be taken into account at a low or nominal value. Here the Service
may argue that the difficulty of valuing such assets makes the
shareholder's claim premature, and that no loss should be allowed
until the claims have been collected or sold.1e
If the $50,000 claim against Y in the preceding example had been
payable in five installments rather than in a single payment, sub~
sequent collections by the distributee shareholder, A, in the closed
liquidation situation raise a further timing problem, viz., whether
A is entitled to recover his $30,000 basis before reporting gain, or
must instead report a ratable portion of each installment collec~
tion ($50,000 less $30,000 over $50,000, or 40 per cent) as ordinary
ment •.. under a contract •.• under which some or an of t1le payments aro allo 1110ro
t1lan a 'Year after t1le date of SlIch sale or exchange." This statutory language might,
arguably, be satisfied if the property of uncertain value consists of a right to receive
property or money at a later date, especially if the corporation itself would have beon
subject to section 483 had it retained the claim, but this would involve only a limited
class of open liquidations. It is not clear, however, that delayed paymonts by someone
other than the buyer of the capital assets in question can constitute unstated interest
under section 483. See Reg. § 1.483-1(b) (1) (section 483 not applicable to share·
holder complete liquidation exchanges). But see sections 1.483-1 (f) (6) (ii) (0) and (iv)
Ex. 2 of the regulations, dealing with transfers of obligatiens having potential section
483 interest income and the treatment of the transferee of such an obligation.
16 Leading open liquidation cases include Comm'r v. Carter, 170 F.2d 911 (2d Oir.
1948) (involving oil brokerage commission contracts); Henry A. Kuckenberg, 19 T.C.:M.
1546 (1960) (partially completed construction contract); Co='r v. Doering, 335 F.2d
738 (2d Cir. 1964) (contested movie distribution contract riglits); Stephen H. Dorsey,
49 T.C. 606 (1968); Morris Schapiro, 27 T.C.M. 205 (1968); Shea Co., 53 T.O. 185
(1969), acq. (contested corporate claims justified open liquidation treatment to share-
holders).
In Miller v. United States, 235 F.2d 553 (6th Cir. 1956), a liquidation in which specu-
lative second mortgage notes were distributed was held to be open because a fair market
value could not be ascribed to them. But on collecting the amounts due, the taxpayer
was held to realize ordinary income rather than capital gain because, at the time of
the collection, there was not a sale or exchange of the notes; tho sale or exchange
character of the liquidation itself did not supply this element. Miller v. United States,
262 F.2d 584 (6th Cir. 1958), citing Osenbach v. Commissioner, 198 F.2d 235 (4th Oir.
1952), involving a section 333 liquidation. Revenue Ruling 58-402, 1958-2 O.B. 10,
however, seems to assume that capital gain would be achieved in an open liquidation.
For closed liquidation cases, see Campagna v. United States, 290 F.2d 682 (2d Ou.,
1961) (second mortgage contracts); Chamberlin v. Co='r, 286 F.2d 850 (7th Oir.
1960) (patent royalty rights); Grill v. United States, 303 F.2d 922 (Ct. 01. 1962)
(film distribution contract); Pat O'Brien, 25 T.C. 376 (1955) (movie distribution con·
tract); United Mercantile Agencies, 34 T.C. 808 (1960) (delinquent accounts receiv-
able); Slater v. Co='r, 356 F.2d 668 (10th Cir. 1966); Waring v. Comm'r, 412 F.2d
800 (3d Oir. 1969) (patent royalty rights).
For cases involving losses claimed by shareholders, see Palmer v. United Statos,
58-1 U.S.T.C. 'lI 9288 (D. Conn. 1958); and Charles A. Dana, 6 T.O. 177 (1946). Boo
also Warren v. Comm'r, 193 F.2d 996, 1001 (1st Cir. 1952).
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"discount" income. The cases generally allow the basis recovery
approach if the claim is held to be speculative; otherwise, a ratable
portion of each installment must be reported as ordinary income
as collectedP It should be noted that a distributed asset may be
sufficiently ascertainable in value to require closing the liquida-
tion, but be speculative enough to allow a recovery of basis before
further gain or loss must be reported thereon.
A further aspect of this problem is illustrated by Warren v.
United States/8 where the court held that a distribution in liquida-
tion of an overriding royalty interest in oil property was a closed
transaction and that subsequent collections in excess of the prop-
erty's basis were reportable as ordinary income. The court noted
that the shareholders acquired income producing property from the
liquidating corporation in exchange for their stock and that subse-
quent receipts of income from that property were not converted into
deferred liquidation capital gain merely because the property in-
terest was acquired in a liquidation distribution. In short, open
liquidation treatment may be limited to distributions of claims
representing potential income at the corporate level (viz., cor-
porate receivables in the nature of "income in respect of a deced-
ent" items defined in section 691,13 as opposed to distributions of in-
come producing assets). It may be that items of the latter category
should be assigned a market value basis under section 334(a)
equal to the fair market value (even if it is difficult to ascertain,
as was done in Burnet v. Logan, for estate tax purposes), so that
they will produce a postliquidation flow of fully taxable income in
the hands of shareholders (less any allowable deductions for de-
preciation or amortization) unrelated to the prior liquidation
transaction. While the courts, other than the Warrell, opinion, have
not specifically adopted this approach as the key to their decisions
on an open versus closed liquidation issue, the results in many of
these decisions can be classified with surprising accuracy in this
manner.
One final point: If the assets distributed to the shareholder in
either an open or closed liquidation represent potential income
17 See .Toseph.T. Weiss, 24 T.C.M. 79 (1965) (instrulment collections on closed liquida-
tion claim. reportable partly as ratable discount income und partly as recow~ry of
basis); General Insurance Agency, Inc., 26 T.C.M. 656 (1967), aff'd, 401 F.2d 324,
5597 (4th eir. 1968) (same); Neil S. McCarthy, 22 T.O.:M. 129 (1963) (recoYlll'j' of
basis allowed). See generally Wingate E. Underhill, 45 T.e. 489 (1066).
18171 F. Supp. 846 (Ot. 01. 1959).
19 See Ferguson, Income and Deductions in Respeot of Decedents and Related Probe
lems, 25 TAX L. REv. 1 (1969).
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items earned or about to be realized by the liquidating corporation,
avoidance of the corporate tax on such items by timely distribution
raises assignment of income problems and related difficulties which
are considered later in this article.
Effect of Liabilities on Shareholder's Gain or Loss
If the shareholders assume, or take property subject to, liabil-
ities on a complete liquidation, their gain or loss must be com-
puted with this in mind.
Thus, if property with a gross value of $100,000, but subject to
a liability of $40,000, is distributed in complete liquidation to a
shareholder whose stock has a basis of $50,000, his realized gain
on the distribution is $10,000, i.e., the amount realized under sec-
tion 1001 on the liquidation exchange is the net value of the dis-
tribution.20 If the liability is unknown at the time of distribution,
or is so speculative or contingent that it is properly disregarded in
computing the shareholder's gain or loss on the liquidation, a
later payment of the debt by the shareholder will probably gen-
erate a capital loss under Arrowsmith v. Commissioner,21 rather
than a deduction from ordinary income, on the theory that his
capital gain on the liquidation was overstated.
Judicial Exceptions to Section 331(a)(1)
No statute, except a new one, is innocent of judicial exceptions.
Suppose a taxpayer acquires all the stock of a corporation for the
sole purpose of liquidating the corporation in order to use its
assets (e.g., a stock of merchandise that is in short supply) in his
own business. If by reason of market fluctuations there is a dif-
ference between the cost to him of the shares and the value of the
assets at the time he liquidates the corporation, is the gain or loss
recognized! On the ground that such a transaction is in substance
no more than a purchase of assets, rather than a purchase of stock
and a liquidation of the corporation, it was held that no gain is
recognizable in H.B. Snively.22
20 Ford v. United States, 311 F.2d 951 (Ct. Cl. 1963).
21. 344 U.S. 6 (1952). See also Note, Taz Treatment of Stookholder·Transferecs' PGlJ.
ments in Satisfaction of Dissolved Oorporation's Unpaid Debts, 61 YALE L.J. 1081
(1952). The shareholder's payment of the debt may be treated as a constructive pay·
ment by the corporation, entitling it to a deduction if a direct payment by it would have
been deductible. See Royal Oak Apartments, Inc., 43 T.C. 243 (1964), aoq.
2219 T.C. 850 (1953), aff'd, 219 F.2d 266 (5th air. 1955). See also Lowndes v. United
States, 384 F.2d 635 (4th Cir. 1967) (ordinary income on bargain purchase of stock of
dormant corporation whose sole asset was cash).
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As to the income produced in the interim by the corporate assets,
however, the court held that it should be taxed to the corporation,
rather than to the stockholder, despite the plan to liquidate:
The stock purchase coupled with the intent to dissolve the corporation and
the taking of some steps to that end, in our opinion did not ipso facto
either destroy the existence of the corporation as a taxable entity or permit
the petitioner to appropriate as his own income which would otherwise be
taxable to the corporation.23
A purchase of stock was similarly treated as the equivalent of a
purchase of assets in Ruth M. Oullen,,24 where a shareholder of a
corporation bought out the other shareholders, with the intention
of liquidating the corporation and operating its business as a sole
proprietorship. Although the price paid for the stock (book value)
exceeded the value of the liquidating distribution, the court held
that the taxpayer had not sustained a deductible loss, because at
the conclusion of the plan he "had neither more nor less than he had
paid for."
Strictly speaking, the Snively and Oullen cases need not be re-
garded as exceptions to section 881(a) (1), since that section neither
taxes gain nor allows the deduction of losses. These functions are
performed by sections 61(a) and 165(a); section 881(a) (1) merely
makes it clear that the stock of a liquidating corporation is to be
treated as though it had been sold or exchanged. For the same rea-
son, section 881(a) (1) does not preclude application of the Oorn
Products doctrine,25 with the result that a corporate liquidation
that is intimately connected to the shareholder's regular trade or
business might, in appropriate circumstances, produce ordinary,
rather than capital, gain or loss. The business function of such
stock overrides its technical definition as a capital asset and re-
quires the gain or loss to be treated as an integral component of
the shareholder's regular business income.
BASIS OF PROPERTY RECEIVED m COMPLETE LIQUIDATION
Section 834:(a) provides that the basis of property received in a
complete liquidation shall be its fair market value at the time of
distribution, if gain or loss was recognized on its receipt.2ll (The
2319 T.O. at 858.
2414 T.O. 368 (1950).
25 Oom Products Refining 00. v. Oomm'r, 350 U.S. 46 (1955). SCD also Oomm'r v. Bag-
ley & Sewall Co., 221 F.2d 944 (2d Oir. 1955).
26 Recognized as Ulled in section 334(11.) probably memlB recognizable, so that the
failure to recognize gain or loss would not bar an application of the provision, though
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same result was reached under the 1939 Code, though without
explicit statutory authority.) It will be noted that the basis of the
stock given up in the liquidation, plus the gain or minus the loss
recognized on the liquidation, will equal the fair market value of
the property received. If no gain or loss is recognized on the
liquidation, because the stockholder's basis for the stock he sur-
renders happens to coincide with the value of the liquidating dis-
tribution, the basis of the distributed assets is their cost, i.e., the
value of the stock given Up.27
By tying the basis of the distributed property to its fair market
value on distribution, section 334(a) assures that the shareholder's
economic profit, measured from the time of his acquisition of the
stock to his sale of the liquidating distribution, will be recognized
in two steps; the difference between the cost of the stock and the
value of the distribution is taxed on liquidation; and the difference
between the latter amount and the proceeds of the property on an
ultimate sale or other disposition is taxed when the property is
sold. For examples, see columns (c) and (d) of the table above. As
noted in connection with these examples, the gain recognized on
the liquidation will ordinarily constitute capital gain under sections
331(a)(1) and 1221, but the character of the income or loss recog-
nized on the sale or other disposition of the property will depend
upon the nature of the assets in the shareholder's hands and on
whether the disposition qualifies as a sale or exchange under sec-
tion 1222. Assets constituting stock in trade when held by the cor-
poration, for example, may be capital assets when held by the
shareholder, or vice versa.28
It is important to note that the liquidation of a corporation that
ineonsisteney may permit the statute of limitations to be opened up un<ler seetion 1311.
But see Comm'r v. Estate of Goldstein, 340 F.2d 24 (2d Cir. 1965) (refusing to open
the barred year of liquidation, for want of ineonsisteney by taxpayer, even though
assets were later held suseeptible of valuation).
If the shareholders assume or take property subjeet to liabilities, their basis is the
uneneumbered fair market value of the assets. See Ferd v. United States, 311 F.2d 951
(Ct. 01. 1963); Crane v. Comm'r, 331 U.S. 1 (1947). But see Columbus & Greenville Ry.
Co., 42 T.C. 834 (1964) (basis does not inelude hypothetienlliability that is not expeeted
to be paid), aff'il per curiam, 358 F.2d 294 (5th Cir. 1966).
21 See I.R.C. § 1012. The values of the stoek and the liquidating distribution nre or.
dinarily identieal; if there is a diserepaney, there is authority for lotting tho vnluo
of the stoek eontrol. See Aveo Mfg. Corp., 27 T.C. 547, 556 (1956), acq.j Rov. Rul. 56-
100, 1956-1 C.B. 624. But see Philadelphia Park Amusement Co. v. United States, 126
F. Supp. 184 (Ct. CI. 1954); Moore-MeCormaek Lines, Ine., 44 T.C. 745 (1965).
28 See Greenspon v. Comm'r, 229 F.2d 947 (8th Cir. 1956); Aero Mfg. Co. v. Comm'r,
334 F.2d 40 (6th Cir. 1964). See also F. W. Drybrough, 45 T.O. 424 (1966), aff'iJ, 876
F.2d 350 (6th Cir. 1967).
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owns appreciated inventory assets will give the inventory a
stepped-up basis at the cost of a capital gain tax, a possibility that
may be of great advantage if the shareholders intend to continue
the business as partners. This opportunity to acquire a "cheap"
stepped-up basis often gives rise to disputes over the valuation of
such assets, and is an important incentive to use of the troublesome
liquidation-reincorporation device.20
LIQUIDATION FOLLOWED BY REINCORPORATION
The concept of complete liquidation normally envisions a ter-
mination of the liquidating corporation as an entity, either by a
sale of its assets to outsiders and a distribution of the proceeds to
the shareholders, or by a distribution of assets to the shareholders
so that they may either sell them or operate the business in non-
corporate form. (Sometimes these possibilities are combined: some
assets are sold by the corporation, others are distributed in kind
to the shareholders; and of the latter, some are sold by the share-
holders and others are employed by them in a noncorporate busi-
ness.) On occasion, however, the shareholders intend to conduct
the business in corporate form, but hope to obtain the tax advan-
tages of a liquidation, viz., a stepped-up basis for the assets at the
capital gain rate (or at no cost, e.g., when the stock was recently
inherited and has a basis equal to the value of the assets), plus an
elimination of the corporation's accumulated earnings and profits.
They may seek to achieve these goals by any of a number of routes,
which however complex usually fall into one of two categories:
(1) a complete liquidation of the original corporation, followed by
a prearranged tax-free transfer of all or part of the operating
assets to a second (usually newly organized) corporation under
section 351; or (2) a transfer by the original corporation of all or
part of its operating assets to a second corporation controlled by
its shareholders (which may, but need not, have been newly organ-
ized by them), for its cash or other property, followed by a com-
plete liquidation of the transferor corporation.
If these liquidation-reincorporation steps are collapsed and
treated as parts of a unitary transaction, the arrangement takes on
the character of a reorganization coupled with the distribution of
a boot dividend to the extent of the nonoperating or other liquid
assets that are not put into the new corporation. The twin factors
29 See Berg v. United States, 167 F. Supp. 756 (W.D. Wis. 1968) j Morton Ollendorfl,
18 T.C.M. 263 (1959).
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of continuity of business operation in modified corporate form and
continuity of shareholder investment (aside from the bail-out of
corporate earnings), lend support to this analysis. Alternatively,
it could be argued that the liquidation and reincorporation trans-
actions should be ignored as a sham, and the net distribution of
liquid assets to the shareholders treated as a dividend under the
general provisions of section 301.30 Finally, the relationship of the
stock redemption rules of section 302 and the partial liquidation
rules of section 346 to this general area remains to be fully worked
out, particularly in regard to the dividend equivalency tests of
these provisions. Note, however, that shareholder sales of stock of
one "related corporation" to another "related corporation" have
been materially restricted as a bail-out device by the express pro-
visions of section 304(a), although the effectiveness of section 304
in this respect seems to contemplate a preexisting related corporate
purchaser which has substantial earnings and profits, section
304(b) (2).
For the purposes of this article, only several basic aspects of
the liquidation-reincorporation problem will be briefly noted:
(1) For a reorganization, as opposed to a true liquidation, there
must be substantial continuity of shareholder proprietary interest
in the transferor (old) corporation and the transferee (new) cor-
poration.31
(2) Moreover, reorganization treatment requires a continuity
30 See Gregory v. Helvering, 293 U.S. 465 (1935); Bazley v. Commissioner, 331 U.S.
737 (1947); sections 1.301-1(1) and 1.331-1(c) of the regulations; and Revenuo Rul·
ing 61-156, 1961-2 e.B. 62, for suggestions and analogues of this approach.
Other general principles central to the reincorporation problem are illustrated by tho
Oourt Holding 00. decision and its radiations. In a sense the transactions described abovo,
if rearranged, are Oourt Holding 00. transfers of assets for stoc"k, coupled with a liqui.
dation of the transferor, which can thus be viewed as a reorganization.
31. For decisions denying reorganization treatment where shareholders of tho old cor·
poration ended up owning less than 80 per cent of the new corporation, sec Joseph e.
Gallagher, 39 T.e. 144 (1962); Commissioner v. Berghash, 361 F.2d 251 (2d Oir. 1060) ;
Estate of Henry P. Lammerts, 54 T.C. 420 (1970); Drummond v. United States, 1968-2
U.S.T.C. ~ 9608 (C.D. Cal. 1968). Note that in determining common shareholder con·
tinuity for this purpose, the constructive ownership rules of section 318 do not apply.
For decisions finding a reorganization where common share1lolder continuity was
wholly, or virtually, complete, see James Armour, Inc., 43 T.e. 295 (1965); Moffatt v.
Commissioner, 363 F.2d 262 (9th Cit. 1966); Babcock v. Phillips, 312 F.2d 240 (10th
Cir. 1967); Werner Abegg, 50 T.C. 145 (1968), aff'a, 429 F.2d 1209 (2d Cit. 1970);
Ralph C. Wilson, 46 T.e. 334 (1966); :Mark E. DeGroff, 54 T.e. 59 (1910); Davnnt v.
Commissioner, 366 F.2d 874 (5th Cit. 1966); Reef Corp. v. Commissioner, 368 F.2d 125
(5th Cit. 1966); Revenue Ruling 70-240, 1910-20 I.R.B. 17 (May 18); American Mfg.
Co., 55 T.C. No. 21 (1970).
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of business enterprise from the old to the new corporation; if
corporate level business continuity is sufficiently interrupted, liqui-
dation treatment will prevaiJ.32
(3) The Service's nonreorganization theories treating the trans-
action either as a nonliquidation (continuing incorporation), or as
a functionally severable section 301 dividend paid concurrently
with a reorganization, have, as a general rule, not been adopted
by the courts; rather, the judicial analysis has ordinarily focused
on the traditional reorganization definition provisions.:13
(4) Where reorganization treatment has prevailed, the type D
reorganization ordinarily has been the definitional vehicle for this
result, although some courts have also, of late, applied the type F
definition to these transactions.34
(5) Cases :finding a reorganization have not always been
troubled by the lack of such technical niceties as an "exchange of
property for stock," a transfer of "substantially all" the old cor-
poration's assets, or a "distribution pursuant to the plan of re-
organization," all of which are literally required for :finding a
nondivisive type D reorganization-rather, these decisions have
shown a surprising flexibility in interpreting the provisions of sec-
tions 368(a) (1) (D) and 354(b) in this area.3l1
(6) The step transaction doctrine is of major importance in
this area, viz., whether the events are interdependent steps in a
32 Pridemark, Inc. v. Comm.'r, 345 F.2d 35 (4th Cir. 1965); Simon Trust v. United
States, 402 F.2d 272 (Ct. Cl 1968); Book Production Industries, Inc., 24 T.C.M. 339
(1965); Sharp v. United States, 263 F. Supp. 884 (S.D. Tex. 1966), Rommer v. United
States, 268 F. Supp. 740 (D.N.J".1966).
Corporate business continuity will not alone support a reorgnnizntioD, however, if the
transaction otherwise constitutes a liquidation: Willinm C. Kind, 54 T.O. 600 (1970),
acg.; Estate of Henry P. Lammerts, 54 T.C. 420 (1970).
33 See, eg., J"oseph C. Gallagher, 39 T.C. 144 (1962); Simon Trust v. United States,
402 F.2d 272 (Ct. Cl 1968); Estate of Henry P. Lammerts, 54 T.O. 420 (1970);
William C. Kind, 54 T.C. 600 (1970); American Mfg. Co., 55 T.O. No. 21 (1970).
But in the Davant and Beef Corp. decisions, the Trcnsury's nonreorgnnization ap-
proach received its first judicial support, although the courts thero nlBo found n tradi-
tional reorganization, under section 368(a)(1)(D) and section 3G8(n)(1)(F).
S4 See cases cited notes 31 and 32 supra. The Dat'ant and Bcol Corp. cases found a
type F reorganization (in addition to a type D). Sco aZso Estate of StaWYer v. Comm'r,
403 F.2d 611 (9th air. 1968); .Associated Machine v. Comm.'r, 403 F.2d 622 (9th Cir.
1968). For a contrary view on the type F reorgnnizntion point, sco Rev. Rul. 69-185,
1969-1 C.B. 108. See Pugh, Tho F Bcorgani::ation: Beveille for a Slccpino G(ant!, 24
TAX L. REv. 437 (1969).
35 See, e.g., the James Armour, MOffatt, Abcg!J, Wilson, DeGrOff, Dat'ant, American
Mfg. and Beef Corp. cases, note 31 supra. Sco also David T. Grubbs, 39 T.O. 42 (1962)
(constructive distribution found on facts, hence, type D reorgnnizntion resulted).
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unitary transaction (if so, usually a reorganization is found) or
are unrelated transactions (which usually results in a finding of
liquidation) .36
LIQUIDATION OF CONTROLLED FOREIGN CORPORATIONS
Under pre-1962 law, the shareholder's gain on a sale of stock in
a foreign corporation, on some redemptions of stock, and on a par-
tial or complete liquidation of the corporation constituted, with
minor exceptions, capital gain. Rather than repatriate its foreign
earnings in the form of dividends taxable as ordinary income,
therefore, the shareholders of a foreign corporation might allow
the earnings to accumulate and then sell their stock or liquidate
the corporation, reporting their profit as long-term capital gain.
To discourage such transactions, section 1248 was enacted in
1962 to require the gain realized by certain United States persons
on the sale, exchange or redemption of stock or on the liquidation
of a controlled foreign corporation to be treated as a dividend to
the extent of the earnings and profits that were accumulated after
1962 and during the period the shareholder held his stock.
Nonrecognition of Shareholder Gain in Elective
One Month Liquidations Under Section 333
INTRODUCTION
Section 333 provides that under certain circumstances, a share-
holder's gain on the complete liquidation of a corporation may go
unrecognized, if he and enough other shareholders so elect. Its
principal function is to permit a corporation holding appreciated
property, but having no earnings and profits or cash, to be liqui-
dated without the recognition of gain by its shareholders. If the
corporation has any earnings and profits or if it distributes either
cash or stock or securities acquired by it after December 31, 1953,
the shareholder's gain will be recognized in whole or in part, de-
pending upon certain conditions described hereafter. In return
for the nonrecognition of gain under section 333, the Code exacts
the usual price of nonrecognition: The shareholder's basis for the
assets received on the liquidation is the same as his basis for the
stock surrendered (adjusted under section 334(c) if any gain was
recognized). The result is that on selling the assets (and assuming
86 See generally William C. Kind, 54 T.C. 600 (1970), acq.; Americnn Mfg. Co., 55
T.C. No. 21 (1970).
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no later change in "Value), the shareholder will recognize the gain
that went unrecognized at the time of the liquidation.
Section 333's antecedent, section 112(b)(7) of the 1939 Code,
was enacted only as a temporary expedient to encourage the liqui-
dation of personal holding companies, but the provision was revived
from time to time before 1954, and it now appears to be a perma-
nent part of the Code. Although designed to permit the painless
liquidation of personal holding companies, section 888 has never
been limited to such corporations but is applicable to others as
well.37
NONRECOGNITION OF GAIN UNDER SECTION 883
The special rules of section 833 apply only to the gain, of a
qualified electin,g shareholder on the complete liquidation of a
domestic corporation. Section 333 is not applicable to:
(1) The loss of a qualified electing shareholder. Under section
1.3334(a) of the regulations such a shareholder may have a
gain on some shares, subject to section 833, and a loss on others,
unaffected by section 333.
(2) The gain or loss of a nonelecting shareholder.
(3) The gain or loss of an excluded corporation, defined as
a corporation which at any time between January 1, 1954, and
the date of the adoption of the plan of liquidation owned stock
possessing 50 per cent or more of the total combined voting
power of all classes of stock entitled to vote on the plan. Such
a corporation may not elect to come under section 383, and its
stock is not counted in determining whether sufficient other
shareholders have elected to bring section 838 into play for them.
(4) A collapsible corporation, subject to two exceptions.llS
31 Apparently the provision, enacted in 1938 primarily to permit the liquidation of
personal holding companies that had been recently subjected to unexpectedly heavy ta:!:
burdens, was made temporary because of II. fear that II. permanent provision for tn:t·free
corporate liquidations would encourage tho organization of corporations to be subse-
quently liquidated. Possibly the later adoption of tho collapsible corporation provisions,
by limiting the possibility of abuse, led Congress in 1954 to give section 333 perm!l..
nency.
See generally McGaffey, Tlie DeferraZ Of Gain in Onc·Mont1~ Liquidatlon8, 19 T.u:
L. REV. 327 (1964); and Emanuel, Section SSS LiquiiUltioM: Tho ProbZems Created
by Mamng Hasty EZectwns, 21 :I. TAXATION 340 (1964).
3S The exceptions are (1) II. collapsible corporation that meets the standards of sec-
tion 341(0); and (2) II. collapsible corporation to which section 341(11.) docs not apply
(e..g., one whose shareholders are exempt from section 341(1l.) because tho threo year
waiting period of seetion 341(d)(3) has expired). nev. Rul 51-491, 1957-:1 CoB. 232;
Rev. Rul 63-114, 1963-1 C.B. 74.
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When section 333 is inapplicable, the recognition of the share w
holder's gain or loss will be governed by whatever other provisions
of the Code are applicable. Ordinarily, this will result in full recogw
nition under sections 331(a)(1) and 1002. If the shareholder is an
excluded corporation, however, its gain or loss will go unrecognized
under section 332 if the liquidating corporation is an 80 per cent
subsidiary.89
A qualified electing shareholder does not recognize any gain on
shares owned by him when the plan of liquidation was adopted if
the corporation has no post-1913 earnings and profits, and if he
receives no money, or stock or securities acquired by the liquidating
corporation after December 31, 1953. Otherwise, the qualified elect-
ing shareholder must recognize his gain, if any, to the extent of the
greater of (1) his ratable share of the post-1913 earnings and
profits (computed under accrual principles) 40 or (2) the sum of
the money received by him and the fair market value of any stock
or securities so received which were acquired by the liquidating
corporation after December 31, 1953.41
In the case of a noncorporate shareholder, the gain which must
be recognized under the standards just described is taxable as a
dividend to the extent of the shareholder's ratable share of the
post-1913 earnings and profits,42 and the remainder, if any, of the
gain is taxable as capital gain. In the case of a corporate share-
holder, any recognized gain is treated as capital gain in its en-
tirety.43
When the shareholder receives cash in liquidation, section 333 's
requirement that his gain be recognized pro tanto is easily under-
89 Rev. Rul56-212, 1956-1 C.B. 170.
40 Although the shareholder's "ratable share of the earnings and profits" might
seem to embrace the earnings and profits applicable to stock held by him that is not
entitled to the benefits of seetion 333, as well as the portion attributablo to his seeUon aaa
stollk, the regulations made it clear that earnings and profits are taken into account only to
the extent applicable to the latter. Reg. § l.aaa-4(b) (1). See also section l.aaa-4(b)(2)
of the regulations, relating to the similarly ambiguous phrases IIassets recoived by him"
and "assets received by it" in sections aa3(e)(2) and (f)(I).
41 Cancellation of a debt owed by the shareholder to the corporation has been held
to constitute money received by him for this purpose. See Walker v. Tomlinson, 03-1
U.S.T.C. 'U 9119 (M.D. Fla. 1962). For the meaning of acquired, see Rev. Rul. 58-92,
1958-1 C.B. 174; Rev. Rul. 64-257, 1964-2 C.B. 91.
42 Section aaa (e) uses the phrase It treated as a dividend" to insure application of
the dividends received exclusion of section 116.
43 This seeming favor to corporate shareholders is now more apparent than real, slnee
corporate capital gains are taxable at 30 per cent (for 1971 and thereafter), while
dividends obtain the benefits of the 85 per cent dividends received deduction of seetlon
24a.
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stood: Since it would not be feasible to give the money a basis less
than its face value, the shareholder's gain must be recognized now
or never. When the shareholder receives other property, however,
it is feasible to postpone the recognition of gain by giving the assets
a basis equal to the basis of the stock surrendered, and section 33a
adopts this procedure as its underlying principle. An exception is
made, however, for stock and securities acquired by the liquidating
corporation after the cut-off date (December 31, 1953) ".: These
assets are thrown by section 333 into the same category as money,
requiring the immediate recognition of the shareholder's gain.
Absent such a restriction, the corporation could, in advance of
liquidation, convert its money into investment securities and thus
frustrate section 333's requirement that the shareholder's gain be
recognized to the extent of any money received."tl
BASIS OF PROPERTY RECEIVED
If a shareholder takes advantage of section 333, the basis of any
property (other than money) received by him is prescribed by sec-
tion 334(c). The underlying principle is that the basis of the share-
holder's stock in the liquidating corporation is carried over and
becomes the basis of the property received in exchange. More ex-
plicitly, section 334(c) provides that the basis of the property re-
ceived is the same as the basis of the stock, less any money received
and plus any gain recognized under section 333:1G
44For 1970 liquidations, section 917 of the Tax: :Reform Act of 1969 relnxed tho 1953
cutoff date of section 333 in a minor respect.
45 The corporation may reduce its cash position by paying oil indebtedness or pur-
chasing property other than stock or securities, but there is 0. possibility thnt such 1J.
transaction might be treated as an indirect cash distribution to the shareholdera. An-
other possibility wou!d be to distribute cash and liquid securities to shnreholdem with
loses t.o absorb them; here, however, the Service may contend thnt nIl the llSseta 'Were
in effect distributed ratably to the shnreholders and then exchanged among them. For
a similar approach in the ease of non pro rnta trust distributions of Eelected D.£seta to
different beneficiaries, see :Rev. EuI. 69-486, 1969-2 C.B. 159. An attempt to strip the
corporation of post-1913 earnings and profits by dividend distributions to corporate
shareholders (who can claim the section 243 deduction) or to shareholders with losses,
runs the risk of being treated as part of 0. complete liquidation distribution, thereby
failing to comply with the condition of section 333(0.) (2) that nIl the property ba dis-
tributed "within some one c:l1endar month. "
46 See Reg. § 1.334-2; Garrow v. Comm'r, 368 F.2d 809 (9th Cir. 1906). Sec also Ro••
Eu!. 66-81, 1966-1 C.B. 64 (requiring part of basis to be nIlocated to goodwill). Al-
though section 334(e) says nothing about liabilities, the regulations contain pro.isions
for adjusting the basis of the property received if the shareholder nrsume3 or ttilics
property subject to liabilities. Reg. § 1.334-2. See also Rev. :RuI. 9S, 1953-1 C.B. 102,
and, for analogous provisions, section 1031(d). Note section 1223(1) for "tnclring"
the holding period of the shareholder's stock t~ the acquired oESeta.
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As is ordinarily the case when the basis of property given up in
a nontaxable exchange is substituted for the basis of property re-
ceived, section 334(c) has as its purpose the recognition, when the
assets are sold or otherwise disposed of, of the gain that went
unrecognized at the time of the liquidation. Because a section 333
liquidation is a closed rather than open transaction, however, the
character of the gain or loss ultimately realized by the shareholder
on the distributed assets depends upon whether they are capital or
ordinary assets in his hands, and on whether his disposition of them
is a "sale or exchange" under section 1222. Thus, in Osenbaoh v.
Commissioner,47 gain realized by the shareholder on collecting
claims that had been distributed to him in a section 333 liquidation
was taxed as ordinary income, although a substantial portion of it
would have been taxed as capital gain at the time the claims were
distributed to him had the transaction been a normal section
331(a) (1) liquidation.48
Under the Osenbaoh principle, section 333 may be less advan-
tageous where the shareholders intend to sell or otherwise dispose
of the corporation's assets than a normal liquidation under section
331(a)(1) followed by sale or collection, even though section 333
permits deferral of the shareholder's tax until actual receipt of
money or its equivalent, while under section 331 the liquidation
itself is the taxable event. Thus, if a one man corporation holds
assets valued at $100,000, consisting of inventory worth $75,000
and investment property worth $25,000, and if the shareholder's
basis for his stock is $80,000, a section 333 liquidation (assuming
no earnings and profits) will be nontaxable and will result in a
basis of $60,000 and $20,000 for the inventory and other property,
respectively. On later sales of these assets, assuming no change in
values, the shareholder will realize $15,000 of ordinary income on
the inventory (if it retains its character as such in his hands) and
$5,000 of capital gain on the other property. Had he not elected
section 333, however, the liquidation would have produced capital
See generally Rev. Rul. 68-434, 1968-2 C.B. 137 (illustrating a temporlU'y negativo
basis figure under selltion 334(c) where cash exceeds shareholder stock basis).
47 198 F.2d 235 (4th air. 1952).
48 See Garrow v. Co='r, 368 F.2d 809 (9th Cir. 1966); Aero Mfg. Co. v. Comm 'r,
334 F.2d 40 (6th air. 1964) (section 332 liquidatIon).
It is arguable that postliquidation gain in an Osenbach type case might be char-
acterized as capital gain by an extension of Arrowsmith v. Commissioner, 344 U.S. 6
(1952), although the courts have not as yet applied Arrowsmith to closed liquidations.
See Campagna v. United States, 290 F.2d 682 (2d Oir. 1961); Grill v. United States,
303 F.2d 922 (Ct. 01. 1962). For possible application of section 1232(0.) to supply the
sale or exchange, see Rev. Rul. 66-280, 1966-2 C.B. 304.
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gain of $20,000, and, under section 334(a), a stepped-up basis
equal to their market values for the inventory and other property,
with no later gain when these assets were sold.
THE ELECTION .llID OTHER CONDITIONS OF SECTION 333
As stated earlier, section 333 is applicable only to the gain of a
qualified electing shareholder. We must now turn to the meaning
of this term and to the other conditions that bring section 333 into
play.
Qualified Electing Shareholder
Section 333 lays down these conditions to becoming a qualified
electing shareholder:
(1) The shareholder must own stock when the plan of liqui-
dation is adopted and must elect under section 333 within 30 days
thereafter. The time limit may be troublesome for a publicly held
corporation, especially since some shareholders may be unwill-
ing to vote for liquidation unless they can be assured that section
333 will be applicable.
(2) The shareholder must not be an excluded corporation-
one which, at any time between January 1, 1954 and the date the
plan of liquidation is adopted, owned stock possessing 50 per
cent or more of the total combined voting power of all classes of
stock entitled to vote on the adoption of the plan....o
(3) If the shareholder is not a corporation, he will quali:fy
only if elections are filed by noncorporate shareholders who own
stock, when the plan is adopted, possessing at least 80 per cent
of the total combined voting power of the noncorporate owned
stock entitled to vote on the adoption of the plan.
(4) If the shareholder is a corporation, it will quali:fy only
if elections are filed by corporate shareholders who own stock,
when the plan is adopted, possessing at least 80 per cent of the
total combined voting power of the corporate owned stock (other
49 Note that section 333 (b) looks to "stoek entitled to Yote on tho adoption of such
plan" of liquidation, thus taking in stoek that eaunot Yote for directors but ean, either
by charter or under loea! law, Yote on the plan. In point of fact, the corporation's
charter or loea! law, or both, ordinarily designate tho stoek that may Yote on dwale-
tum, but say nothing about a Yote on liquidation. See lOA FLE'l'am:n, PRIVATE Co!U'O-
RA!rIONS § 7968 (rev. ed. 1962). In referring to "stoek entitled to Yote on tho adoption
of such plan" of liquidation section 333(c)(1) may mean stoek entitled to Yote on
dissolution, though this is not entirely clear. Sec also section 1.337-2(b) of tho reguln.
tions, which seems similarly to confuse liquidation with dissolution.
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than stock owned by an excluded corporation) entitled to vote
on the adoption plan.
As the foregoing indicates, corporate and noncorporate share-
holders are taken separately; one group may make use of section
333 even though the other group rejects it. Moreover, a shareholder
may elect to come under section 333 even though his stock cannot
vote on the adoption of the plan of liquidation, but his election will
be effective only if enough voting stock of his group (corporate or
noncorporate) makes similar elections. Thus, the right of a share-
holder to employ section 333 depends upon the willingness of his
fellow shareholders to file elections.
Mechanics and Effect of the Election
Rigorous attention to the formalities of an election (e.g., timely
filing of the proper forms) is extremely important under section
333; although the Oommissioner has discretion to waive use of the
wrong form, it has been held that he cannot be compelled to do so.rlO
Because noncorporate shareholders must treat gain realized on
the liquidation as a dividend to the extent of earnings and profits, a
section 333 liquidation may be more costly than an ordinary sec-
tion 331 liquidation. Hence an election may be a major blunder if
an error is made in computing earnings and profits. In Estate of
Meyer v. Oommissioner,51 the shareholders were allowed to with-
draw their elections upon discovering that the corporation's earn-
ings and profits were not $80,000, as believed when the elections
were filed, but $900,000. (The shareholders had made the common
mistake of assuming that earned surplus was identical with earn-
ings and profits; the discrepancy was caused by earnings and
profits inherited in a tax-free corporate reorganization in an earlier
year, but not reflected in earned surplus.) The regulations, how-
ever, provide that the election is irrevocable, and other courts have
been less lenient than Meyer in cases involving an improvident
election.52
GO Lambert v. Co='r, 338 F.2d 4 (2d Cir. 1964). See also Virginill. E. Ragen, S3 T.C.
706 (1960). Occasionally a taxpayer has succeeded in getting a. privato bill enacted to
extricate him from a procedural error; see H.R. 1733, 85th Cong., 1st Sess., 103 CONGo
REO. 15912 (1957) (accountant's failure to file form on time).
G1200 F.2d 592 (5th Cir.1952).
52 Reg. § 1.333-2(b)(l) ; Raymond v. United States, 269 F.2d 181 (6th Cir. 1959);
Frank T. Shull, 30 T.C. 821 (1958). The Shull case was reversed on appeal, 271 F.2d 447
(4th Cir. 1959), to permit consideration of a second line of defense (that dissolution of
the corporation had occurred prior to a purported adoption of a plan of liquidation,
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Plan of Liquidation
Section 333(a)(l) requires that the liquidation be pursuant to
a plan of liquidation adopted on or after June 22, 1954.113
Complete Cancellation and Redemption of Stock
Section 333(a)(2) provides that the distribution must be "in
complete cancellation or redemption of all the stock." Despite this
requirement, Revenue Ruling 54-518 G4 permits the retention of the
liquidating corporation's charter (to protect the corporate name
against appropriation), so long as the corporation distributes all
of its assets and goes into a state of quiescence.
Transfer of All Property in One Calendar lJlonth
Section 333(a) (2) provides that the transfer of all the corpora-
tion's property under the liquidation must occur "within some
one calendar month." No reason comes to mind for this insistence
on haste, which is, however, somewhat alleviated by a tolerant
attitude in the regulations toward arrangements for paying un-
ascertained and contingent liabilities.lll! Some relief also results
from the fact that under sections 1.333-1(b) (1) and (2) of the
regulations the month of distribution need not be the month in
which the plan of liquidation was adopted, and dissolution under
state law is not necessary.
SPECIAL RULES FOR LIQUIDATION OF CERTAIN PERSONAL
HOLDING COMPANIES
The Revenue Act of 1964 substantially tightened the personal
holding company provisions and special rules were added by sec-
tion 333(g) to permit the liquidation of corporations which become
personal holding companies because of these changes (so-called
would-have-been corporations). In general, if such a corporation
so that the 30 day requirement of section 333 'MUl not met), which WllS rejected by tho
Tax Court, 34 T.C. 533 (1960), but upheld on n. second nppcnl, :l91 F.::!d 080 (4th Cir.
1961). See also Harold O. Wales, 50 T.C. 399 (1968) (Fourth Circuit view in 81lun
regarding time of liquidation plan adoption followed).
58 For the term "plan of liquidation" see Knox v. CoIllDliJ;sioner, 323 F.2d 84 (6th
Cir.1964).
54.1954-2 C.B. 142
55 See R~g. § 1.333-1(b)(l) ; Estate of Lewis B. Meyer, 15 T.O. 850, 862-03 (1950),
1'6'V'd on other grounds, 200 F.gd 592 (5th Cir. 1952) i Rev. Rul. 66-286, 1966-1
<}.:13, 17~.
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liquidated under section 333 before 1967, securities distributed by
it were taken into account in computing the shareholder's gain
only if they were acquired after 1962 (rather than after 1953), and
the gain was taxed as capital gain. The rules for liquidations of
such corporations after 1966 were also liberalized, but not so sub-
stantially. Section 333 (g) 's repeal has been proposed by the
Treasury.56
Nonrecognition of Parent Corporation's Gain or Loss
on Liquidating a Subsidiary: Section 332
INTRODUCTION
As has been seen, section 331(a) (1) establishes the general rule
that a complete liquidation of a corporation is to be treated by the
shareholder as a sale or exchange of his stock, and section 1002
establishes the principle that the entire amount of the gain or loss
on the sale or exchange of property is to be recognized "except as
otherwise provided in this subtitle." An important exception to the
general rule that the shareholder's gain or loss is to be recognized
on a complete liquidation is section 332, providing that under cer-
tain conditions no gain or loss shall be recognized by a parent cor-
poration on the receipt of property distributed in complete liquida-
tion of a subsidiary. This nonrecognition provision is coupled with
a basis provision, section 334(b), which ordinarily requires the
parent corporation to take over the distributed assets at the sub-
sidiary's basis.57
The prototype of section 332 came into the Internal Revenue
Code in 1935; Congress hoped that it would encourage the simplifi-
cation of complex corporate financial structures by permitting the
liquidation of unnecessary subsidiaries without recognition of gain.
Since statutory mergers can be accomplished tax-free, it is not
surprising that Congress was willing to extend the same privilege
to the "practical" or "upstream" merger that results when a sub-
sidiary corporation is liquidated into its parent. Moreover, since
66 ILR. 17971, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. § 148 (1969) (the so-called deadwood bill).
61 See generally Weithorn, Lichfield & Brown, Liquidation of Corporato SUbsidiarios-
General, TAX MANAGEMENT PORTFOLIO 238 (1970). For discussions of section 112(b)
(6) of the 1939 Code, the predecessor of section 332, see Bustorud, Tho LiqUidation of
Subsidiaries under Section 112(0)(6), 58 YALE L.J. 1050 (1949); Colgan & Molloy,
Tag;.Free Liquidations of Corporate Subsidiaries under Seotion112(b)(6) of tho Internal
Revenue Code, 4 TAX L. REV. 305 (1949).
For the relationship of section 332 to the Iiquidation.reincorporation aroa, 80e Amori.
can Mfg. Co., 55 T.C. No. 21 (1970), holding that reorganization treatment supplants
section 332 treatment.
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the parent corporation ordinarily inherits its liquidated sub-
sidiary's earnings and profits and other tax attributes under sec-
tion 381(a) (1), the liquidation of a subsidiary is less appropriate
as a taxable occasion than the liquidation of other corporations.
Since section 334(b) provides that a parent corporation on liqui-
dating a subsidiary under section 332 must ordinarily take over
the assets at the subsidiary's basis, a later sale of the assets by the
parent will (assuming no change in values) require the recognition
by it of the gain or loss that would have been recognized by the
subsidiary had it made the sale. This result is in accord with sec-
tion 332's underlying assumption that the complete liquidation of
a subsidiary works a change of form rather than of substance. But
it will be noted that the parent's basis for its stock-representing
its investment in the subsidiary-is not taken into account, either
when the subsidiary is liquidated or when the assets thus acquired
are ultimately sold by the parent. Thus, section 332's assumption
that the elimination of the corporate veil between parent and sub-
sidiary should have no tax significance, though having much to
commend it, necessarily has the effect of obliterating forever the
parent's gain or loss on its investment in the subsidiary. This fact
is illustrated by the following examples:
Parent's basis for stock of subsidiary
Subsidiary's basis for its assets









In Example A., the parent has suffered a real loss of $25,000 (basis
of stock less value of liquidating distribution), but it will go un-
recognized, and on a sale of the assets (assuming no later change
in value) the parent will recognize gain of $35,000. In Example B,
on the other hand, the parent's gain of $25,000 will go unrecog-
nized, and a sale of the assets by the parent will produce a loss of
$10,000.58 Other combinations of basis and value are of course pos-
58These results under sections 332 and 334(b)(1) may be somewhat mitignted by
the fact that under section 381(a) (1) the parent will inherit the ~ ntmbute3 of tho
subsidiary. In Example ..4., there might be a loss carryover from the subsidinry, re.,ll1t·
ing from its earlier operations in which the investment of $100,000 was pared down to
assets with a basis of only $40,000; in Example B there would probably be e:u-nings and
profits resulting from successful operations in the past. :But it would be pure accident
if these offsetting tax advantages counterbalnnced the effects of sections 332 and
334(b) (1) with even the roughest degree of MCuracy.
For characterization of the parent's gain or loss on the sale, seD Aero Mfg. Co. v.
Commissioner, 334 F.2d 40 (6th Cir. 1964).
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sible, but all would have in common a disregard of the parent's
gain or loss on its investment in the subsidiary in order to treat
the liquidation as a matter of form only. As will be seen, most of
the problems under section 332 arise from attempts by the parent
corporation or the government, as the case may be, to escape from
section 332-which at least in form is not an elective provision-in
order to recognize the parent's gain or loss on its investment when
the subsidiary is liquidated.
CONDITIONS OF SECTION 332
Section 332 provides that no gain or loss shall be recognized on
the receipt by a corporation of property distributed in complete
liquidation of another corporation, provided (1) the corporation
receiving the property owns a specified amount of the distributing
corporation's stock; (2) there is a complete cancellation or redemp-
tion of all of the stock of the distributing corporation; and (3)
the transfer of the property occurs within certain time limits. It
has been held that the term "property" as used in section 332
includes cash, so that a liquidation in which nothing but money is
distributed is within section 332/i9 Although section 334(b) (1), re-
quiring the parent to carryover the subsidiary's basis for the dis-
tributed assets, cannot be applied to a distribution of money, the
cited cases point out that the subsidiary will have recognized gain
or loss on disposing of its assets, so that the function of section
334(b) (1) has already been discharged. If an all cash distribution
did not qualify under section 332, there would be an unwarranted
disparity between a liquidation that followed a sale of assets and
one that preceded the sale.
If the parent corporation does not intend to continue the sub-
sidiary's business (e.g., if the subsidiary's assets are sold, by either
the subsidiary or the parent, and the parent thereupon devotes the
proceeds of sale to a radically different line of business), the cases
have divided on the applicability of section 332. Judge Hand, in
59 See Tri-Lakes S.S. Co. v. Co='r, 146 F.2d 970 (6th Cir. 1945); International In-
vestment Corp., 11 T.C. 678 (1948) (overruling an earlier Tax Court Cllse to the con-
trary), aff'il per curiam, 175 F.2d 772 (3d Cir. 1949). See also Edwards Motor Transit
00., 23 T.O.Y. 1968 (1964) (cancellation of parent's debt in merger of parent into sub·
sidiary did not cause gain to parent).
See Friedman, ..Iill Cash Distributions Under Section 112(b)(6), 8 TAX L. REV. 3GD
(1953).
Rev. Rul. 69-379, 1969-2 C.B. 48 (superseding G.O.Y. 19435, 1938-1 C.B. 176), agrees
that section 332 applies to all cash liquidations.
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Fairfield 8.8. Gorp. v. Commissioner, said of section 112(b) (6) of
the 1939 Code (the predecessor of section 332) that its "underlying
purpose was to permit the union in one corporate form of a single
business or venture which had theretofore been managed by two
corporations" and that "the privilege assumes that the business
shall continue and that the liquidation shall not be merely a step
in winding it up." 60 In Inter-national Investment Corp.,Ol however,
the Tax Court rejected the theory that there must be a "continua-
tion of the precise business of the liquidated subsidiary by the
parent," though hinting that section 332 might be inapplicable if
(as in the Fairfield 8.8. Corp. case) both the subsidiary and the
parent were liquidated.
If the subsidiary is insolvent, and its shareholders receive noth-
ing on the liquidation, section 332 is inapplicable since there has
been no "receipt by a corporation of property distributed in com-
plete liquidation of another corporation." In this event, the share-
holders may deduct their loss on the worthless stock under section
165(g). This principle was applied in CO'1n'missioner v. Spaulding
Bakeries, Inc.,62 where a parent corporation that owned all the
common and nonvoting preferred stock of a subsidiary received
assets in liquidation with a value less than the liquidating prefer-
ence of the preferred stock. The court held that section 332 was
inapplicable, on the theory that nothing was received by the parent
in respect to its common stock. An alternative approach would be
to disregard the common stock because its equity was zero, and to
treat the preferred stock as all the corporation's stock under sec-
60157 F.2d 321, 323 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 329 U.S. 774 (1946).
The Fairfielil Steamship case erroneously assumed that section 332 is npplicable to
the subsidiary's gain or loss, whereas it is confined to the pnrent's gnin or loES, nnd nn
addendum to the opinion fails to clear up the confusion. See Kurtz, ..4. Critique of the
Fairjielil Steamship Case, 25 TAXES 612 (1947); Tnx: Notes, 32 A.B.A.J. 516 (1946).
But the court's view that the provision was enacted to de:l1 with continuatiol13, rnther
than windings up, of the subsidinry's business was well founded, e\'en though tho court
wrongly thought this was dispositive of the issue before it.
In Aero Mfg. Co. v. Commissioner, 334 F.2d 40 (6th Gir. 1964), where tho pnrent
corporation immediately sold tho assets of its liquidated subsidiary, the court held that
the character of those assets did not earry over from tho Bubsidiary to the pnrent. If
the court had applied the Fairfield Steams71ip principle, tho liquidntion would hn\'e been
a taxable event, giving the parent 1I. basis for the distributed nssets undor section
334(a) equal to their fair market value.
Moreover, Revenue Ruling 69-172, 1969-1 C.B. 99 (invol¥ing combined liquidntions
of a parent and its subsidiary), apparently nssumed nonapplication of the Fairfield
Steamship principle.
6111 T.C. 678 (1948), aff'd per curiam, 175 F.2d 772 (3d Cir. 19:19).
62252 F.2d 693 (2d air. 1958).
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tion 332(b)(3), in which event the parent's gain or loss on the
preferred stock would go unrecognized under section 332.63
Turning now to the conditions mentioned above for the applica-
tion of section 332:
Eighty Per Cent Stock Ownership
Section 332(b)(1) provides that section 332 shall apply only if
the parent corporation owns (1) stock possessing at least 80 per
cent of the total combined voting power of all classes of stock en-
titled to vote, and (2) at least 80 per cent of the total number of
shares of all other classes of stock (except nonvoting stock which
is limited and preferred as to dividends), and that this amount of
stock must be owned on the date the plan of liquidation is adopted
and at all times thereafter until the receipt of the property. In view
of this condition, can section 332 be avoided by a sale of stock,
either before the plan of liquidation is adopted or between that date
and the receipt of the property, so as to reduce the parent's owner-
ship below the 80 per cent bench marki (The parent might wish to
avoid section 332 in order to take a loss on the liquidation, or it
might be willing to recognize gain to get a stepped-up basis for
the assets and to forestall inheriting the subsidiary's earnings and
profits.) In Commissioner v. Day & Zimmermann, Inc., such a sale
by the parent for the sole purpose of avoiding section 332 was held
to be effective.64 The shares were offered for sale at a public auction
63 Of. Helving v. Alabama Asphaltic Limestone Co., 315 U.S. 179 (1942). Seo also
Norman Scott, Inc., 48 T.C. 598 (1967) (merger of insolvent brother corporation into
solvent sister corporation qualified as valid A reorganization-parent subsidiary liqui·
dation cases distinguished) ; Rev. Rul. 68-602, 1968-2 C.B. 135.
64.151 F.2d 517 (3d Cir. 1945). Whatever criticism may be directed against the Day
!f Zimmermann, Inc. case as an interpretation of section 112(b) (6) of the 1939 Code,
a statutory amendment in 1954 tends to support it as an interpretation of sectlon 332
of the 1954 Code. Under section 112 (b) (6), the parent not only was required to own at
least 80 per cent of the subsidiary's stock from the date the plan of liquidation was
adopted until the property was received by it (as required by section 332), but was
also forbidden to dispose of any stock during the intervening period. Because of tho
latter provision, a disposition by the parent of even an insigniflcant part of its holdings
made section 112(b)(6) of the 1939 Code inapplicable to tho liquidation. Thus, in
Avco Mfg. Corp., 25 T.C. 975, 979 (1956), nonacq., tho taxpayer successfully avoided
section 112(b)(6) by selling 200 shares of its subsidiary's stock for about $1,300,
thus reducing its proportionate ownership from 90.88 per cent to 90.85 per cont Il.I1d
clearing the way for recognizing a loss of about $6.8 million. See also Granito Trust
Co. v. United States, 238 F.2d 670 (1st Cir. 1956), endorsing the same practico; ono
of the transactions which successfully reduced the parent's stock ownership was a con-
tribution of two shares, worth about $130, to a charitable institution which surrondered
them to the subsidiary for a liquidating distribution of cash four days later. Tho gov-
ernment argued, unsuccessfully, that this transaction was not a gift of stock by the
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after the liquidation had been decided on, and were purchased by
the parent corporation's treasurer at "a fair pI'ice under all the
circumstances" with his own funds and at his own risk and without
"being directed by anyone to bid for the shares." Since the sub-
sidiarywas about to be liquidated and the amount of the liquidating
distribution (to be paid in cash) could be estimated with reasonable
accuracy, it is surprising that the transaction was given effect for
tax purposes.
If a corporation with 80 per cent or more of the stock of another
corporation can avoid section 332 by reducing its holdings to less
than 80 per cent, does it follow that a corporation with less than 80
per cent can bring itself within section 332 by increasing its hold-
ings ~ There is clearly no rule that the requisite 80 per cent must
have been acquired at one time. But what if some shares are ac-
quired immediately before a liquidation solely to qunlify7 The
requisite 80 per cent ownership must exist" on the date of the adop-
tion of the plan of liquidation. ' , Neither section 332 nor the regula-
tions thereunder, however, define the term "date of the adoption
of the plan." If the shareholders of the subsidiary adopt a resolu-
tion authorizing the directors to liquidate, the date of the resolu-
tion will probably be controlling in ordinary circumstances, but
if the parent corporation has previously decided to liquidate the
subsidiary and thereafter acquires additional shares solely in order
to meet the 80 per cent requirement, it may be held that the plan
of liquidation was informally adopted before the additional shares
were acquired. If the adoption of the plan is predated in this
fashion, the acquisition of additional shares, even though it occurs
before the formal meeting of the subsidiary's shareholders, will be
too late.65
parent, but an anticipatory assignment of cash. When the 1954 Code was enacted, tho
SO per cent rule was carried forward without ehange, but the no reduction in ownership
condition was dropped "with the view to limiting the elective features of the Eection."
S. REP. No. 1622, S3d Cong., 2d Sess. 255 (1954). A possible negntive inference is thnt
section 332 is still elective by virtue of the SO per cent rule, i.e., thnt C<lngrcs!l in euret
endorsed the Day go Zimmermann, Inc. case for post·1954: liquidations. Sco Granito TTU8t,
supra. The principal argument to the contrary is that if (kmgress intended section 332
to be elective, it would have provided explicitly for an option in the parent corporation,
instead of requiring it to resort to the hocus pocus of selling some of its stoclt.
65 In Granite Trust Co. v. United States, 238 F.2d 670 (1st Cir. 1950), tho govern-
ment argued that the plan of liquidation was adopted at least a month before the formal
meeting of the shareholders, in the form of a definitive determination by the parent
corporation to cause the subsidiary's liquidation, but the court did not find it ncccss3%'y
to pass on this contention. See section 1.337-2(b) of tho regulations to tho cficct that
the date of a plan of liquidation is not necessarily the date of the shareholders' meeting.
See R€V. Rul. 70-106, 1970-10 I.R-B. 11 (March 9), holding that redemption of 21.i
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Complete Cancellation or Redemption of All
the Subsidiary's Stock in Accordance With a
Plan of Liquidation
Section 332 is applicable only if the subsidiary distributes prop-
erty "in complete cancellation or redemption of all its stock."
Ordinarily this requirement is satisfied without any difficulty, since
in most cases the corporation distributes all of its assets, calls in
and cancels the stock certificates and dissolves under state law.
But the regulations provide that a dissolution is not required, and
even that the corporation may retain assets in a nominal amount
to preserve its legal existence; and it may be that some informality
in the liquidating process, though not to be recommended, will be
tolerated, as it is under section 331(a) (1).66 As to the requirement
of a plan of liquidation, section 332(b) (2) explicitly provides that
a shareholders' resolution authorizing the distribution of all the
corporation's assets in complete cancellation or redemption of all
the stock" shall be considered an adoption of a plan of liquidation"
if the transfer of all the property occurs within the taxable year,
even though no time for completing the transfer is specified in the
resolution. The term "plan of liquidation" is not necessarily re-
stricted to a shareholders' resolution, however; the statutory re-
quirement should be satisfied by a resolution of the direotors if
under state law they have the power to liquidate the oorporation,
and the government has on occasion argued that the term "plan"
embraces a determination by the oontrolling shareholder to liqui-
date, even though not reduced to writing.61
Timing of the Distribution
As already stated, section 332(b)(2) provides that the share-
holders' resolution authorizing the distribution will be considered
an adoption of a plan of liquidation, even though it speoifies no
time for completing the transfer, if the transfer is in faot oom-
pleted within the taxable year. Otherwise, the plan of liquidation
must provide for the transfer of all the property within three years
per cent minority interest (giving parent 100 per cent control) was part of singlo liqui.
dation plan, hence, parent did not have requisite control.
66 See Reg. § 1.332-2(c). See also Rev. Rut. 54-518, 1954-2 C.B. 142, tnldng a simi·
lar position under section 333. There appears to be a conflict between soction 1.332-2(0)
of the regulations and the requirement of section 332 (b) of a t t complote cancollation
or redemption of all the stock."
61 Rev. Rut 58-391, 1958-2 C.B. 139.
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from the close of the taxable year in which the first distribution is
made; and the transfer must be completed during this period. If
the transfer is not completed within this period, or if the parent
corporation does not remain qualified until the transfer is com-
pleted, section 332 is retroactively inapplicable to all distributions
under the plan.6s Because of this possibility, under section 332(b)
the Internal Revenue Service may require the taxpayer to post a
bond or to waive the statute of limitations on assessment and col-
lection, or both, in order to insure assessment and collection of all
income taxes attributable to the distributed property.
The provisions of sections 332(b)(2) and (3) suggest the pos-
sibility of avoiding section 332, when the taxpayer so desires, by
specifying no limit in the shareholders' resolution, spreading the
transfers out over more than one taxable year and adopting no
other formal plan of liquidation. In Burnside Veneer 00. 'V. Oom-
1nissioner,69 however, it was held that the statute was applicable if
the liquidation in fact was completed within the three year period,
on the ground that the resolutions of the shareholders and directors
and the local corporation law contemplated a prompt liquidation.
In another case, the Tax Court said: "There is no need for any
formal plan of liquidation if one can be discovered from the cir-
cumstances surrounding the liquidation." 70 These were cases in
which the taxpayer was seeking to avoid section 332 on the ground
that the arrangements for liquidation did. D~)t ttnrStitute lJ 8::::.\ ''TJ
ciently formal plan of liquidation to meet the statutory require-
ments. Had the courts acceded to the taxpayers' arguments, sec-
tion 332 would have become an almost entirely optional provision.
68 In Rev. Rul. 66-186, 1966-2 C.B. 112, the Service ruled that retention of nny :lS-
sets by the subsidiary will cause the transaction to flunk section 332.
On the other hand, in Cherry-Burrell Corp. v. United Stntro, 3G7 F.2d GG!) (8th air.
1966), the court held that an involuntary delay in the final distribution of assets (cnuscd
by litigation against the liquidating subsidinry) did not cause n forfeiture of the non-
recognition benefits of section 332. Application of equitnbile considerations in the inter-
pretation of the time limits of section 332 WllS, t~ sa.y the least, n highly unusun! ap-
proach; whether similar :flexibility would apply t~ the time schedulro of section 333 or
section 337 seems doubtful, although the Clierry·Burrell ease could prove helpful in
rescuing poorly advised taxpayers from the consequences of their inadvlll"tent dis-
qualification under these provisions.
69 167 F.2d 214 (6th air. 1948).
10 International Investment Co., 11 T.C. 678 (1968), aff'd per curiam, 1711 F.2d 772 (3d
air. 1949). See also Service Co. v. Commissioner, 165 F.2d 711 (8th air. 1948), holding
that the parent corporation could not use its failure t~ comply with the record heeping
provisions of section 1.332-6 of the regulations t~ avoid the llppUeatIon of section 332,
on the ground that these requirements were "promulgated primarily for the protection
of the revenue, not for the advantage of the taxpayer. "
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If it is the Commissioner who objects to the absence of a formal
plan of liquidation, however, deficiencies in the paper work may be
taken more seriously.
What if the plan provides, in accordance with section 332(b) (3),
that the liquidation is to be completed within three years, but the
distributions are deliberately spread out over a longer period7 The
final clause of section 332(b)(3) states that if the transfer is not
completed within the three year period, none of the distributions
will be considered distributions in complete liquidation. While this
clause can be used by the government to disqualify a nonconforming
transaction, it is not so clear that the taxpayer could avail itself of
a deliberate delay that serves no purpose. The parent might be
held, in such a case, to have received a constructive distribution
despite its willingness to wait until after the prescribed three yoar
period for an actual distribution.71
EFFECT OF SUBSIDIARY INDEBTEDNESS TO ITS PARENT
Section 332 provides for nonrecognition of gain or loss when
property is distributed to a parent corporation in complete liquida-
tion of its 80 per cent subsidiary. If the subsidiary is indebted to
the parent at the time of the liquidation, its property may be trans-
ferred to satisfy indebtedness, as well as in cancellation of its
stock. If the subsidiary is insolvent, so that there is no distribution
t~th respect tc. 'its :stock, the parent's loss is not subject to section
332. But even in the case of a solvent subsidiary, a distribution to
the parent in its capacity as creditor rather than as shareholder
permits recognition of gain or loss thereon by the parent.72
71 Compare the text with David T. Grubbs, 39 T.C. 42 (1962).
72 Reg. § 1.332-7; Rev. RuI. 59-296, 1959-2 C.B. 87. In its roport on section 332 of the
1954 Code, the Senate Finance Committee said: "Unlike the provisions of ••• tho House
bill, [section 332(c)] has ne application as respects tho tax treatment to tho parent upon
receipt of the asset in satisfaction of the indebtedness. In this conllllction, your commit·
tee intends that present law shall govern in the determining of the tax consequences of
such transfer." S. REP. No. 1622, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 256 (1954). For present law, S60
Houston Natural Gas Corp. v. Comm'r, 173 F.2d 461 (5th Cir.1949.)
If the subsidiary cannot satisfy its debt to the parent in full, tho parent will have
a bad debt deduction under section 166(a) or a worthless security deduction under soc-
tion 165(g).
Query whether the parent, if it wishes to bring the transfer of tllO subsidiary's assots
under section 332 (e.g., to inherit a loss carryover), could forgive the dobt and theroby
lay the foundation for a transfer of the subsidiary's assets in liquidation of the stock
(Rev. RuI. 68-602, 1968-2 C.B. 135, held no under step transaction principles). Seo
Stuetzer, Upstream Debts in Bection 112(b)(6) Liquidations, 5 TAX L. REV. 199, 209
(1950). Another possibility, if the subsidiary is indebted to the parout (or to II. third
party) in an amount exceeding the value of its assets, is that the debt will bo treatod na
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Before 1954, the Service took the position that the subsidiary
recognized gain or loss on such a transfer, if it satisfied its in-
debtedness to the parent with appreciated or depreciated prop-
erty.73 Because of difficulties in determining which of the sub-
sidiary's assets were used to satisfy its indebtedness and which
were distributed in exchange for the stock, however, the Service
later ruled that it would not insist upon recognition of gain by the
subsidiary if the parent executed a closing agreement agreeing to
carry over the subsidiary's basis for all the transferred property.
The 1954 Code has adopted this approach by providing in section
332(c) that the subsidiary recognizes neither gain nor loss on
transfers of property in satisfaction of indebtedness to its parent;
and section 334(b)(1) provides that the parent's basis for such
property shall be the same as the subsidiary's.14
Because section 332(c) applies only if the subsidiary is indebted
to its parent on the date of the adoption of the plan of liquidation,
preplan transfers of appreciated or depreciated property in satis-
faction of the subsidiary's debt to its parent will result in recogni-
tion of gain or loss to the subsidiary, and will also confer on the
parent a basis for the property equal to its fair market value at the
time of the transfer. If the subsidiary's anticipatory payment of
its debts is an integral part of the plan of liquidation, however, it
may result in a finding that the plan was adopted prior to the date
of formal adoption.
MINORITY SHAREHOLDERS
Under section 332, nonrecognition treatment applies only to the
parent corporation's gain or loss on the liquidation. Minority
shareholders must determine their gain or loss without regard to
section 332. Ordinarily such amounts will be recognized under sec-
the equivalent of stock (on the ground that the creditors ,vould ume over the corpora-
tion in the event of a bankruptey reorganization), thWl briDging section 332 into play
for the creditor. But see Northern Coal & Dock Co., 12 T.O. 42 (1949), aeq.
13 See LT. 4109, 1952-2 O.B. 138 (gain), declared obsolete by Rev. Rul. (,m-4G, 1969-1
C.B. 313; Northern Coal & Dock 00., 12 T.O. 42 (1949), acg. (loss). Sec also Rev. Rul.
70-271,1970-22 LR.B. 9 (June 1).
u Section 334(b)(1) carrying over the subsidiary's basis, is inapplicnblll to Kimbell-
Diamonilliquidations. In such cases, the parent's basis for the assets iB presumablj' their
fair market value. Section 332(c) itself is inapplicable to property transferred by un
insolvent subsidiary, siDce nothing is distributed with respect to its stock; hence, the
authorities cited in note 73 supra are probably applienble. But Revenue RuliDg 69-426,
1969-2 C.B. 48, held that basis of property received in satisfaction of subsidiary debt to
parent is determined under the enrryover rules of section 334(b) (1) even though assets
distributed re parent's stock in subsidiary got step-up treatment under swtion 334(b) (2).
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tions 1002 and 331(a)(1) ; but these shareholders may be entitled
to elect nonrecognition treatment under section 333.71:; It is also
possible that minority shareholders may be entitled to nonrecogni-
tion treatment by virtue of the reorganization provisions of the
Code. For example, if the liquidation of an 80 per cent subsidiary
takes the form of a statutory merger in which all of its assets are
transferred to the parent, and the parent issues its stock to the
subsidiary's minority shareholders as consideration for their rata-
ble interest in the subsidiary's property, the transaction may con-
stitute a tax-free reorganization under section 368(a)(1)(A). In
this event, neither the parent corporation nor the subsidiary's
minority shareholders would recognize gain or 10s8.76 Where the
parent owns less than 80 per cent of the subsidiary's outstanding
stock, however, tax-free acquisitions of the subsidiary's assets by
the parent and nonrecognition treatment for the minority share-
holders face greater technical difficulties, with the tax results de-
pending, it would seem, primarily on the form of the transaction.
Thus, in Revenue Ruling 54-396,77 the Service ruled that acquisi-
tion of all the assets of a 79 per cent owned subsidiary in exohange
for the parent's stock, followed by a liquidation of the subsidiary,
did not constitute a reorganization under section 112(g) (1) (C) of
the 1939 Code since the acquiring corporation, in substance, ob-
tained only 21 per cent of the subsidiary's assets in exchange for
its stock, the balance being acquired as a liquidating distribution in
exchange for the parent's 79 per cent stock interest.
BASIS OF PROPERTY RECEIVED BY PARENT CORPORATION:
SECTION 334(b)
In General: Section 334(b)(1)
Upon the liquidation of a subsidiary under section 332, the
property received by the parent-with an exception to be noted
hereafter-carries over the basis that the property had in the
hands of the subsidiary under section 334(b)(1). This is one
reason why parent corporations sometimes maneuver, ordinarily
with fair success, to remove a liquidation from the clutches of sec-
tion 332.
If the general rule of section 334(b)(1), carrying over the sub-
111 Rev. Rul ii6-212, 1956-1 C.B. 170.
16 Section SS2(b), last sentence; and Reg. §§ l.SS2-2(d) and (e).
111954-2 C.B. 147. To the same effect is Bausch BY Lomb 0I,ticnl Co. v. Comm'r, 207
~.2d 75 (2d air. 1959).
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sidiary's basis, were rigorously applied, it would create an un-
justified dichotomy between two otherwise similar methods of
acquiring the assets of another corporation: If the purchasing cor-
poration bought the assets from the second, its basis for them
would be its cost under section 1012, but if it acquired the assets
by purchasing the stock of the second corporation and liquidating
it, it would have to carryover the second corporation'8 basis. This
inherited basis might, of course, be substantially more or less than
the price paid for the stock, since the price reflects the market
value of the assets rather than the acquired corporation'8 basis
for them.
For this reason, in a line of pre-1954 cases the courts adopted
the position that the purchase by one corporation of the stock of
another corporation in order to obtain its assets through a prompt
liquidation should be treated as a single transaction, viz., a pur-
chase of the assets, producing a basis equal to their cost rather
than a carryover of basis. In the leading case, Kimbell-Diamond
Milling 00.,78 the single transaction doctrine was applied at the
behest of the Commissioner, so as to deny the purchasing corpora-
tion the right to carryover a basis in excess of the price paid for the
stock; but the Kimbell-Diam01zd principle has been applied to give
the acquiring corporation the benefit of its cost, where that ex-
ceeded the acquired corporation's basis.
The KimbeU-Diamond Exception: Section 334(b)(2)
Against this background, in 1954 Congress enacted section 334
(b)(2) to incorporate "rules effectuating principles derived from
Kimbell-Diamond Milling Co." 70 Section 334(b) (2) provides that
the parent corporation's basis for property acquired in a section
'1814 T.C. 74 (1950), ail'a per curiam, 187 F.2d 718 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 342 U.s.
827 (1951). See Montana-Dakota Utilities Co., 25 T.C. 408 (1955), acq.j KruulTIhn. GM
& Utilities Co. v. Comm'r, 214 F.2d 685 (5th Cir. 1954) j Georgia·Pacific Corp. v.
United States, 264 F.2d 161 (5th Cir. 1959) j United States v. :M:.O.J". Corp., 274 F.2d
713 (5th Cir. 1960) j United States v. :Mattison, 273 F.2d 13 (9th Cir. 1959) j Gris-
wold v. Comm'r, 400 F.2d 427 (5th Cir. 1968) (stock purchasC!, liquil1D.tion nnd rein-
corporation, held a tax-free reorganization with carryover basis). Sce also Frederick
Steel Co., 42 T.C. 13 (1964) (doctrine not applied where both corporations were under
common control).
'19 S. :REP. No. 1622, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 257 (1954). Sce gcnerally Lenis '" Schapiro,
Sale of Corporate Business: Stoel: or A.ssetsF, 14 N.Y.U. INsr. 745, 75D-GO, (1950) j
Mansfield, The Kimbell-Diamond Situation: Basis to the Purchaser in Connection with
Liquidation, 13 N.Y.U. INST. 623 (1955) j Pllulston, How to Plan. and Ezccuto tho SaID
of a Corporate Business "Under the InternallletJC1lue Code 0/1954, 1956 S. CALIF. I2lSl".
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332 transaction is the cost of the stock (with certain adjustments),
rather than the subsidiary's basis for the assets, if at least 80 per
cent of the stock was acquired by purchase as defined in section
334(b)(3), during a period of not more than 12 months, and if
distribution is pursuant to a plan of complete liquidation under
section 332 adopted not more than two years after the purchase.80
Of these conditions, the purchase requirement will probably cause
the most trouble, since section 334(b)(3) defines this term to ex-
clude (1) transactions in which the basis of the stock carries over
from the transferor (e.g., an acquisition by gift, contribution to
capital or tax-free reorganization) or is determined under section
1014 (inherited property) ; (2) acquisitions of stock in exchanges to
which section 351 applies; and (3) acquisitions from related persons
within the meaning of section 318(a).81 Thus, the statutory Kim-
bell-Diamond rule primarily applies to essentially one-shot pur-
chases of stock by the parent corporation from unrelated persons
in transactions that, as to them, are taxable events (i.e., in which
their gain or loss on the transfer is recognized).
Section 334(b)(3) (definition of "purchase") was amended by
Public Law Number 89-809 in 1966 to cure the timing problem
created by section 334(b) (3) (0) where a chain of subsidiaries was
acquired and liquidated into the parent in the wrong order, i.e.,
3S3; O'Malley, The Pitfalls of a Section 384(b)(2) Liquidation ancZ How to .il.voiil Them,
24 J. TAXATION 13S (1966); Sheppard, Depreciation Recapture: Some PracticaZ Prob·
lems in Working with Seotion 11145, 24 J. TAXATION 194, 196 (1966).
80 See section 1.334-1(c) (3) of the regulations, stating that the two year period
begins to run after the earliest date which is the end of a period of 12 months or less
within which the amount of stock required by section 334(b) (2) (B) was acquired. In
short, the time limits of section 334(b) (2) prohibit creeping acquisitions.
81 On the meaning of It purchase," see Bijou Park Properties, Inc., 47 T.O. 207
(1966) (not a qualified purchase because stock acquired from related seller within meaning
of section 31S); Baker Co=odities, Inc. v. Co='r, 415 F.2d 519 (9th Oir. 1969)
(stepped-up basis for assets acquired on liquidation of various subsidiaries denied for
lack of qualliied purchase: in one instance, acquisition of the subsidiary occurred in n
section 351 exchange; in the other, acquisition was from a "related person " beco.use of
the sidewise attribution rules of section 31S, prior to their elimination in 1964); stevens
Pass, Inc., 4S T.O. 532 (1967) (qualifted purchase, not a section 351 transnction).
On the possibility of backing into the SO per cent purchase requirement via a com·
bination of stock redemptions and market purchases of the stock, 806 Rev. Rul. 76-100,
1970-10 I.R.B. 11 (March 9), holding that if the redemptions were part of the llquido..
tion plan, section 332 did not apply to the parent because it did not have 80 per Ilent Ilon·
trol (the theory of this ruling could apply to section 334(b) (2) purcho.ses liS well, but the
result, denying section 332 protection, would ordinarily produce relatively lninor
realized gain or loss to the parent, at least if the liquido.tion promptly followed its
stock purchase; the parent would also obto.in a soetlon 334(0.) fair markot vnluo basJs
for the assets in view of the nonapplication of section 332).
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where stock of a first tier subsidiary is acquired by purchase and
assets of the second tier subsidiary are ultimately acquired by the
purchaser parent corporation after a prior liquidation of the first
tier subsidiary. Under this amendment, the parent can now liqui-
date the first tier subsidiary before liquidating the second tier
subsidiary and obtain section 334(b) (2) treatment with respect
to the latter's assets notwithstanding section 334(b)(3)(C).~
In keeping with the theory that a section 334(b) (2) transaction
is in substance a purchase of the assets by the acquiring corpora-
tion, it does not inherit the liquidating corporation's earnings and
profits or other tax attributes as it would in a normal liquidation
of a subsidiary by its parent. On the other hand, the purchase of
assets theme is not ordinarily carried to the point of holding that
the liquidating corporation realizes gain or loss on a hypothetical
sale of its assets to the acquiring corporation.83
1£ the conditions of section 334(b) (2) are satisfied, the parent
corporation's basis for its stock (including any stoek that may
have been acquired in an unqualified transaction) is to be allocated
among the assets received in the liquidating distribution in accord-
ance with the regulations.
Example: Assume that the value of X Corporation's assets and
its outstanding liabilities on December 31, 1964: are as follows:
82 Prior to this amendment, if the parent liquidated its first tier subsidiary before liqui-
dating the second, stock of the second tier subsidiary technictilly would Dot have been
acquired by purchase because of the attribution principles of section 334(b) (3) (0) j
if the order were reversed, hOmlver, section 334(b) (2) would apply to give the pll1'ent a
stepped-up basis for assets of the second tier subsidiary. In order to climinnte this
formal distinction, based solely on the order of liquidation of a chain of Bubsidiaril?3,
section 334(b) (3) was amended to provide that section 334(b) (3) (0) would Dot apply
to the parent's acquisition of the second tier subsidilll'y's stock if it mnde a qunllilcd pur-
chase of the first tier subsidiary's stock.
83 See section 381(a) (1) (transfer of tax attributes not applicable to section 334(b) (2)
transactions); Dallas DO'lVIlto'lVIl Development C<J., 12 T.C. 114 (1949), acq. (no gain
to liquidating corporation) j Steubenville Bridge Co., 11 T.O. 789 (1948), acq.; Conun'r
v. South Lake Farms, Inc., 324 F.2d 837 (9th Cir. 19(3) j but seo Idol v. Conun'r,
319 F.2d 647 (8th eir. 1963) j Blueberry Land Co., Inc., 42 T.C. 1137 (1964).
See also Bijou Park Properties, Inc., 47 T.O. 207, (196(1), which hold that the acquired
subsidiary did not recognize gain on the distribution of its n£Scts (coIlEisting of Ecction
453 installment obligations) in liquidation to the acquiring pll1'ent corporation. The
Blueberry Lana Co. case was distinguished as II. situntion where the subsidiary's nssefs
were, in substance, sold by it to the acquiring interests. In Cherry v. United StntC3, 264
F. Supp. 969 (C.D. CaL 1967), the taxpayer succeeded in obtaining II. stepped·up basis
for the section 453 obligations of the purchased subsidiary j in addition, the Bijou case "11M
followed in that gain was not recognized to the liquidating corporation on the distribu-
tion of such items.
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Mortgage on real estate $100,000
Unsecured bank loans 10,000
Total liabilities 110,000
Net worth $410,000
If P Corporation purchases all of X's stock on January 5, 1965
for $410,000 in cash, and immediately thereafter liquidates X,
the transaction would qualify under section 334(b)(2) and P
would be entitled to allocate the basis of its stock in X among
the assets received from X in the liquidating transaction, with
appropriate adjustments for the liabilities of P which were as-
sumed by X or to which X's assets are subject. P's basis for its
stock in X ($410,000) would be reduced by the $20,000 cash and
increased by the unsecured liabilities assumed of $10,000, re-
sulting in a $400,000 figure to be allocated among X's noncash
assets. .Allocation is then made in proportion to the relative net
fair market values, with an adjustment for liabilities that are
liens on particular properties, in this case the $100,000 real es-
tate mortgage. The net value of X's noncash assets is $400,000
(including the $20,000 of goodwill which would apparently sur-
vive liquidation, if P continued to operate X's business as a go-
ing concern).84 Accordingly, the basis for the acquired assets
would be computed as follows: inventory, $50,000 (5/40 X $400,-
000) ; receivables, $50,000 (same); machinery, $80,000 (8/40 X
$400,000) ; real estate, $300,000 (20/40 X $400,000, plus $100,000
mortgage liability assumed by P) ; and goodwill, $20,000 (2/40
X $400,000).
In this illustration, it was assumed that the liquidation occurred
immediately after P acquired X's stock. If the liquidation is de-
layed,85 the process of computing the parent's basis for the assets
84 North American Service Co., 33 T.e. 677 (1960) acq.; Rev. Rut 66-81, 1966-1
C.B. 64; FrankJ. Longo, 27 T.C.M.1075 (1968).
For allocation problems created by the presence of goodwill in a section 334(b) (2)
liquidation, see Harnack, The Oommissioner Is Looking for Goodwill, 40 TAXES aa1
(1962).
8Ci The plan of liquidation must be adopted within two years of tho last qualifying
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received may be complicated by a variety of events between the
date the stock is acquired and the date of the liquidating distribu-
tion. In. the interim, for example, the subsidiary may have sold
some of the assets, acquired others, made nonliquidating distribu-
tions to the parent, et cetera. The regulations describe and illus-
trate the adjustments required to take appropriate account of
such post-acquisition events.S6
Unlike the Kimbell-Diamond, doctrine as judicially formulated,
section 334(b) (2) is applicable without regard to the acquiring
corporation's intent, so that the assets will acquire a new basis if
the liquidation satisfies the statutory conditions, even though it
may not have been contemplated by the acquiring corporation when
the stock was purchased. Such an automatic application of section
334(b) (2) whenever the statutory conditions are satisfied, how-
ever, does not necessarily mean that Ki'11z,bell-Dia'1nonil has no con-
tinuing vitality when these statutory conditions are not satisfied.
Thus, a deliberate avoidance of the time limits for acquiring the
stock or liquidating the acquired corporation might, on a finding
of an intent to acquire assets, produce the same result as under
pre-1954 law; and even more clearly, the purchase of stock by an
individual with an intent to liquidate the corporation in order to
obtain its assets-a transaction outside of section 334(b) (2) be-
cause the purchaser is not a corporation-may be treated as a pur-
chase of assets.51
SPECIAL PROBLEMS OF SECTION 334(b) (2) LIQUIDATIONS
Because of the importance of section 334(b) (2) in the liquida-
tion area, comments on some problems in its scope and operation
are appropriate.
acquisition of stock, section 334(b) (2) (A) (li), and the liquidntion itself may bo spread
over a three year period after the plan is adopted, section 332(b) (3).
86 For illustrations of the mechanics of section 1.334.-1 (e) of tho regulations, sec
First Nat'! State Bank of New.Tersey, 51 T.C. 419 (1968) (parent allowed to step up
basis of liquidated subsidiary's assets to the ~ent tlmt subsidiary's rorninga and
profits were increased by a bad debt reserve income item, net of tmtes thereon, required
to be included in subsidiary's final return); Boise Cascade Qlrp. v. United States, 288
F. Supp. 770 (D. Idaho 1968), aft'il per curiam, 70-2 U.S.T.O. 'J 9595 (9th Cir. 1970);
Solari, Solving Asset Basis Problems Created by 331(0)(2) LiqUidations, 29 .T. TAXATIo:r
150 (1968).
81 See Rev. Rut 60-262, 1960-2 C.B. 114 (formal steps controlling under seetion 334
(b) (2), regardless of "purpose or intent").
The Court of Claims, moreover, in the first reported decision on the issue, hcld that the
Kimbell-Diamond doctrine did survive the enactment of section 334(b) (2), American
Potash & Chemical Corp. v. United States, 399 F.2d 194 (at. Ct 1968).
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Delayed Liquidation Problems
Because a purchased subsidiary does not have to be liquidated
immediately in order for the parent to qualify for the basis bene-
fits of section 334(b)(2), adjustments to the parent's basis for its
stock of the subsidiary are necessary to take account of the sub-
sidiary's operations between the date of the parent's purchase of
the stock and the liquidation, as well as its interim distributions,
earnings and deficits and other items. In prescribing the adjust-
ments, section 1.334-1(c)(4) of the regulations attempts to put
the parent in essentially the same position, for basis purposes,
as if the subsidiary had been liquidated immediately after the
parent purchased its stock.
The adjustments required are the following:
(1) Section 1.334-1(c)(4)(i-iv) provides that the adjusted
basis of the subsidiary's stock must be reduced by dividends dis-
tributed out of preacquistion earnings and profits. The theory
is that these earnings were in effect purchased by the parent
when it acquired the stock, so that distributions represent a
return of investment to the parent, somewhat analogous to the
"flat purchase" rules of regulation section 1.61-7 (c) in the case
of bonds purchased with defaulted interest arrears.
(2) Stock basis must also be reduced (but not below zero) by
liquidating distributions of cash or its equivalent under section
1.334-1(c) (4) (v).
(3) Stock basis is increased by unsecured liabilities (includ-
ing tax liabilities of the subsidiary) assumed or taken subject to
by the parent upon liquidation.
(4) Stock basis is also increased by a postacquisition earnings
and profits account (or reduced by a deficit therein). This ac-
count is a mechanism to equalize the stock purchase transaction
with a purchase of assets. Section 1.334-1(c) (4) (vi) of the regu-
lations states that in computing this account, accrual accounting
principles apply, and earnings or deficits are measured by using
an assumed basis for the subsidiary's assets, determined as if
the parent had promptly liquidated it at the time of the qualify-
ing stock purchase.
(5) Section 1.334-1(c)(4)(viii) denies a section 334(b)(2)
basis for property contributed by the parent, directly or incH-
rectly, to the capital of the subsidiary during such period.
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Once the adjusted stock basis is determined under these rules,
it is allocated under section 1.334:-1(c) (4) (viii) among the non-
cash assets of the subsidiary (net of liens on particular assets) in
proportion to their relative values. Liens are then added to the
basis of the assets to which they relate; if more than one asset is
covered by a lien, it is allocated among them in proportion to rela-
tive values.
These provisions can be illustrated by the following examples,
in which X Corporation, at the time its stock is purchased by Y
Corporation, owns depreciable equipment with a basis of $60
and a value of $100 (fully subject to section 1245), and inventory
with a basis of $40 and a value of $100 and has neither earnings
nor a deficit:
(1) If Y buys X's stock for $200 and promptly liquidates X, X
will realize $40 of ordinary income under section 1245 (which over-
rides section 336 in a section 334(b) (2) liquidation) and will incur
a tax liability thereon (assuming a 50 per cent flat rate) of $20;
Y's basis for the assets will be $220 ($200 stock cost plus the $20
tax liability of X assumed on the liquidation), allocable $110 to
the equipment and $110 to the inventory. No earnings and profits
adjustment occurs here because, for this purpose, X uses a hypo-
thetical basis for its assets of $200, viz., preacquisition apprecia-
tion is added to the subsidiary's true basis in this determination.
Since Y did not reduce its purchase price for the X stock to take
account of X's potential section 1245 tax liability, the premium
cost to Y in the form of X's section 1245 taxes gets added onto
Y's section 334(b) (2) basis for the assets.
(2) If Y operated X for a year instead of promptly liquidating
it, and X claimed $10 of depreciation on the equipment and sold
off its inventory (not in bulk) for $100 in cash, incurring a tax
liability of $25 ($60 profit less $10 depreciation, giving net taxable
income of $50), and Y assumes the tax liability upon liquidation,
Y's basis for the equipment would be determined as follows: $200
stock cost, less $100 cash, plus the $50 assumed tax liabilities of
X ($25 attributable to the inventory sales, net of depreciation, and
$25 of taxes on X's $50 of section 1245 gain), or $150. Here again
there is no hypothetical earnings or deficit adjustment because,
using the hypothetical point of purchase basis of $100, $10 of sec-
tion 1245 gain was generated by postacquisition depreciation and
that gain was offset by the $5 of postacquisition depreoiation (net
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of tax savings of $5 attributable thereto) and the $5 of hypotheti-
cal taxes that were attributable to such gain.
(3) If the inventory were sold for $120 rather than $100, ad-
justed stock basis would still be $150, viz., $200 stock cost, less
$120 of cash, plus $60 of tax liabilities ($35 tax on the inventory
gains of $70 after depreciation, and $25 on the section 1245 gain of
$50), plus $10 of postacquisition hypothetical earnings ($120 sale
price less $100 hypothetical basis, less $10 hypothetical taxes there-
on).
(4) If, instead of having Y assume its tax liabilities, X paid
them and distributed its remaining $60 of cash to Yon liquidation,
the result would be the same, viz., $200 stock cost less $60 cash plus
$10 earnings adjustment, or $150.
(5) If X instead paid a $60 dividend to Y out of current earn-
ings (there being no preacquisition earnings and profits), adjusted
stock basis would be $200-$200 stock cost, less $60 cash ($120 less
the $60 dividend), plus $60 of tax liabilities (the $60 dividend wiped
out the adjustment for hypothetical earnings of $10).
(6) If X had $30 of earnings at the time its stock was purchased
by Y, and distributed a $90 dividend to Y in (5) above, Y's ad-
justed stock basis again would be $200-$200 stock cost, less $30
cash, less $30 adjustment for dividends out of prepurchase earn-
ings, plus $60 of tax liabilities.
If these examples suggest that the better part of valor may be
a liquidation of the subsidiary immediately after the purchase
of its stock, then they have served their purpose.
Contingent Liabilities and Related Problems
While the regulations provide that liabilities of the subsidiary
assumed, or taken subject to, by the parent upon the liquidation
constitute an additional cost of the parent for the subsidiary's as-
sets under the basis rules of section 334(b) (2) 88 (as would be true
of a direct purchase of assets under section 1012), the treatment
88 See generally Rev. Rul 59-412, 1959-2 C.B. 108. But in Revenue Ruling 69-420,
1969-2 C.B. 48, the Service ruled that property received by tho parent in satisfaction
of the subsidiary's debt to the parent took a camJ01Jcr basis under section 334(b)(1),
even though the transaction otherwise qualified as a section 334(b) (2) liquidation, since
property received in its capacity as a creditor did not qualify for the benofits of scction
334(b)(2). In Revenue Ruling 70-271, 1970-22 I.R.B. 9 (June 1), the Service held that
corporate debts assumed by the shareholders in the context of a reorganization liquida-
tion of the corporation could be added to the section 358 basis of the stock received by
the shareholders in the exchange.
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of contingent liabilities is less clear. One approach would be to
estimate the amount of such liabilities at the time of liquidation
and to include this amount in the basis computation, adjusting the
basis when subsequent events finally determine the exact amount
of those liabilities. Support for this approach exists in Revenue
Ruling 55-119,89 relating to the basis of property purchased in
exchange for a private annuity. Another approach, recently
adopted by the Tax Court in Pacific Transport 00.,00 is to ignore
contingent liabilities initially under section 334(b)(2), but to al-
low the parent an expense deduction when the liability becomes
fixed or is paid. A third possibility, asserted by the Service in the
Pacific Transport case but rejected by the court, is to hold the
basis adjustment open (somewhat on the order of an open liquida-
tion) until the liabilities are fixed, and then adjust basis upward,
prospectively.91
A similar problem is created when the amount to be paid by the
parent for the stock is contingent, e.g., on the resolution of the
subsidiary's contingent liabilities or the achievement of a specified
level of earnings in future years. The only alternatives appear
to be the estimated cost approach of Revenue Ruling 55-119 (sub-
ject to later prospective adjustments when the contingencies have
been resolved), or the open basis theory asserted by the Service
in Pacific Transport. A deduction for the payments when made
would be improper in this situation, since the amounts in question
are paid for the acquisition of property.02
If some of the assets acquired upon liquidation of the subsidiary
are so speculative as not to be subject to reasonable ascertainment
of value, Burnet v. Logan and similar open liquidation cases sug-
gest that no basis should be assigned to them under section 334(b)
(2). If they are subsequently disposed of or collected, capital gain
or ordinary income would be realized, depending upon their status
as capital assets in the parent's hands and the sale or exchange
requirement of section 1222. Another approach, administratively
891955-1 OoB. 352.
9029 T.O.M. 133 (1970).
91. See, e.g., Recs Blow Pipe :Mfg. Co., 41 T.O. 598 (1904); Inter·City Television Film.
Corp., 43 T.O. 270 (1964). But see Manuel D. Mayerson, 47 T.O. 340 (1900) (99 yC.:lr
purchase money liability part of cost basis under section 1013, even though no personnl
liability and no amortization of the debt were required).
92 See generally Woodward v. Comm'r, 397 U.S. 573 (1970); Hilton Hote1B Corp. v.
United States, 397 U.S. 580 (1970).
But see Associated Patentees, Inc., 4 T.O. 979 (1945); Rev. RuL 07-130, 1907-1 OoB. 58.
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more cumbersome, would be a reshuffling of asset bases when the
properties acquire an ascertainable value prior to their disposition.
Valuation Problems-Cash Equivalent, Goodwill, Et Cetera
The regulations under section 334(b)(2) require the parent's
stock basis, as adjusted, to be spread ratably among the liquidated
subsidiary's noncash assets (including goodwill) in proportion
to their relative values, thus apparently foreclosing an attempt
by the parent to assign specific values to the assets in the stook
purchase transaction.93 Debates over the relative mix of asset
values can be considerable as a result of this approach, and two
categories of property, cash equivalent assets and goodwill, oause
much of the difficulty here. In Revenue Ruling 66-290,94 the Service
defined cash to include currency, checking accounts, time deposits,
drafts, checks, money orders, certificates of deposit, all of which
are treated at face. Accounts receivable, notes, inventory and mar-
ketable securities, even though highly liquid in charaoter, are
excluded from this definition and enter into the basis allocation
mechanism of section 334(b) (2).
Whether or not goodwill is present on the subsidiary's liquida-
tion depends, in general, upon continuity of the acquired business
as a viable entity. Fusion of the subsidiary's assets into the par-
ent's general operations, or liquidation of most of the properties
through sales and the like, would indicate the parent's laok of
concern with preservation of the acquired enterprise as a going
concern, so as to preclude allocation of basis to goodwill as an
asset. If goodwill exists, however, any purchase premium in ex-
cess of the value of the other properties will have to be assigned
to this item, rather than be spread among the other assets in
proportion to their values.
98 For an illustration see Boise Oascade Corp. v. United States, 288 F. Supp. 770
(D. Idaho 1968), aff'd per curiam, 70-2 U.S.T.O. 11 9595 (9th Oir. 1970) (seourities,
inventory, prepaid supplies and accounts receivable not equivalent to cllsh, but dobt of
parent to subsidiary was; also buyer can't overturn regulation's allocation priorities
on "intent" grounds, i.e., Williams v. McGowan principle not applicable to stoclt acqui-
sition route); Ralph R. Garrow, 43 T.O. 890 (1965) (relative value allocation manda-
tory).
On the problems of valuing various assets acquired in a section 3S4(b) (2) liquida.
tion, see ;rack Daniel Distillery v. United States, 379 F.2d 569 (Ct. 01. 1967) (valuation
of bulk inventory and goodwill); Crawford, AUocation of Goodw£!Z in. a Scotion. 994
(b)(2) Liquidation; Which Method May Be Used!, 26 ;r. TAXATION 204 (1967).
94 1966-2 C.B. 112.
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Reorganization Aspects
If the parent desires to continue operation of the acquired busi-
ness in a separate subsidiary, prompt reincorporation of the liqui-
dated enterprise may lead the Service to assert that the liquidation
of the purchased subsidiary combined with the transfer of its as-
sets to the new subsidiary constituted a reorganization, resulting in
a carryover basis for the assets, rather than a section 332 through
section 334(b) (2) liquidation followed by a section 351 transfer.
On the other hand, the Service apparently permits a section 334
(b)(2) basis if a newly organized subsidiary purchases the ac-
quired corporation and liquidates it.llls There is little save form to
distinguish between those two acquisition methods, but this is
apparently merely another illustration in the tax law where the
formal recipe is more important then the functional reality.
Acquisition by one corporation of the stock of another corpora-
tion, followed by a liquidation (or other combination) of the two
corporations, often involves one or more aspects of the tax-free
reorganization provisions. Thus, the initial acquisition of the stock
may constitute a tax-free type B reorganization if the considera-
tion consists solely of voting stock of the acquiring corporation
and the requisite 80 per cent control is obtained. In order for the
basis provisions of section 334(b)(2) to come into play, however,
acquisition of the subsidiary's stock must be by purchase, as de-
fined in section 334(b) (3), a definition that precludes application
of the reorganization rules to the stock acquisition step. Thus, sec-
tion 332(b)(2) would not apply to a liquidation of the acquired
subsidiary into its parent here. Conversely, where the initial stock
acquisition step is a taxable purchase within the meaning of section
334(b)(3), a subsequent type A statutory merger reorganization
of the subsidiary into its parent would still qualify for the section
334(b) (2) basis rules because section 332(b) provides that absorp-
tion of an 80 per cent subsidiary constitutes a liquidation within
the meaning of that section, notwithstanding overlapping jurisdic-
tion of the reorganization provisions. The relationship of sections
332 and 334(b) (2) to the reorganization provisions is not always
95 See XIX-a Tax Sec. Bull 87 (1966); GrisTIold v. Comm.'r, 400 F.2d 427 (lith Clr.
1968).
For the formal method of avoiding this problem by firat organizing the no¥/' sub-
sidiary, and then having it make the stock purchnse followed by tho section 33<!(b) (2)
liquidation, see R~venue Ruling 60-262, 1960-2 C.B. 114.
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free from doubt, despite the basic statutory scheme of mutual exclu-
sivity between liquidations and reorganizations.Do
Debt Financed Acquisitions
The Tax Reform Act of 1969 materially changed the ground
rules for certain acquisitions of stock or assets in exchange for
debt securities of the acquiring corporation. These matters were
recently considered in the Review.D1
LIQUIDATIONS OF FOREIGN SUBSIDIARmS AND OF
DOMESTIC SUBSIDIARmS BY FOREIGN PARENTS
In order to avoid the recognition of gain on the liquidation of a
subsidiary (when either the parent or the subsidiary is a foreign
corporation), an advance ruling under section 367 must be ob-
tained by showing that the avoidance of federal income taxes is not
one of the principal purposes of the transaction.
The Liquidating Corporation's Income and Loss
INTRODUCTION
The preceding parts of this article have been concerned with the
effect of a complete liquidation on the shareholder. We have seen
that section 331(a)(1) lays down the general rule that the share-
holder is to treat the liquidating distribution as the proceeds of a
sale of the stock, which will normally result in capital gain or loss,
to be fully recognized by him unless section 333 (nonrecognition
of gain on elective one month liquidations) or section 332 (nonrec-
ognition of gain or loss on liquidation of subsidiary corporations)
is applicable to the transaction. We now turn to the effect of the
liquidation on the liquidating corporation. The principal issues
are (1) whether the distribution itself produces gain or loss for
the corporation; (2) whether corporate sales, collections and other
transactions in the course of the liquidation are to be recognized
for tax purposes; and (3) how the corporation's earnings and
profits are affected by the liquidation. A miscellany of collateral
issues will also be considered.
96 Seo generally Henderson, Yoting BtocTe in a Two-Btop A.sset A.cquisition: Tho Kim-
bell-Diamond lleorganization., 25 TAX L. REV. 375 (1970).
97 Eustice, Corporations and Corporate Invostors, 25 TAX L. REV. 509 (1970).
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EFFECT OF THE DISTRmUTION ITSELF: SECTION 336
Under seetion 336, the corporation recognizes neither gain nor
loss on the distribution of its assets in partial or complete liquida-
tion, even though their fair market value exceeds or is less than
their adjusted basis.9s Section 336 contains an exception for install-
ment obligations, whose distribution in complete liquidation will
produce corporate income under seetion 453(d).o9 In this respect,
section 336 resembles section 311, which prescribes the conse-
quences to the corporation of a nonliquidating distribution of
property, but seetion 336 does not go on (as does section 311) to
recognize corporate income on a distribution of appreciated LIFO
inventory or assets subject to liabilities in excess of basis.loa
Unlike most nonrecognition provisions, which provide that the
transferor or transferee (or both) must carryover the old basis for
the transferred property so that the nonrecognized gain or loss will
be taken into aceount at a later date, seetion 336 ordinarily results
in a permanent nonrecognition of the liquidating corporation's
gain or loss. This is because the transferred assets do not preserve
their old basis, but acquire a basis equal to their fair market value
at the time of the liquidation under section 334(a), except in special
circumstances when seetion 332 or section 333 applies. For this rea-
son, the various reeapture rules, such as sections 1245 and 1250
(depreciable property) and section 47 (a) (1) (early disposition of
investment credit property), override section 336 by requiring the
liquidating corporation to include an appropriate amount in its tax-
98 This principle :first entered the statute with the enactment of section 33G of tho
1954 Code, but it WaB previously applied by sections 118 and 39.m1(a)-:!0 of tho rep-
tions, even while the Internal Revenue Serviee was urging unsuccessfully that gain
should be recognized by the eorporation on n. wnliquidating distribution of appreciated
property.
Distributions to shareholder creditors in their capacity as creditors nro not pro-
tected by section 336, however, and result in tnmble gnm or 10ES to tho eorporntiou.
Rev. Rul. 70-271, 1970-22 LR.B. 9 (.Tune 1).
99 As to the distribution of section 453 instnllment obligations by n. liquidntiug cor-
poration, section 453(d)(4)(A) was nmended by Public Law Number 89-809 (1911G)
to provide that nonrecognition treatment for the distributing corporation will be limited
to those section 332 liquidations in which the parent corporation obtnius n. carryover
basis under section 334(b) (1). For eontrary results under prior law, SCD Bijou Pnrk
Properties, Inc., 47 T.C. 207 (1966); Cherry v. United Statcs, 2M F. Supp. 9li9 (CoD.
Ca1.1967).
100 The Tax: Reform .Act of 1969 added section 3il(d) to tho Codo which, in general,
taxes the distributing corporation on any gain with respect to appreciated property dis·
tributed in exchange for its stock. The new provision does not apply, however, to dis-
tributions in partial or complete liquidation.
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able income or tax liability when property subject to these pro-
visions is transferred.101 Similarly, since the liquidation itself is
often the Service's last clear chance to tax the disappearing corpo-
ration on its appreciated assets or other sources of future income,
the government frequently seeks to sidestep section 336 by assert-
ing a deficiency based on some theory other than the mere distribu-
tion of assets in liquidation. We turn now to a discussion of the
problems arising in such efforts to tax the liquidating corporation.
INCOME OF THE LIQUIDATING CORPORATION: TIMELY
LIQUIDATIONS AND RELATED PROBLEMS
The adoption of a plan of complete liquidation does not terminate
the corporation's existence. Under the regulations, death does not
occur until the corporation "ceases business and dissolves, retain-
ing no assets," and even though the liquidating process may be
quite protracted, the corporation must continue to file tax returns
and pay the corporate income tax on its sales, collections, com-
missions and other income.102 If the corporation winds up by sell-
ing all of its assets before making a liquidating distribution and
terminating its corporate existence, it will have paid its debt to
society and no further tax problems are likely to arise. Frequently,
however, some or all of the assets are distributed in kind to the
shareholders, especially if a going business is to be continued; and
such a midstream liquidation usually involves the transfer of ap-
preciated assets, accounts receivable, claims for services rendered
and other sources of future income, some of which may be associ-
ated with expenses that were deducted by the liquidating corpora-
tion in past years. Because the shareholders will ordinarily take
these assets at a basis equal to their fair market value at the time
of distribution under section 334(a), so that accrued appreciation
101 See generally Gardner, The Impact of Sections 1245 anil 1250 on Oorporato Liqui-
dations, 17 U. FLA. L. REV. 58 (1964); Schapiro, Recapt1tre of Depreciation anil Section
1$45 of The Internal Revenue Ooile, 72 YALE L.J. 1483 (1963) i Horvitz, Seotions 1£50
anil1245: The Pudille ana the Lake, 20 TAX L. REV. 285 (1965).
Recapture does not occur, however, in a section 332·section 334(b) (1) carryover
basis liquidation; instead, the potential ordinary income passes over to the trnnsferree
parent corporation.
102 See Reg. § 1.6012-2(a) (2). See also Rev. Rut 61-191, 1961-2 O.B. 251 (corpo-
ration may be dissolved do facto even though not dissolved de 3uro) i United States v.
Joliet & Ohicago R.R., 315 U.S. 44 (1942) (corporate existence continued after perpetual
lease of property) i HerslofE v. United States, 310 F.2d 947 (Ot. 01. 1962) (corporato
existence preserved by continuing business activities despite technical dissolution) i
S.N. HerslofE, 46 T.O. 545 (1966). Estate of Charles Fearon, 16 T.O. 385 (1951) (liquida-
tion spread over more than 23 years).
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will not be taxed to them when they ultimately sell or dispose of the
assets, the Internal Revenue Service frequently insists that the
liquidating corporation recognize the accrued or potential income
inherent in such assets.103 One or more of the following theories
is ordinarily offered for such an adjustment, which in effect as-
sumes that section 336 is inapplicable to the situation in question:
Anticipatory Assignments oj Income
The corporation cannot escape the corporate income tax by an
anticipatory assignment of income to its shareholders, even though
the assignment takes the form of a complete liquidation. This
principle is simply an application of a pervasive doctrine of in-
come tax law, under which income is taxed to its source rather than
to the person who happens to collect it, a doctrine of such breadth
and general application that it falls outside the scope of this work.
As an illustration, see J. Ungar, bu;. 'V. Commi$sioner,lM in which
a corporation was taxed on commissions for services performed
by it, although the amounts in question were collected by a share-
holder after the corporation's assets were distributed to him in
complete liquidation. The anticipatory assignment doctrine is of
such uncertain scope that the results in litigated cases are unpre-
103 Sce generally Lyon & Eustiee, .Assignment of Income: Fruit ana Tree as Irrigated
by tM P.G. Lake Case, 17 TAX L. REv. 293, 396-415 (1962); Eustice, Contract Bights,
Capital, Gain, and .Assignment of Income-TIlo Ferrer Caso, 20 TAX L. REv. 1, 51-76
(1964); Weiss, Corporate Contingent Income: .A Case of TaJ; Planning, 12 TAX L. REv.
73 (1956).
Similar problems arise when a. going business is incorporated under section 3G1, 0.1-
though in sueh cases the income would usually be recognized cventunlly, because of
the carryover of basis for the transferred assets; even so, adjustments nre sometimC3
required to prevent a. shifting of tax liability from the transferor to the tronsferee cor-
poration by a. midstream incorporation.
104244 F.2d 90 (2d air. 1957). See also Willimnson v. United StntC3, 292 F.2d 524:
(at. CI. 1961) (cash basis corporation taxed on accounts receivable for previously tend-
ered services); Wood Harmon Corp. v. United States, 311 F.2d 918 (2d Cit. 1963)
(condemnation award, liquidated in amount and paid after distribution to Bhnrcholdera,
ta:xable to corporation); Cold Metal Process Co. v. Comm'r, ::l4:7 F.2d SG4: (lith Oir.
1957); United Mercantile Agencies, 34 T.C. SOS (1960) (unaccrued commissions con-
tingent on future events); James Poro, 39 T.C. 641 (1963), acg:. (contingent litigation
claims, corporate existence terminated); and Pat O'Brien, 25 '1'.0. 376 (19SG) (motion
picture distribution contract, corporate existence terminated).
For the relationship between the dnte of liquidation l1lld the date tho income is paid
by the obligor, see Sol C. Siegel Prod., Inc., 4:6 T.C. 15 (196G) (cash basis corporation
not taxed in year of distribution, where it did not liquidate until a year later l1lld pay-
ments were received by shareholders in subsequent year; court noted corporation llhould
be taxed on assigned income in the later collection yenr). For subsequent litigation, BCO
Siegel v. United States, 70-2 U.S.T.C. 11 9605 (CoD. CnI. 1970).
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dictable; moreover, it may be that the courts will be less willing to
apply it if the corporation completely liquidates than if the share-
holders receive the property in an ordinary distribution or partial
liquidation, for the reason that a complete liquidation usually has
more drastic nontax consequences and is less likely to be employed
principally for tax avoidance. See, for example, the Shea 00.10U
case where the Tax Court held that a distribution of contingent, or
contested, income claims by an accrual basis liquidating corpora-
tion successfully avoided corporate tax on the income since it was
not earned or accrued at the time corporate existence terminated.
Clear Reflection of Income Under Section 446(b)
As a general rule, taxable income is computed under the ac-
counting method regularly employed by the taxpayer; but the Com-
missioner, under section 446(b), may compel use of another method
if the taxpayer's does not clearly reflect income. A method of ac-
counting that would clearly be permissible for a continuing business
may not properly reflect income where the corporate taxpayer
liquidates in midstream; and the government has successfully
argued, in several cases of this sort, that the taxpayer's method
of accounting should be changed in order to prevent distortion of
the income stream. Thus, in the well known Jud Plumbing and
Standard Paving cases, construction companies using the completed
contract method of reporting income liquidated before certain con-
struction contracts were fully completed and they were required
in effect to shift from the completed contract method (under which
income would not be recognized until the work was finished) to the
percentage of completion method of reporting income.1oo In both
cases, the court relied on the assignment of income doctrine as
well as on section 446 (b) ; and in Jud Plumbing, the court also in-
voked section 482 (permitting income and deductions to be reallo-
cated among related businesses under common control).
10553 T.C. 135 (1969), acq.
106Jud Plumbing & Heating Inc. v. Co='r, 153 F.2d 681 (5th Gir. 1946) i Stan·
dard Paving Co. v. Co='r, 190 F.2d 330 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 342 U.S. 860 (1951).
See also Henry A. Kuckenberg, 35 T.C. 473 (1960), aff'd on this issue, 309 F.2d 202 (9th
Gir. 1962) (cash basis construction company required to accrue income on comploted
contracts); Susan J. Carter, 9 T.C. 364, 373 (1947), acq. (brokerage contracts); Idaho
First Nat'! Bank v. United States, 265 F.2d 6 (9th Cir. 1959) (accrued intorest tllXod
to liquidating cash basis bank); Floyd v. Scofield, 193 F.2d 594 (5th Cir. 1952).
Although it is usually thought that the government's use of section 446(b) to roquiro
adjustments in the year of liquidation does not bring section 481 (adjustments requirod
by change of accounting method) into play, the relationship between thoso provisions
in this area remains to be worked out.
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Contingent or Inchoate Income Items and the
Problem of Corporate Existence
The above observations must be qualified, where complete liqui-
dations are involved, by considering situations where a liquidating
corporation distributes items of potential income too contingent
to constitute current income under any ordinary accounting
method. In a number of such cases, courts have refused to apply
assignment of income doctrines because the corporation either had
not earned the potential income at the time of distribution, or was
not in existence at the later time when the uncertain income ma-
tured and became definite.lo7 But where corporate existence con-
tinues, taxability may remain with the liquidating corporation if it
is found tQ have earned the income in question.10S
On the meaning of corporate existence, the regulations have long
provided, substantially as they do now:
Existence of Oorporation. A corporation in existence during any portion
of a taxable year is required to make a return. If a corporation was not in
existence thxoughout an annual accounting period (either calendar year
or fiscal year), the corporation is required to make a return for that frac-
tional part of a year during which it was in existence. A corporation is not
in existence after it ceases business and dissolves, retaining no assets,
whether or not under State law it may thereafter be treated as continuing
as a corporation for certain limited purposes connected with winding up its
affairs, such as for the purpose of suing and being sued. If the corporation
has valuable claims for which it will bring suit during this period, it has
-retained assets and therefore continues in existence. A corporation does not
1.07 Cold Metal Process Co. v. Comm'r, 247 F.2d 864 (6th Cir. 1957) (income not
earned). For other situations where corporations have avoided tn:t 011 potential income
through a timely liquidation, see United Mercantile Agencies, 34 T.O. 808 (1960) (un-
accrued commissions contingent on future events); Jrones Poro, 39 T.O. 641 (1963), acq.
(contingent litigation claims, corporate existence terminated); Pat O'Brien, 25 T.C. 376
(1955) (motion picture dIstribution contract, corporate existence terminated). See also
Shea Co., 53 T.C. 135 (1969), aeq. (distribution of contingent or contested income
claims by an accrual basis liquidating corporation successfully avoided corporate tax on
the income since it was not earned when corporate existence terminated) j Sigurd N.
Hersloff, 46 T.C. 545 (1966) (corporate existence WllS held to have termInated for the
years in issue).
l.OS J. Ungar, Inc. v. Comm'r, 244 F.2d 90 (2d Cir. 1957) (colJlIDiE3ions earned, but
not yet accrnable at date of a liquidation distribution, nevertheless remnined tn:roble to
the still existing corporation) j Wood Harmon Corp. v. United States, 311 F.2d 918 (2d
Cir. 1963) (liquidating corporation, whose existence continued, held ta:mble on pro-
ceeds of condemnation award, previously distributed to shareholders, although rononnt
of award not :fixed until after the distribution). Seo also Hersloff v. United StatC3, 310
F.2d 947 (Ot. CL 1962) (corporate existence preserved by continued business activities
of trustees in dissolution, although teehnico.1 dissolution occurred many years earlier) j
SolO. Siegel Prod., Inc., 46 T.C. 15 (1966).
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go out of existence if it is turned over to receivers or trustees who continue
to operate it.loO
See also United States v. Joliet <t Ohicago R.R.1l0 where the cor~
poration had disposed of all its property under a perpetual lease,
the lessee agreeing to pay a stated annual dividend to stockholders
of the lessor; the court taxed these payments as rental income to
the corporate lessor, and noted that the umbilical cord between
the taxpayer and its shareholders had not been cut. The message
thus seems to be that de facto dissolution of the liquidating cor~
poration is necessary to argue nonexistence; and unless the cor~
poration is a mere empty shell, it may be deemed to have a life
after death, at least for assignment of income purposes where po~
tential income items are involved.
If the liquidation is timely (i.e., corporate existence terminates
before realization of the inchoate income item), taxation at the
corporate level may be avoided; at the same time, this item of
potential income is converted into capital gain at the shareholder
level, since the distribution, under section 331, is treated as a pay~
ment in exchange for stock (note also in this latter regard, that the
contingencies may prevent valuation of these items under B'ltrnet
v. Logan, thus resulting in open liquidation treatment to the dis~
tributee shareholders). The tax stakes in this area call to mind
the collapsible corporation provisions, designed primarily to dis~
courage this type of ploy; but they are not always fully effective
to serve this purpose.l1l Finally, it should be noted that the prob-
lems in this area resemble those which arise under section 691 on
the death of an individual; with the important exception that items
of income in respect of a decedent retain their character in the
hands of transferees. Not so on the death of a corporation, with
the result that untaxed corporate potential income items may be
transformed into shareholder capital gain if the parties plan the
timing of the liquidation with due care.
Corporate Deductions and Shareholder Income
If a timely liquidating distribution of a potential income item
does not run afoul of the foregoing principles, should the corpora-
tion at least be required to give back any tax benefit it may have
109 Reg. § 1.6012-2(a) (2).
110315 U.S. 44 (1942).
1U See, e.g., Shea Co., 53 T.C. 135 (1969), acq., where the court made noto of this
point but still refused to tax the liquidating corporation.
Imaged with the Permission of N.Y.D. Tax Law Review
HeinOnline -- 26 Tax L. Rev. 245 1970-1971
1971] COllrPLETE LIQUIDATIONS 245
obtained by deducting the expenses incurred in creating the trans-
ferred item~ For example, if a corporation has incurred and de-
ducted the expenses of raising an agricultural crop but liquidates
before reaping what it sowed, and if it is not taxed on the harvested
crop, should the deductions be retroactively disallowed in order to
prevent a distortion of income ~ (If the crop is sold for more than
the cost of its production, such a disallowance of the expenses
would be less drastic than taxing the income to the corporation.)
Conversely, if the corporation received funds that were not taxed
on receipt because of an offsetting liability, should an adjustment
be made on liquidation in recognition of the fact that the corpora-
tion will not have to incur any expense to discharge the liability1
Much can be said for requiring such adjustments in a wide variety
of circumstances (e.g., bad debt reserves; business expenses al-
locable to uncollected claims and rights; capital outlays for tools,
subscriptions and similar assets that by regulation or statute can
be deducted; prepaid subscription income; reserves for customer
deposits, returnable containers, and overcharges), but the govern-
ment has pressed the point in only a few areas and has lost the
argument as often as it has won.l12 Moreover, the development of
statutory recapture devices (sections 1245, 1250, 1251 and 47) to
deal with analogous problems may stimulate a judicial refusal to
police this area on the ground that Congress can do the job more
systematically. Similarly, F'fibou'fg Navigatio1l, 00., bzc. 'V. Oommis-
sione'f,113 refusing to disallow depreciation deducted in the year
property was sold for more than its adjusted basis, is not very
sympathetic to judicial or administrative disallowance of an item
that seemed deductible on the facts as lmown when the expense
was incurred.114
U2Diamond A Cattle Co. v. Comm'r 233 F.2d 739 (10th Cir. 19G6) (opernting
losses incurred by corporation liquidating in midstream nllo'l7ed); Comm'r v. South
Lake Farms, Inc., 324 F.2d 837 (9th Cir. 1963) (expenses of raising agricultural crop
not restored to income on liquidation); West Seattle Nat'l BlUllt v. Gomm'r, 288 F.2d
47 (9th air. 1961) (bad debt reserre taken into income in liquidation after sale of as·
sets) ; Argus, Inc., 45 T.C. 63 (1965).
Nash v. United States, 398 U.S. 1 (1970), nnd Estate of Schmidt v. C<1mmissioner, 3liG
F.2d 111 (9th air. 1966), hold that the bad debt reserve of nn unincorporated enterprise
was not taxable to the transferor when the business was incorporated under section 351,
may be inapplicable to liquidations, because of the stepped-up basis acquired by the
transferred assets. See Arent, Reallocation of Income alla Exptmses in Connection tDit1~
Formation ana Liquidation of Corporations, 40 TAXES 995, 1001-0:1 (1902).
113 383 U.S. 272 (1966).
114 The force of Fribourg's radiations is reduced by its reliance on the legislative
and administrative history in the depreciation nrea, sinee there is far less bawground
material of this kind in the liquidation field. On the other hand, if Fnoourg had gone
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THE Oourt Holding 00. DOCTRINE AND ITS LIMITATIONS
The purpose of a corporate liquidation is often to set the stage
for a sale of the distributed property by the shareholders. An
alternate route to the same end is a sale of the assets by the cor-
poration itself, followed by a liquidating distribution of the pro-
ceeds of sale to the shareholders. The enactment of section 337,
one of the most important 1954 changes in the corporate provisions
of the Internal Revenue Code, greatly alters the tax consequences
of such transactions. Before the 1954 change can be explained,
however, the development of the law in this area before 1954 must
be described.
Example: Assume that Jones owns all the stock of Jones, Inc.,
with a basis of $50,000, and that the corporation's sole asset is
an apartment house, with an adjusted basis to the corporation
of $40,000 but a fair market value of $100,000. If the corporation
sells the apartment house, it will have a profit of $60,000, on
which the federal income tax would be $18,000 if the profit is
taxable as long-term capital gain under section 1231. If the bal-
ance of $82,000 is then distributed in liquidation to Jones, he will
have a profit of $32,000 on which the tax (long-term capital
gain rate) will be $8,500. Jones will be left with $73,500. But if
Jones liquidates the corporation and then sells the apartment
house, the after-tax proceeds will be substantially greater. On
the liquidation, the corporation would not recognize income (sec-
tion 336), but Jones would recognize $50,000 of profit, on which
the tax (at a 25 per cent long-term capital gain rate) would be
$12,500. But the basis of the apartment house would now be
$100,000 (section 334(a» and there would be no further profit,
or tax, on the sale. Jones would be left with $87,500 after taxes.11ll
the other way, it would probably have stimulated a general effort to disallow deduc-
tions that seemed valid when taken but became less convincing in the light of hind-
sight, e.g., advertising expenses contributing to the value of goolhvill, if tho goodwill
itself were sold or distributed later in the same taxable year; and this approach might
have been extended to deductions taken under such provisions as section 177 (trade.
mark expenditures), section 174 (research and experimental expenditures), et cotera,
if the taxpayer sold or distributed the assets created by these expenditures in the Samo
taxable year. Moreover, a logical extension would have been an effort to recapture such
deductions, under the tax benefit doctrine or section 446 (b), even if they were taken
in prior years. As stated above, the taxpayer victory in FribouTD rests on tho special
history of section 167; hence, it does not directly affect these recapture potentialities,
but a government victory on broader grounds would surely have encouraged the govern-
ment to explore them with vigor.
1115 A liquidation under section 333 would also produce only one tax: The liquidation
itself is tax-free, the properly's basis in the hands of the shareholder is the basis of tho
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But while it is easy enough to see the tax difference between a
sale by the corporation and a sale by the shareholder, it is much
more difficult to know when a transaction falls in one category and
when in the other. One of the most famous of all federal income tax
cases, 00m1nissioner 'V. Oourt Holding 00., was concerned with
this distinction of whether the sale at the corporate level was a
"foregone conclusion." The opinion is brief enough to be quoted
almost in its entirety:
The respondent corporation was organized in 1934 solely to buy and hold
the apartment building which was the only property ever owned by it. All
of its outstanding stock was owned by 1\Iinnie 1\Iiller and her husband. Be-
tween Oct-ober 1, 1939 and February, 1940, while the corporation still had
legal title to the property, negotiations for its sale took place. These negotia-
tions were between the corporation and the lessees of the property, together
with a sister and brother-in-law. An oral agreement was reached as to the
terms and conditions of sale, and February 22, 1940, the parties met to
reduce the agreement to writing. The purchaser was then advised by the
corporation's attorney that the sale could not be consummated because it
would result in the imposition of a large income tax on the corporation. The
next day, the corporation declared a "liquidating dividend," which in-
volved complete liquidation of its assets, and surrender of all outstanding
stock. 1\frs. 1\filler and her husband surrendered their stoek, and the build-
ing was deeded to them. A sale contract was then drawn, naming the Millers
individually as vendors, and the lessees' sister as vendee, which embodied
substantially the same terms and conditions previously agreed upon. One
thousand dollars, which a month and a half earlier had been paid to the
corporation by the lessees, was applied in part payment of the purchase
price. Three days later, the property was conveyed to the lessees' sister.
The Tax Court concluded from these facts that, despite the declaration
of a "liquidating dividend" followed by the trausfers of legal title, the
corporation had not abandoned the sales negotiations; that these were mere
formalities designed to "make the transaction appear to be other than what
it was," in order to avoid tax liability. The Circuit Court of Appeals, draw-
ing different inferences from the record, held that the corporation had
"called-off" the sale, and treated the stockholders' sale as unrelated to the
prior negotiations.
There was evidence to support the :findings of the Tax Court, and its
findings must therefore be accepted by the courts. . . . On the basis of these
findings, the Tax Court was justified in attributing the gain from the sale
to respondent corporation. The incidence of taxation depends upon the sub-
stance of a transaction. The tax consequences which arise from gains from a
sale of property are not :finally to be determined solely by the means cm-
stock given up under section 334(c), 3lld the holding period of tho property includes tho
holding period of the stock under section 1223(1), so that Jones would recognize long-
term. capital gain on the sale in the amount of $50,000 3lld be left with $87,500. But
section 333 would be less attractive if tho corporation had post-1913 earnings 3lld
profitsl cash or stock or securities acquired after December 31, 1953.
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ployed to transfer legal title. R.ather, the transaction must be viewed as a
whole, and each step, from the commencement of negotiations to the con-
summation of the sale, is relevant. .A sale by one person cannot be trans-
formed for tax purposes into a sale by another by using the latter as a
conduit through which to pass title. To permit the true nature of a transac-
tion to be disguised by mere formalisms, which exist solely to alter tax
liabilities, would seriously impair the effective administration of the tax
policies of Congress.
It is urged that respondent corporation never executed a written agree-
ment, and that an oral agreement to sell land cannot be enforced in Florida
because of the Statute of Frauds, Compo Gen. Laws of Florida, 1927, vol.
3, §5779. But the fact that respondent corporation itself never executed a
written contract is unimportant, since the Tax Court found from tho facts
of the entire transaction that the executed sale was in substance the sale
of the corporation. The decision of the Cirouit Court of .Appeals is re-
versed, and that of the Tax Court affirmed.110
Since the sale of the property was imputed to, the corporation, it
was required to report the profit on the sale as corporate income.117
Although the moral of the Court Holding Co. case-do not m'w
range for a sale of the corporation's appreciated property before
the liquidation has been consummated-wlls clear enough, it was
more easily preached than practiced. For one thing, shareholders
persisted in their evil custom of arranging for the sale of their
corporation's property before consulting their lawyers. For
another, if the corporation were liquidated first, the capital gain
tax was payable even if the shareholders were unable to find a
buyer for the property,118 and to the difficulty of finding cash to
pay the tax was added the possibility that in the absence of a sale,
valuation of the property by the government in computing the
shareholder's capital gain might be excessive. A liquidation in
advance of a contract of sale could be even more troublesome if
the shareholders were numerous and not otherwise associated with
each other.
To be sure, the shareholders might eliminate the danger of a
taxable liquidation without a buyer by negotiating with possible
116 Co='r V. Court Holding Co., 324 U.S. 331 (1945) (footnotes omitted).
111 Unless the corporation happened to retain enough assets to pay the tax linbility,
the shareholders are liable as transferees under section 6901(a) (1) (A). Having com·
puted their capital gain tax on the liquidation on the assumption (now proven orron·
eous) that the corporation was not liable for a tax on the sllle, tho shareholders aro
entitled to a deduction in the year they discharge their liability as transferees. TIlO
Supreme Court has held that the appropriate adjustment for the shareholders is n eapi.
tal loss. Arrowsmith V. Comm'r, 344 U.S. 6 (1952). See also section 1341; Webster,
The Olaim of Bight Doctrine: 1954 Version, 10 TAX L. REV. 381, 399 (1055).
11S Unless the conditions were ripe for a one month liquidntion undor section 838,
on which gain would not be recognized.
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buyers while the corporation was still alive, but then they must
take care to act only in a personal capacity, and not as agents or
officers of the corporation. This bit of sophistication was endorsed
by the Supreme Court, as a way to avoid corporate tax on the sale,
in UIJ~ited States 1). Cumberland Public Service CO.110 There the
shareholders first tried to sell the stock of their corporation and,
when the buyer refused to buy the stock,120 they offered to acquire
the assets by liquidating the corporation and then to sell the assets.
The Court of Claims held that the assets were sold by the share-
holders, not by the corporation, and the Supreme Court affirmed,
distinguishing the Court Holding Co. case on its facts:
Our Oourt Holding 00. decision rested on findings of fact by the Tax
Court that a sale had been made and gains realized by the taxpayer cor-
poration. There the corporation had negotiated for sale of its assets and
had reached an oral agreement of sale. When the tax eonsequenees of the
corporate sale were belatedly recognized, the corporation purported to
"call off" the sale at the last minute and distributed the physical properties
in kind to the stockholders. They promptly conveyed these properties to the
same persons who had negotiated with the corporation. The terms of pur-
chase were substantially those of the previous oral agreement. One thousand
dollars already paid to the corporation was applied as part payment of the
purchase price. The Tax Court found that the eorporation never really
abandoned its sales negotiations, that it never did dissolve, and that the
sole purpose of the so-called liquidation was to disguise a eorporate sale
through use of mere formalisms in order to avoid tax liabili~. The Circuit
Court of Appeals took a different view of the evidence. In this Court the
Government contended that whether a liquidation distribution was genuine
or merely a sham was traditionally a question of fact. We agreed with this
contention, and reinstated the Tax Court's findings and judgment. Dis-
cussing the evidence which supported the findings of fact, we went on to
say that "the incidence of taxation depends upon the substance of a. trans-
U9 338 U.S. 451 (1950).
120 Although the reasons for the buyer's refnsal to purchnse tho stock nro not sat out
in the opinion, there are many t3.x and nontax reasons for a refU83l. Among tho lat-
ter, the possibility of contingent and other liabilities undisclosed on tho b31nnco sheet
is important. For the use of a guaranteed b31ance sheet as protection against undiEcloscd
liabilities, see Blnstein v. Eugene Sobel Co., 263 F.2d 478 (D.C. Cir. 10(9). Tax rea-
sons for refusing to buy stock nre that the corporation mny havo ll. low basis for its
assets, a large earnings and profits account, an unfm'orablo accounting mlithod, et
cetera. Buyers may be able to avoid these drawbacks by liquidating tho corporation,
unless a prompt reincorporation of the assets is necessary, in whieb cm::e the liquida-
tion might be disregarded. Moreover, before 1954, if the buyer was ll. corporation, n
liquidation of its newly acquired subsidiary would have resulted in ll. cnrryovcr of tho
subsidiary's basis for the assets unle£s the Kimbell-Diamond cnse wns applicable. Sec
Mintz, Eecent Developments U'llder tll6 Court Holding Co. and CumbCTland Public Ser-
vice Co, Cases-Stile of A.ssets or Stoel;, II N.Y.U. lUST. 873, 884-90 (1053) j C:uy,
The Effect Of Taxation On Selling Out A. Corporato Businc.ss For Casll, 45 ILL. L.
REV. 423, 441-51 (1950).
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action" regardless of "mere formalisms," and that taxes on a corporate
sale cannot be avoided by using the shareholders as a "conduit through
which to pass title."
This language does not mean that a corporation can be taxed even when
the sale has been made by its stockholders following a genuine liquidation
and dissolution. While the distinction between sales by a corporation as
compared with distribution in kind followed by shareholder sales may be
particularly shadowy and artificial when the corporation is closely held,
Congress has chosen to recognize such a distinction for tax purposes. 'rhe
corporate tax is thus aimed primarily at the profits of a going concern. This
is true despite the fact that gains realized from corporate sales are taxed,
perhaps to prevent tax evasions, even where the cash proceeds are at once
distributed in liquidation. But Congress has imposed no tax on liquidating
distributions in kind or on dissolution, whatever may be the motive for such
liquidation. Consequently, a corporation may liquidate without subjecting
itself to the corporate gains tax, even though a primary motive is to avoid
the burden of corporate taxation.
Here, on the basis of adequate subsidiary findings, the Court of Claims
has found that the sale in question was made by the stockholders rather than
the corporation. The Government's argument that the shareholders acted as
a mere "conduit" for a sale by respondent corporation must fall before
this finding. The subsidiary finding that a major motive of the shareholders
was to reduce taxes does not bar this conclusion. Whatever, the motive and
however relevant it may be in determining whether the transaction was
real or a sham, sales of physical properties by shareholders following a
genuine liquidation distribution cannot be attributed to the corporation for
tax purposes.121
In an effort to decide the case on something other than mere
formalisms, the Supreme Court contrasted the Tax Court's finding
that the Court Holding Co. never did dissolve with the Court of
Claims' finding that there was a genuine liquidation of the Cumber·
land Public Service Co. In practice, however, this distinction could
mean little more than that tax advice came early, rather than late,
since the findings of fact in the Cumberland Publio Servioe Co. case
might not have been so favorable if the shareholders had not been
carefully guided during their negotiations. The last words of the
Supreme Court in the Cumberland Publio Servioe Co. case were:
"It is for the trial court, upon consideration of an entire trans·
action, to determine the factual category in which a particular
transaction belongs. Here as in the Court Holding Co. case we ae·
cept the ultimate findings of fact of the trial tribunal." 122 However
much they tried to cut their garb to the pattern of the C'umberland
Public Service Co. case, taxpayers ran the risk of failing to demon-
121 United States v. Cumberland Public Service Co" 338 U.S. 451, 453-55 (1050)
(footnotes omitted).
122 ld. at 456.
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strate that they were negotiating only in anticipation of a liquida-
tion; if they appeared to be acting for the corporation, rather than
in a personal capacity, the Oourt Holding 00. case, rather than the
OumberlanrZ Public Service 00. case, would be controlling.123
Because the "result of these two decisions is that undue weight
is accorded the formalities of the transaction and they, therefore,
represent merely a trap for the unwary," 124 the Congress in 1954
took action to divorce the tax consequences of the liquidation-sale
combination from the form of the transaction. The new legislation,
section 337 of the 1954 Code, adopts as its principle the elimination
of the corporate tax, whether the sale is made by the corporation in
anticipation of the liquidation or by the shareholders thereafter.
By virtue of section 337, the tax consequences to the shareholders
ordinarily will be identical, whether the corporation sells the assets
and then distributes the proceeds in complete liquidation or dis-
tributes the assets in kind to the shareholders for sale by them.
The Oourt Holding 00. doctrine is not dead, however, since section
337 is ordinarily inapplicable to inventory property and install-
ment obligations, nor does it ordinarily apply to liquidations of
collapsible corporations, to elective one month liquidations under
section 333, or to most liquidations of subsidiary corporations UD-
der section 332. Moreover, because section 337 provides for non-
recognition of loss as well as gain, it may have adverse conse-
quences to the shareholders in certain instances.
SECTION 337-THE ANTI-Oourt Holding 00. PnoVISIoN
The general rule of section 337(a) provides that if a corporation
(1) adopts a plan of complete liquidation and (2) distributes all
of its assets (less those retained to meet claims) in complete liqui-
dation within the 12 month period beginning on the date of the
adoption of the plan, it shall not recognize gain or loss from the
sale or exchange of property within the 12 month period.1Z (Al-
123 A guide to the ritual that was necessary before 1954 to avoid an attribution of 1I.
shareholder sale to the corporation (which is still necessary if section 337 is inappli-
cable) may be found in Mintz, Recent Devewpmcnts Under tllo Court Holding Co. and
Cumberland Public Service Co. Cases-Sale of Assets on Stoel:, 11 N.Y.U. Il:ST. 873,
876-84 (1953). Among many other articles on the Court Holding Co. and Cumberland
Public Service Co. cases, see Cary, TlIe Effect of Taxation On Selling Out A Corporato
B'USincss For Cash, 45 ILL. L. REv. 423 (1950).
For the current vitality of Court Holding Co. and Cumberland Publio Scrr;ica Co.
choice of seller problems, see Rev. RuL 69-172, 1969-1 CoB. 99.
124 s. REP. No. 1622, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 49 (1954).
125 "Property" is defined by section 337(b) to exclude tho corporation's inventory
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though it is commonly said that the plan must be adopted" before"
the sales in question, section 1.337-1 of the regulations provides
that sales made on the same day that the plan is adopted are in-
cluded in section 337 even if they precede adoption of the plan.)
Section 337 has the effect of changing the result in cases like Oourt
Holding 00., because even if a sale by the shareholders is imputed
to the corporation on the ground that they acted merely as a con-
duit for a corporate sale, the gain is not recognized by the corpora-
tion by virtue of section 337(a). So long as the sale is made within
the 12 month period following the adoption of the plan of liquida-
tion, there is no difference under section 337 (a) between a sale by
the corporation itself and one that is imputed to the corporation
under the Oourt Holding 00. case. This in turn means that in most
cases, the corporation itself will negotiate with potential buyers
and make the sale; there is no longer any need for the shareholders
to liquidate the corporation before looking for a buyer for the
assets or to employ the ritual endorsed by the O~tmberland Pteblic
Service 00. case. Moreover, the regulations permit the corporation
to negotiate for a sale even before the plan of liquidation is
adopted, thus foreclosing a possible government argument that
the sale was not made within "the 12-month period beginning on
the date of the adoption of such plan" if negotiations began before
the plan was adopted.126 The regulations go on to state that an
executory contract to sell is to be distinguished from a contract of
sale, thus implying that the former may precede the adoption of
the plan so long as the sale itself occurs within the prescribed
period. This suggestion, however, is followed by the ambiguous
statement: "Ordinarily, a sale has not occurred when a contract
to sell has been entered into but title and possession of the property
property (unless sold in bulk) and some installment obligations, so that sales of its
stock in trade in the regular course of business do not qualify for nonrecognition under
section 337(a).
It has been held that gain on property purchased after tho plan is adopted can
qualify for nonrecognition; see Frank W. Verito, 43 T.e. 429 (1965) (short-torm
capital gain on marketable securities representing a temporary investment of proceeds
of a prior sale under section 337).
See generally Note, Tax·Free Sales in Liquidation Under Seotion 88'1, 76 HARV. L.
REv. 780 (1963); Boland, A Eeview of Developments Under Scotion 88'1 of tllo Inter-
nal Eevenue Oode of 1954, 42 TAXES 676 (1964); Lowis & Schapiro, Sale of Oorporato
Business: Stock or Assets?, 14 N.Y.U. INST. 745 (1956); Silverstein, Seotion 33'1 and
Liquidation of the Multi-Oorporate Enterprise, 16 N.Y.U. INST. 429 (1958); Bolton
& Sherman, Oorporate Liquidations under Section 38'1, TAX :MANAGEMENT PORTFOLIO
18-4th (1968).
126 Reg. § 1.337-2(a).
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have not been transferred and the obligation of the seller to sell
or the buyer to buy is conditional." 121
The Plan-Nature and Timing
Section 337(a) provides for the nonrecognition of gain or loss
on sales by the corporation within the prescribed period. Because
the section is not elective, it may have the unexpected result of
denying a deduction for property sold at a loss in circumstances
where the shareholders had no thought of avoiding the 001trt Hold-
ing 00. case. For example, a corporation in a declining industry
may decide to sell its assets at a loss with the expectation of ap-
plying the loss against current profits or carrying it back to
earlier years under section 172, and then to distribute its assets in
complete liquidation. If the sale of the depreciated assets occurs
within the 12 month period beginning with the adoption of the plan
of liquidation, section B37(a) will prevent the recognition of the
loss, even though the circumstances that led to its enactment (the
possibility of a double tax under the Oom·t Holding 00. case) are
not present. With advance planning, however, the corporation may
be able to avoid the applicability of section 887(a), by making the
sale before adopting the plan of liquidation. Although the statute
does not define the phrase" the date of the adoption of such plan,"
the regulations provide that it is ordinarily the date on which the
shareholders adopt a resolution authorizing the distribution of the
corporation's assets (other than those retained to meet claims) in
redemption of the stock.128 The regulations go on to provide that
if the corporation sells substantially all of its property before the
shareholders adopt the resolution, the resolution date will be
treated as the date the plan was adopted. The purpose of this part
of the regulations is evidently to permit the recognition of loss (or
a combination of loss and gain) if the corporation is prepared to
sell substantially all of its property outside of section 837.
But if the corporation seeks to straddle section 337(a) by selling
its depreciated property before the shareholders act on the plan
of liquidation and its appreciated property thereafter, it may find
itself in difficulties. The regulations treat the shareholders' resolu-
tion as controlling only if the corporation sells substantially all of
its property before that date (thus recognizing both its gains and
121 Ibill.
~28 See Reg. § 1.337-2(b). See also Reg. § 1.337-6(n). Sec generally Harold O. Wales,
50 T.O. 399 (1968) (corporate filing of intent to dissolve held adoption of plan for ace·
tion 333).
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its losses) or after that date (thus subjecting both gains and losses
to nonrecognition under section 337). If the corporation splits its
sales, the regulations say that "the date of the adoption of the
plan of liquidation shall be determined from all the facts and cir-
cumstances. " 129 In the case of a straddle, the government might
successfully contend that the plan of liquidation was adopted-
albeit informally-when the corporation made the first sale of
property at a loss, or when it set about doing so. This predating of
the plan might make section 337(a) applicable to all sales, so that
neither gains nor losses would be recognized, or it might make sec-
tion 337(a) totally inapplicable, if more than 12 months elapsed
between the predated plan and the ultimate distribution of tho
assets in liquidation. The position of the Internal Revenue Service
is evidenced by Revenue Ruling 57-140,130 where a corporation
sold part of its assets at a loss, then adopted a plan of liquidation
by shareholder action, and then sold the rest of the assets. The
Service held that the plan was adopted when the shareholders
acted, but only on convincing proof that the earlier sale was not in
contemplation of liquidation and hence was not connected with the
later sale. Had the earlier sale been part of a prearranged plan of
liquidation, the ruling would no doubt have been adverse to the
taxpayer.
The Service has met with a singular lack of success in its efforts
to combat the straddle device, however, where taxpayers have been
careful to observe the proper formalities. For example, in Virginia
Ice db Freezing Corp.,131 the government lost in its argument that
an informal plan of complete liquidation had been adopted at a
directors' meeting preceding action by the shareholders, even
though one of the directors had in the past regularly received prox-
ies from most of the other shareholders. The formal shareholders'
resolution was accepted as the date of adoption of the plan. The
stock in this case was dispersed among 26 shareholders, but the
corporation in City Bank of Washington,132 acting with admitted
tax motivation, successfully sold its depreciated assets, adopted
its plan of liquidation, and sold its appreciated assets under sec-
tion 337 in that order. It is too early to assume that. the straddle
device is wholly reliable, especially if the depreciated and ap-
preciated assets are sold in two installments to the same buyer;
129 Reg. § 1.337-2(b).
1801957-1 e.B. 118.
181 30 T.e. 1251 (1958).
13238 T.e. 713 (1962), '/l(macq. on this issue, 1964-2 e.B. 4.
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but this seems to be a gamble in which the taxpayer has something
to win but ordinarily nothing to lose.
In the straddle cases, the taxpayers insisted on formality, argu-
ing that the plan was not adopted before the formal shareholders'
resolution. The shoe is often on the other foot, however, since the
shareholders of a closely held corporation may agree informally to
liquidate, but sell the assets before taking formal action to adopt a
plan of liquidation; indeed, they may distribute the proceeds of sale
and close up shop without complying with any of the formalities
seemingly required by section 337 or by state law. The Internal
Revenue Service has ruled that an informal agreement by share-
holders owning 75 per cent of the stock of a closely held corporation
that the corporation should sell its assets and distribute the pro-
ceeds in complete liquidation would be regarded as the adoption
of a plan, even though the formal shareholders' meeting and resolu-
tion followed the sale, where local law permitted shareholders own-
ing two thirds of the stock to approve a dissolution of the corpora-
tion.133 In the typical case of an informally conducted family
corporation that sells its assets at a gain, this ruling will be helpful
to the taxpayer; but it is not easily reconciled with the straddle
cases cited in the preceding paragraph. Where no formal resolu-
tion was adopted at any time, the courts have come to the tax-
payer's rescue on several occasions by holding that a plan of liqui-
dation can be adopted without a document in writing and that the
plan can be gleaned from all of the facts of a business transac-
tion.134 This pattern of behavior is obviously not to be recom-
mended, however, since it may take a lawsuit to establish the ap-
plicability of section 337, and the cases are in conflict. (One can
only speculate about the number of fraudulently predated docu-
ments that are employed in this area, where the stakes are high and
the taxpayer is likely to feel that his failure to adopt a plan in
advance was an inconsequential detail.) If a plan is adopted (either
formally, or by such informal action as quali.fi.es under section
337), the Service has ruled that failure to file the information re-
turn required by section 604:3 (Form 966) or the information re-
quired by section 1.337-6 of the regulations will not per se be fatal;
here again, however, compliance with the formalities is obviously
1SS R€V. RnI. 65-235, 1965-2 e.B. 88.
1S~ Bee .Alameda Realty Corp., 42 T.e. 273 (1964) i :Mountain Water Co. of La Cres-
centa, 35 T.e. 418 (1960). But see Whitson v. Rockwood, 190 F. Supp. 478 (S.D.N.D.
1960); Intercounty Development Corp., 20 T.e.:M. 1011 (1961) (both decisions rejecting
claims that an informal plan predated the sale). Bea gancrally Note, Liquidation of
Closely HeUl Corporations Under Bectictn 337, 16 Tu L. REv. 255 (1961).
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desirable, since a failure to do so may cause the Service to question
whether or when a plan was adopted.13G
After adopting a plan of liquidation in anticipation of a sale of
its assets, the corporation may be unable to consummate the sale;
and if a new opportunity to sell the assets arises at a later time, it
will be necessary to decide whether the original plan is still pend-
ing or a new one should be adopted, so as to insure that a plan is in
force before the sale is ;made and that the proceeds are distributed
in complete liquidation before the 12 month period expires. If the
original plan was clearly abandoned, a later plan would seem to be
necessary and effective; but a corporation that has been engaged
in a leisurely process of disposing of all of its assets under a plan
that is more than 12 months old can hardly expect to get the benefit
of section 337 for its final sale by purporting to call off the old plan
in favor of an allegedly new one.136 A corporation that may have to
make a quick sale of its assets in circumstances precluding the
adoption of a plan on the same day as the sale, but that does not
want its plan to be more than 12 months old when the sale is made,
may seek to meet the problem by adopting a plan contingent on the
sale itself. There is some authority for believing that such a con-
tingent plan is adopted when the sale occurs, rather than when the
resolution is passed.137
Complete Distribution Within 12 Month Perioll
Section 337 requires all corporate assets to be distributed in
complete liquidation within the 12 month period beginning on the
date the plan is adopted/3s except for assets retained to meet
185 Rev. Rul. 65-80, 1965-1 e.B. 154; Rev. RuI. 65-30, 1965-1 e.B. 165. SI10 (11so In·
tercounty Development Corp., 20 T.e.M. 1071 (1961) failure to file Form 966 liS ovldence
that no plan was adopted; Richard W. Pastene, 52 T.e. 647 (1969).
186 See Malcolm e. Howell, 40 T.e. 940 (1963) (old plan continued; no section 337).
But see Rev. Rul. 67-273, 1967-2 e.B. 137 (new plan not a mere extension of old);
West Street-Erie Blvd. Corp. v. United States, 411 F.2!l 738 (2d eir. 1961) (adop'
tion of new plan because of changed facts created new 12 month poriod).
181 See Henry H. Adams, 38 T.e. 549 (1962) (loss sales included in scction aa7
period). But sce Whitson v. Rockwood, 190 F. Sl1PP. 478 (S.D.N.D. 1960) (gllin slIlos
excluded from section 337 period).
188 Seetion 1.337-2 (b) of the regulations states that seetion 337 cannot apply if tho
distribution takes more than 12 months from the date the shareholders' resolution is
adopted. This outside limit may be shortened, however, if the plan was lIdopte(l before
the resolution. See generally Co=cnt, The Usc of Liquiifatinu Trusts to Obtain t110
Bmejits of Section 397 of tlle InternaZ Revenue OorIe Of 1964, 34 U. Ont. L. REV. 66a
(1967) i Bird Management, Inc., 48 T.e. 586 (1967).
In Riehard W. Pastene, 52 T.e. 647 (1969), distribution was timely whoro cbeclls
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claims. .Although contingent and unkno~ as well as fixed, claims
may be provided for, the amount retained must be reasonable and
the arrangements for payment must be made in good faith.wD The
regulations state that the term claims does not embrace amounts
set aside to meet claims of shareholders with respect to their stock.
.Although the Tax Court may disagree on this point, at least if the
claims are insignificant in amount, there is a safer way to provide
for payment to shareholders who cannot be located or whose rights
are in dispute, viz., a distribution of the net assets to an escrow
agent or trustee for the shareholders.Ho The same device may be
useful in providing for payment of contingent creditor claims
against the corporation; a distribution to a trustee for share-
holders, subject to the claims, may avoid the problem of proving
that a retention of assets by the corporation itself is reasonable in
amount. It will be noted that what is required is a distribution of
all of the assets (less amounts retained to pay claims) in complete
liquidation, not a formal dissolution of the corporation under state
law; but here, as elsewhere, a prompt or prearranged reactivation
of the corporation may be inconsistent with the claim that it was
completely liquidated.
Because section 337 provides flatly and without exception that
the assets must be distributed within a 12 month period beginning
when the plan of liquidation was adopted, it penalizes an inad-
vertent delay in effecting the distribution; and at the same time
it invites an effort at avoidance (e.g., to permit a loss on a sale of
the assets to be recognized) by stretching out the period of distribu-
tion. While it is too early to be sure that the latter maneuver will
always be successful, it has been upheld in at least one case.HI A
delivered t{l shareholders (even though paid after 12 month period) bcCtlWlo corpora·
tion had sufficient funds t{l cover, even though deposited in another acconnt.
139 OoB.M., Inc. v. Comm'r, 427 F.2d 661 (2d Cir. 1970) (reasonable excWl~ontingent
liabilities and contingent assets-for fnilure t{l distribute within 12 months).
140 See Jeanese, Inc. v. United States, 341 F.2d 502 (9th Cir. 1905) (inventory assets
retained to meet claims); Reg. § 1.337-2(b) (retention to pay ahnreholder claims not
allowed; distribution to trustee for shareholders permissible); Monntain Water Co. of
La Crescenta, 35 T.O. 418 (1960) (small amonnts t{l meet shareholder claims); Rev.
Rnl. 63-245, 1963-2 OoB. 144 (distribution of clnim that cannot be readily dirlded to
trustee for shareholders for collee-tion and distribution of proceeds; approved); Rev.
Rnl. 65-257, 1965-2 O.B. 89 (distribution to ese-row agent for dissenting minority
shareholders).
The ubiquitous problem of stoek v. debt crops up once more: An amount retained to
meet the claims of shareholder creditors will be fatal to a seetion 337 tran~ction if
their claims tum out to be stoek rather than bona fide debt. Seo John TOWIl, Inc., 46
T.O. 107 (1966), ail'a per euri<Jm, 67-1 U.S.T.O. 'Il 9462 (7th Cir. 1907).
:L41 See Milwaukee Sanitarium v. United States, 193 F. Supp. 299 (E.D. Wis. 1901).
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foresighted taxpayer who wishes to avoid section 337 will also
refrain from taking any formal action to adopt a plan of liquida~
tion, a refinement which will impose on the Service the formidable
burden of (1) proving that a plan was informally adopted and (2)
persuading a court that the deliberate delay in distributing the
assets should be disregarded and the distribution treated as com~
plying with section 337. The Service's chance of success in these
circumstances seems so slight that little would be lost by a formal
ruling permitting a taxpayer who wishes to avoid section 337 to
do so by deliberately stretching out the distribution period.
Insolvent Corporations
In Revenue Ruling 56-387/42 the Service ruled that section
337(a) does not apply unless there is a distribution to the share~
holders of the corporation, so that an insolvent corporation whose
assets will be distributed entirely to its creditors cannot take ad~
vantage of section 337(a). The theory of the ruling is that section
337(a) was designed to obviate double taxation of the corporation
and its shareholders, but not to eliminate the tax on gains from
sales of corporate assets in conjunction with a liquidation.
Under the ruling, an insignificant distribution to shareholders
could eliminate a very large corporate tax. Moreover, whether the
shareholders receive a distribution or not, they will not necessarily
pay a tax, as the ruling erroneously assumes: The distribution may
be less than their basis, they may be tax-exempt institutions, et
cetera. Despite the weakness of the ruling, it was influential in the
rejection of a plan of reorganization proposed under Chapter X,
on the ground that the hazard of a corporate tax on a sale of the
assets of an insolvent corporation was so great that the plan could
not be regarded as equitable and feasible.u3
SECTION 337-NoNQ.UALIFYING ASSETS AND DISPOSITIONS
Account must be taken of a number of transactions to which
section 337 does not apply:
For inadvertant disqualifications, see Harriet Fibel, 44 T.C. 647 (1965); Covored
Wagon, Inc., 24 T.C.M. 641, 24 T.C.M. 427 (1965), at!'iJ, 369 F.2d 629 (8th Cir. 1966).
142 1956-2 C.B. 189.
143 See In 1'6 Inland Gas Corp., 241 F.2d 374 (6th Cir.), cere. denied, 355 U.S. 838
(1957). The position adopted in Revenue Ruling 56-387, 1956-2 C.B. 189, may have been
inspired by the nonapplicability of section 332 to the liquidation of an insolvent sub.
sidiary; but section 332 speaks of a "distribution • . . in complote cancellation or
redemption of all [the subsidiary's] stock," whereas section 337 rofers only to a
distribution of all of the assets in complete liquidation, less those retained to meet
claims.
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Inventory Property and Installment Obligations
Section 337 is inapplicable to sales of the corporation's stock in
trade, inventory and most installment obligations. The reason for
excluding these items is that section 337 was aimed at winding up
sales, rather than sales in the regular course of business even
though occurring during the final months of the corporation's life.
In keeping with this spirit, however, section 337(b) (2) makes an
exception for a bulk sale of substantially all of the inventory prop-
erty to one person in one transaction.Hi Although the statute is
silent on the time when the" substantially all" test is to be applied,
section 1.337-3(b) of the regulations provides that this determina-
tion is to be made at the time of the bulk sale. This means that a
corporation can make taxable sales of inventory property in the
regular course of business after adoption of its plan of liquidation,
with a tax-free bulk sale of its remaining stock in trade just before
distribution of its assets inliquidation.UG Moreover, because section
337(b) (2) permits a bulk sale of stock in trade which is attributable
to a business of the corporation, section 337(a) will apply to the
bulk sale of inventory of one business, without regard to what the
corporation does with the stock in trade of any otlLer business it
may be engaged in.146
If a corporation holding appreciated inventory property does not
wish to sell it in bulk, it may be possible to avoid a double tax even
though section 337(a) does not apply. The property in question
might be distributed in liquidation to the shareholders, and sold
by them as partners in reliance on the Oumbet·Zand P1.lblic Service
00. case. There is some reason to believe, however, that the Oourt
Holding 00. doctrine would be applied even more freely to so-called
shareholder sales of inventory than to their sales of other types of
144 See The Luff Co., 44 T.C. 532 (1965) (bulk sale of work in process inventory
qualified for section 337 nonrecognition treabnent); Hollywood Bnseb:ill All3'n v.
Co='r, 423 F.2d 494 (9th eir. 1970) (baseb:ill player contracts gnve rise to incoma
on sale despite section 337, under Corn Products doctrine). Sec also Lee, NCIJJ Caso
Greatly Broadens Ezeeptions to Nonrecognition Provisions of Section SS7, 33 J. T..u:-
ATION 20 (1970).
See also Jeanese, Inc. v. United States, 341 F.2d 502 (9th Cir. 19GG), holding that n
bulk sale of the corporation's stock in trllda qualified despito retention of certain in-
ventory subject to claims based on a. purchase contract (but bulk trmlsfer of an inven-
tory subject to such claims seems safer).
145 Winer v. CO='r, 371 F.2d 684 (1st Cir. 1967) (cost of goods sold adjusted to
reflect tax-free sale of inventory under section 337); Richard W. PnsteneJ G2 T.C.
647 (1969) (distinction between bulk snle to one buyer and piecemeal snle3 to customers
through an agent).
146 Reg. §§ 1.337-3(c) and (d).
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property, at least if the corporation's business is in effect carried
on by the shareholders at the same place, in the same way and with
the same customers. In the Oumberland P'ltblio Servioe 00. case,
the court said: "The corporate tax is thus aimed primarily at the
profits of a going concern." Sales of the distributed inventory in
the ordinary course of business, even though made in form by the
shareholders, might be regarded as a belated realization of cor-
porate profits.141
The treatment of a sale of installment obligations is considerably
more complex, involving as it does an interrelationship between
sections 453(d), 336 and 337(b). In general, section 453(d) (1) pro-
vides that any disposition of an installment obligation by the holder
thereof will terminate the deferral privilege with respect to the
gain segment of the obligation. However, section 453(d)(4)(B)
makes an exception for transfers in liquidations if the obligation
could have been sold without recognition of gain under section 337
(provided it did not arise in a sale of property subject to the re-
capture of depreciation under section 1245 or section 1250). Sec-
tion 337(b) in turn provides generally that installment obliga-
tions 148 do not constitute property subject to section 337(a),
unless they arose from the sale of noninventory property aftel'
adoption of the plan of liquidation or from a qualified bulk sale of
inventory under section 337(b){2). This labyrinthine set of rules
may be summarized as follows:
(1) Installment obligations acquired on a sale of noninven-
tory property (other than section 1245 or section 1250 recapture
property) or on a bulk sale of inventory after adoption of the
plan of liquidation can be sold or exchanged by the corporation
under section 337(a), or distributed without recognition of gain
or loss under sections 336 and 453(d) (4) (B).
(2) All other installment obligations will produce gain at the
corporate level under section 453(d)(1), whether sold under
section 337 or distributed in kind under section 336 (subject to a
147 United States v. Lynch, 192 F.2d 718 (9th air. 1951), cert. c1enfec1, 843 U.S. 934
(1952).
148 Obligations may be installment obligations within the meaning of section 837,
even though they do not qualify as such under section 453. See Family Record Plan,
Inc., 36 T.e. 305 (1961), ajf'c1 on other grounds, 309 F.2d 208 (9th Cir. 1962); Sara G.
Wimp, 20 T.e.Y. 1790 (1961). The Family Record theory was followed by tho Tax
Court in Coast Coil Co., 50 T.e: 528 (1968), ajf'd per curiam, 422 F.2(1 402 (9th Otr.
1970), the court holding that sale of previously taxed receivables at II. loss allowed as a
deduction from sale of nonqualified installment obligations.
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minor exception, by virtue of section 453(d)(4)(A), for section
332 liquidations with a section 334(b) (1) basis) .14ll
It should be noted that whether the corporation recognizes gain
on installment obligations distributed to its shareholders or not,
their fair market value must be taken into account in computing
the shareholders' gain or loss on the liquidating distribution. Thus,
when a corporation is arranging for a sale of its assets under sec-
tion 337, its shareholders have nothing to gain from a sale on the
installment basis so far as their own tax liability is concerned, aI-
. though there may of course be a business reason for spreading
the payments over a period of time.IllO
The Requirement of a Sale or ExclU1nge
Nonrecognition treatment is available under section 337 only
for gain or loss on the sale or exchange of property, a term which
has generated its own special body of technical minutiae, especially
in the capital gain area, where a disposition of property may be a
taxable event but not constitute a sale or exchange as required by
section 1222 (definition of capital gain and 10ss).1ll1 Transactions
that have been held to constitute sales in applying section 1222
should also be so regarded in applying section 337.Ill2 The status
of "artificial" sales-i.e., transactions that are treated as sales in
applying section 1222 or other provisions, even though they would
not otherwise be so characterized-is more problematical. Early
in section 337's history, the Internal R-evenue Service ruled that
gain on collecting the proceeds of insurance after a building was
'destroyed by fire was not realized on "a sale or exchange • . • of
property" under section 337, although the transaction would be
treated as a sale in applying section 1231. Mter several litigation
149 As to the distribution of section 453 instnllment obligations by n. liquidnting cor.
poration, section 453 (d) (4) (A) was amended by Publie Law Number 89-809 (1966)
to limit nonrecognition to section 332 liquidntions in which tho parent corporotlon ob-
tains a carry over basis under section 334(b) (1). For contrary result under prior l!Lw,
see Cherry v. United States, 264 F. Supp. 969 (C.D. Cal. 1907).
150 Freeman v. Comm'r, 303 F.2d 580 (8th Cir. 1962); Leonard S. Krouse, 20 T.C.Y.
358 (1967).
151 See Note, TlIe Elements of a Seotion 117 "Sale or E:rc'hange." 53 CoLlJU. L. EEv.
976 (1953). See also Comm'r v. Brown, 380 U.S. 563 (1905).
152 In. Hollywood Baseball Ass'n, 42 T.C. 234 (1964), tho Tax Court held tlw.t tho
term should be more liberally construed in applying section 337; four judge3 dJseented
on this issue. See also Comtel Corp. v. Comm'r, 376 F.2d 791 (lld Gir.), cert. iIcnfeiI,
389 U.S. 929 (1967) (transaction a disguised loan rather than n. &110).
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failures, however, the Service held that all gains and losses on the
involuntary conversion of property by casualty qualify under sec-
tion 337.153 In some cases, such events would not constitute sales
under section 1231 or otherwise (e.g., involuntary conversion of
assets held for six months or less), and their status under section
337 is still debatable, although taxpayers are likely to raise the
issue only on incurring a loss.154 If transactions that enjoy the
status of sales under section 1231 are to qualify for nonrecognition
of gain or loss under section 337, there seems to be no reason to
exclude transactions that are treated as sales by other statutory
provisions, e.g., losses on worthless securities (section 165(g))
and gains and losses on corporate liquidations and redemptions
(sections 331(a) (1) and 302), on the cancellation of leases or dis-
tributorship agreements (section 1241), and the retirement of
bonds (section 1232).155
It should be noted that a transaction may constitute a sale in
applying section 337 but fail to qualify for nonrecognition because
it occurred before the plan of liquidation was adopted. Condemna-
tions are especially troublesome in this respect, since under local
law title may pass to the public authority without advance warning
153 See Rev. RuL 56-372, 1956-2 C.B. 187, revoked by Rev. Rut 64-100, 1964-1 C.B.
130.
Taxpayers who incur casualty losses may wish to litigate this mntter further, on tho
ground that section 1231 overrides Helvering v. William Flaccus Oak Leather Co., BIB
U.S. 247 (1941) (no"sale" on collection of fire insurance proceeds) only if tho gains
and losses are recognized; and if the corporation's section 1231 losses exceed its gains,
on the added ground that section 1231 creates an artificial sale only wIlen gains oxcood
losses.
In United States v. Morton, 387 F.2d 441 (8th air. 1968), section 337 was held to
apply even where the casualty occurred prior to adoption of the plan of liquidation,
a result that seems clearly contrary to the condemnation cases.
154 The treatment of casualty gains and losses to long-term business or capital assets
was refined by the Tax R-eform Act of 1969 to provide that such gains and losses aro
first netted separately and, if losses exceed gains, they are to be treated as ordinary
gains and losses; if, however, casualty gains exceed cnsualty losses, such gains and
losses go into the general netting pot with any other section 1231 items for tho year.
It can be argued that section 1231 casualty transactions ought to bo viowed moro
liberally under section 337 in view of the parties' inability to control, or plnn for,
the transaction (other than holding their section 337 plan meeting during the fire, or
adopting a shelf liquidation plan, contingent upon a major catastrophe to corporate
properties) .
155 See Rev. RuI. 57-243, 1957-1 C.B. 116 (gain on liquidation of 60 per cent owned
subsidiary); 84 Woodbine St. Realty Corp., 22 T.C.M. 1324 (1963) (condemnation;
held, sale occurred when condemning authority obtained title to proporty; no scction
1232 sale on collecting award from state). But see Rev. RuI. 69-18, 1969-1 O.B. 188
(regulated investment company's capital gain dividend not snle by the liquidating cor-
poration of its assets). Note also section 1253 (added in 1969) which may convort cor-
tain franchise dispositions into ttnonsale" transactions.
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to the taxpayer, so that there is no time to adopt a plan of liquida-
tion.156
Sale of Property-Relation to A.ssignment of Income,
Clear Reflection of Income and
Tax Benefit Principles
A substantial body of case law and rulings has evolved in the
complete liquidation area, under which a corporation that dis-
tibutes its assets in kind may have to recognize the accrued or
potential income inherent therein. Whether they invoke assign-
ment of income principles, the requirement of section 446(b) that
the taxpayer's accounting method must clearly reflect income, or
the tax benefit doctrine, these authorities seem equally applicable
to a complete liquidation under section 337, so far as assets dis-
tributed in kind are concerned. The important question, however,
is the extent to which they apply to assets that are sold, rather
than distributed, by the liquidating corporation, in view of sec-
tion 337's principle of not recognizing gain or loss on "the sale
or exchange [by the corporation] of property."
The function of section 337-to eliminate the distinction between
Court Holding Co. situations and Cumberland P'llblic Ber-vice 00.
situations-strongly suggests that section 337 should be inter-
preted, whenever possible, in such a way as to minimize the dis-
parities between these situations. If the tax results at the cor-
porate level are to be identical whether the corporation sells the
assets itself, or distributes them to its shareholders for sale by
them, nonrecognition of gain cannot be accorded to a transaction
under section 337 if a liquidating distribution in kind of property
involved would have generated income under the assignment of
income, tax benefit or section 446 (b) principles discussed
earlier.157 In keeping with this approach, the cases and rulings
156 See Wendell v. Comm'r, 326 F.2d 600 (2d eir. 19G4), and casC3 thero cited;
A.T. Newell :Realty Co., 53 T.C. 130 (1969).
A recent condemnation case where section 337 did not npply becauso (1) tho snle
occurred prior to adoption of the plan, and (2) tho distributions did not oceur r.ithin
the requisite 12 month period, is Covered Wagon, Inc. v. Commissioner, 30!! F.2d 6:::9
(8th eir. 1966). But see West Street-Erie :Blvd. Corp. v. United States, 411 F.2d 738
(2d eir. 1969) (adoption of new plan becauso of changed fads crroted now 12 month
period and saved taxpayer from timing bind caused by dilatory condemnntion process).
157 Sales at a loss (e.g., the sale of a partinlly completed construction contrnct for
less than the accumulated costs by a taxpayer using tho completed controet method of
acconnting) are troublesome to 1it into this framework: If tho 1003 would go unrec-
ognized on a distribution of the contract rights, a disparity can be nvoided only by
applying the nonrecognition rule of section 337. Yet a salo of tho same contrnct at a
gain would have to be excluded from the nonrecognition rulo to avoid ll. disparity r.ith
section 336. Of course, the disparity would be avoided if tho loss could bo recognized
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exhibit a tendency to limit section 337 so as to achieve a parity
between sales of assets by the corporation and distributions in
kind.
In refusing to apply the nonrecognition rule of section 337 to
gain or income that would have been recognized if there had been
a distribution in kind of the assets reflecting the gain, the cases and
rulings assert either that the term "property" in section 337(a)
does not include so-called income items IllS or, more broaclly, that
the provision taken as a whole was not intended to override the
assignment of income, tax benefit and section 446(b) principles
that would have applied if the liquidating corporation had dis-
tributed its assets in kind. Thus, in Oommissioner v. K'lec7cenberg,tllD
where a cash basis corporation sold accrued rights to compensa-
tion income, the court held the sales proceeds taxable despite sec-
tion 337, by dual reliance on the clear reflection of income language
of section 446 (b) and principles sounding in assignment of in-
come.16D
The courts also have generally, though not unanimously,l61 held
that liquidating corporations must include bad debt reserve ac-
counts in gross income upon selling their accounts receivable, on
the ground that the reserve represents deductions for anticipated
losses which did not in fact occur. The Supreme Court decision
in Nash v. United Btates l62 that bad debt reserve accounts need
not be restored to income upon a transfer of the receivables in a
on a distribution of the contract in kind; but so far there have been no section 336 caSeD
involving the deductibility of a loss in such circumstances.
158 See Eustice, Contract Bights, Capital Gain, and .d.ssignment of Income-Tho
Ferrer Case, 20 TAX L. REV. 1 (1964); Lyon & Eustice, Assignment 01 Incomo: Fruit and
Tree as Irrigated by the P.G. Lake Case, 17 TAX L. REV. 293 (1962).
159309 F.2d 202 (9th air. 1962).
160 See also Rev. Rut 59-120, 1959-1 C.B. 74 (sale of discount notes with accrued
interest by a cash basis taxpayer); Central Bldg. & Loan ASS'Il, 34 '1'.C. 447 (11)60)
(notes with accrued interest); Family Record Plan, Inc. v. Comm'r, 36 T.O. 305
(1961), atJ'd on other groonds, 309 F.2d 208 (9th air. 1962) (accounts receivable arising
from sales of goods and services).
161 West Seattle Nat'l Bank v. Comm'r, 288 F.2d 47 (9th Cir. 1961) (sale at face
value). If the receivables are sold for less than face, there is authority both for and
against taking the bad debt reserve into income. See J.E. Hawes Corp., 44 T.O. 705
(1965) (taxable); Mountain States Mixed Feed Co. v. United States, 245 F. Supp.
369 (D. Colo. 1965) (contra); Bird Management, Inc., 48 T.C. 586 (1967).
In James M. Pierce Corp. v. Commissioner, 326 F.2d 67 (8th air. 1964), the court
relied on the West Seattle Ban7c case to require a publisher to take deferred subscrIp.
tion income into account on liquidating, but permitted this to be offset by II deduotion
on the theory that the taxpayer had paid the buyer to take over the liabilities attrIbu.
table to the reserve in the form of a reduced sales price for the assots.
162398 U.S. 1 (1970). For a decision applying Nash to section 337 sales, seo Citizens
Acceptance Corp. v. United States, 70-2 U.S.T.C. 11 9711 (D. Del. 1970).
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tax-free incorporation under section 351, however, undermines,
though it does not directly overrule, the rationale of the decisions
in the section 337 area. Since the section 337 cases and the section
351 bad debt reserve cases have tended to rely interchangeably
upon each other, the Nash decision will encourage taxpayers to
relitigate the issue. The relationship of the tax benefit doctrine to
sections 337 and 336 has also resulted in conflicting decisions in
other situations involving the sale or distribution of items whose
costs had been expensed by the liquidating corporation with tax
benefit.163 Tax benefit principles may only be applicable where the
deductions have preceded the year of sale of the related property,
however, since if the two events occur in the same period, other
adjustment mechanisms (capitalize or disallow the expense) are
available.164
In an effort to confine section 337 to its proper role, it is some-
times suggested that it applies only to corporate capital gains,
not to ordinary income.lOG While this generalization is roughly
correct, it can be pushed to the point of overkill. Section 337 itself
expressly sanctions nonrecognition of gain or loss on a bulk sale
of inventory and certain installment obligations, even though such
gain or loss if recognized would almost certainly be noncapital.
Moreover, it seems quite clear that some other assets qualify for
nonrecognition under section 337, even though they would yield
ordinary gain or loss if sold outside of section 337, e.g., 001"'17, Pro-
ducts assets; business assets held for six months or less; copy-
rights or other similar property described by section 1221(3); et
168 See Commissioner v. Anders, 414 F.2d 1283 (10th air.), cat. iIcniciI, 390 U.s.
958 (1969), where the court held that gain from the SlIle of previously expCIlEed prop-
erty is taxable under tax benefit principles notwithstanding section 337. Sec, by con·
trast, the results under section 336, note 112 supra.
164 See United States v. Spitalny, 430 F.2d 195 (9th Cir. 1970) (tax benefit rule not
followed where sale and expense occurred in same year; expense instend diEnllowed, or
capitalized so as to reduce unrecognized gain).
165 The high water mark in assimilating the term property in section 337 to the
term capital asset as defined by section 1221 is Prldemnrk, Inc. v. Comm.iE3ioner, 345
F.2d 35 (4th air. 1965), holding gain on a snle of eertnin SlIles contracts tnxable de-
spite section 337, on the ground that "the ineompleted SlIlcs contracts not being cnpi.
tal assets, the proceeds received for their assignment are to be taxed ns ordinnry in·
come." (This language is broader than neccsslU"Y to the result, however, and it may
be treated in later eases as an overgeneralization rather than a holding.) Sea also Cnlley
v. United States, 220 F. Supp. 111 (S.D. W. Va. 1963) (npplying section 337 to insure
ance agent's expirations and renewals on ground that they constituted capitnl assets);
Frank W. Verito, 43 T.C.429 (1965).
In Coast Coil Co., 50 ':I;'.C. 528 (1968), at!'d per curiam, 422 F.2d 40:1 (9th Cir. 1970),
the Tax Court followed the Priilemar7; view that section 337 did not apply to snle of
noncapital assets.
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cetera.166 Hence, even though the sales on which Congress focused
in enacting section 337 ordinarily involved assets that would gen·
erate capital gain or loss under section 1221 or section 1231, the
provision as written is not so narrowly confined. On balance, the
parity treatment of sales under section 337 and distributions in
kind under section 336, described above, has much to commend it
as a solution to the interpretive problems in this area.167
Despite the general efficacy of attempting to harmonize sec·
tion 337 with section 336, the Ninth Circuit, in Hollywood Baseball
Association v. Commissioner,16s applied the Corn Products doctrine
to require corporate recognition of gain, despite section 337, upon
the sale of "business related" contracts, ignoring its previous de·
cision in South Lake Farms 16D that section 336 distributions in
kind of expensed inventory items did not give rise even to tax
benefit recapture income, let alone the profit element attributable
to those assets. Thus, it would appear that the C~tmberlandPublic
Service Co. and Court Holding Co. dichotomy dies hard in this
area.
Recapture of Depreciafion, Ef Cetera
The nonrecognition rule of section 337 is subordinate to the re·
capture of excess depreciation under sections 1245 and 1250, as well
166 Corn Products Refining Co. v. Comm'r, 350 U.S. 46 (1955) (ordInary incomo on
sale of business connected futures contracts); Comm'r v. Bagley &, Sowall Co., 221
F.2d 944 (2d air. 1955) (ordinary loss on sale of business connected govornmont bonds).
See also Eustice, Oontract Bights, Oapital Gain, and L1ssignment of Incomc-1.'110 Ferrer
Oase, 20 TAX L. REV. 1, 69-70 (1964). Although it is impossible to be dogmatic in
such a murky area, the limitations on section 336 would have to be pushod boyond
their present location to permit recognition of gain or loss on a distribution in kind of
'llSsets such as these; but the theory that the nonrecognition rule of section 337 does
not cover ordinary income or loss would lead to the recognition of gain or loss on a
liquidating sale of these assets, and those mentioned in the text. If so, tho dichotomy
between Oourt Holding 00. and Oumberland Public Service 00. would be porpotuatod
in this area.
It should be noted that the Service has acknowledged that section 337 applics to
potential ordinary income in at least one ruling. Rev. Rul. 59-308, 1959-2 a.B. 110
(gain on sale of defense facilities embraced by section 337, altllOUgh constituting or·
dinary income under section 1238). Note also that section 337 covers short-torm capital
gain, although it often has the sanle tax result as ordinllry income. See Frank W. Vorito,
43 T.C. 429 (1965).
167 Frank W. Verito, 43 T.C. 429, 440 (1965) : <t [T]he purpose of section 337 was to do
away with the necessity of deciding who made the sale as long as tho corporation is in
a state of complete liquidation and the sale (of property) takes placo within a cortaIn
period of time. .Any result which would cause the question of taxation to onco again do·
pend upon who made the sale, where the formal requirements of tho section havo boon
met, would be a direct violation of the section."
168423 F.2d 494 (9th air. 1970).
169324 F.2d 837 (9th air. 1963).
Imaged with the Permission of N.Y.D. Tax Law Review
HeinOnline -- 26 Tax L. Rev. 267 1970-1971
1971] COMPLETE LIQUIDATIONS 267
as to section 47(a), providing for a recapture of the investment
credit on early disposition of the property on which the credit was
based/70 and to the recapture rules of sections 1251 and 1252, re-
lating to dispositions of certain farm properties.
Effect of Nonrecognition of Gain on Deductions
Section 265(a) forbids the deduction of any amount "which is
allocable to one or more classes of income other than interest .••
wholly exempt from [income] taxes.)) The Internal Revenue Ser-
vice ruled in 1960 that gain subject to nonrecognition under sec-
tion 337 was exempt for the purpose of applying section 265, with
the result that expenses and state income taxes attributable thereto
were not deductible; after losing a series of cases on this point,
however, the Service revoked its 1960 ruling.111 See also Royal
Oak Apartments, Inc.,172 holding that a liquidating corporation
could deduct state excise taxes imposed on its section 337 un-
recognized gain, even though actual payment was made by the
taxpayer's shareholders, the corporation having retained insuf-
ficient assets to discharge the liability. The court found a construc-
tive payment by the corporation, in view of its primary liability.
Presumably the shareholders would also be entitled to a capital loss
deduction, under Arrowsmith 'lJ. Oom11tissioner,t73 if their capital
gain or loss on the liquidating distribution was computed and re-
ported without allowance for this liability.
There seems to be little justification for allowing a liquidating
corporation to deduct the expenses of selling its assets, in view of
the well established principle that such expenses are an offset
against the sales proceeds, reducing the corporation's realized gain
or 10ss.174 .As to sales under section 337, however, where the gain or
loss goes unrecognized, the cases are in conflict.17G If the expense
110 FranJdin Clayton, 52 T.C. 911 (1969).
111. See Rev. Rul. 63-234, 1963-2 C.B. 148, revoking Rev. Rut 00-::!36, 1900-2 O.B.109.
See also Co='r v. McDonald, 320 F.2d 109 (5th air. 1963).
11243 T.C. 243 (1964), acq.
113344 U.S. 6 (1952).
114 See generally Woodward v. Comm'r, 397 U.S. 572 (1970) j Hilton Hotels Corp. v.
United States, 397 U.S. 1036 (1970); Third Nat'l Bank in Nashville v. United State3,
427 F.2d 343 (6th air. 1970); Helgerson v. United States, 426 F.2d 1293 (8th air.
1970) as to the requirement that acquisition and selling costs must be capltalizeil.
115 For decisions allowing a deduction for expenses of &Iles under section 337, sec
Pridemark, Inc. v. Commissioner, 345 F.2d 35 (4th air. 19(5) (legal fees nllowed as
liquidation expense) j United States v. Mountain States Mixed Feed Co., 365 F.2d
244 (10th air. 1966). Contra, Alphaco, Inc. v. Nelson, 385 F.2d 244 (7th Cir. 19(7);
United States v. Morton, 387 F.2d 441 (8th air. 1968) j Lanrao, Inc. v. United State3, 422
F.2d 481 (6th Cir.1970).
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of distributing assets in kind can be included in the corporation's
deductible liquidation expenses, a denial of a deduction for ex~
penses attributable to assets that are sold will create a disparity
between section 336 and section 337; but ordinarily the cost of ar~
ranging an in kind distribution is slight in comparison to the
broker's commissions, legal fees, et cetera, incurred on a sale of
assets.
The liquidating corporation'8 deductions may also have to be
adjusted in other respects in the context of a section 337 liquida~
tion. For example, the cost of goods sold account requires an ad~
justment if inventory is sold tax-free under section 337, to avoid a
deduction for the cost of the unrecognized sales, as the court
pointed out in Winer v. Gommissioner.176 The Service has held,
however, in Revenue Ruling 56-448 177 that gain unrecognized un~
der section 337 does not reduce the liquidating corporation's net
operating loss for the year of sale under section 172(c), despite
the economic profit realized from such sales.178
SECTION 337-NONQUALIFIED LIQUIDATIONS
Section 337 is made inapplicable to the liquidation of collapsi-
ble corporations, as well as to liquidations under sections 333 and
332 and partial liquidations and stock redemptions, for the reasons
set out hereafter.
Collapsible Corporations
If section 337 were applicable to collapsible corporations, the
punitive provisions of section 341 would be nullified. For the Cor-
poration would then be able to sell its assets, avoiding the recogni~
tion of its gain under section 337, while the shareholders would
escape section 341(a), because the corporation would have realized
(though without recognizing) its gain, and hence would not be a
collapsible corporation under section 341(b). To protect seotion
The Woodward and Hilton Hotel decisions support the view that stich expenses nro
capital in nature, and will probably result in accelerating the current trend of decisions
toward BtIch treatment in the section 337 sale area as well.
See also Beauchamp & Brown Grov:es Co. v. Commissioner, 371 F.2d 942 (9th Oir.
1967), holding that section 268 requires cost of grovling crop to be capitnlized, even
though gain on sale of land and crop is tax-free under section 337.
116 371 F.2d 684 (1st air. 1967).
1111956-2 C.B. 130.
118 See also United States v. Spitalny, 430 F.2d 195 (9th air. 1970) (expensss in year
of sale).
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341, therefore, section 337 is made inapplicable to collapsible cor-
porations by section 337(c) (1) (A). The statutory language is be-
low par, because it leaves room for the argument that a corpora-
tion that sells its assets has realized its gain (even though it is
not recognized) and therefore is not collapsible Under section
341(b) ; but the regulations rightly reject this literally possible, but
otherwise untenable, constructionpo
The denial of the benefits of section 337(a) to a collapsible cor-
poration, however, does not automatically result in the corpora-
tion's recognition of gain on a sale of its property, as is sometimes
assumed. The corporation may distribute the assets in liquidation;
although the shareholders will be taxed on their gain under section
341(a), subject to the limitations of section 341(d), they may pro-
ceed to sell the assets as individuals, relying on the Oumberlana
Public Service ao. case to avoid an attribution of the sale to the
corporation. If the corporation itself makes the sale (or if the sale
is attributed to the corporation under the Oourt Holding 00. case),
however, it will recognize its gain because section 337(a) is inap-
plicable, but this recognition of gain on the sale will make the puni-
tive provisions of section 341 inapplicable to the shareholders by
taking the corporation out of the collapsible category.180
Under a 1958 amendment, a restricted group of otherwise col-
lapsible corporations became eligible for the benefits of section 337.
See also section 341(f), added in 1964, which provides that sales
of section 341(f) assets will not qualify for nonrecognition treat-
ment under section 337.
Elective One lJlonth Liquidations Under Section 333
Section 337(c) (1) (B) provides that section 337 is inapplicable
if the corporation is liquidated under section 333, providing for
nonrecognition of gain by electing shareholders on a one month
liquidation. Although the Senate report on the 1954: Code does not
state why section 337 was made inapplicable to such liquidations,
presumably this was done so that tax will not be avoided at both
the corporate and shareholder levels by a use of section 337 and
section 333 in combination.181 Since a use of section 333 by any
119 Reg. § 1.337-1. A seeond line of defense open to the CoIlUlli£sioner in some circum-
stanees would be to predate the adoption of the plan of liquidation to the time the col-
lapsible corporation was organized, in whieh event the liquidation would probably Dot be
completed within the prescribed 12 month period.
180 See Rev. Rul. 58-241, 1958-1 C.B. 179; Rev. Rul 03-125,1903-2 C.B. 1411; Sproul
Realty Co., 38 T.C. 844 (1962).
181 The corporation, if seetion 337 were applicable, could sell its m:.sets without
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shareholder bars the use of section 337 by the corporation, the
shareholders' interests may be very divergent. For example, if
the individual shareholders elect to proceed under section 333,
a sale of assets by the corporation may result in a corporate tax,
thus reducing the value of the liquidating distribution for all share-
holders. The sale, moreover, will increase the corporation's cash
and earnings and profits, thus affecting the computation of gain
under sections 333(e) and (f). These complications may be reduced
if the corporation is liquidated under section 333 and the property
is sold by the shareholders under the shelter of the Oumberland
Public Service Co. case. If the shareholders fail to bring the trans-
action within that case, however, and the sale is attributed to the
corporation under the Court Holding Co. doctrine, there will be a
tax at the corporate level, and in addition the shareholders' gain
under section 333(e) and section 333(f) will probably have to be
recomputed on the theory that they constructively receive the
sales proceeds from the corporation, rather than the property
itself.
Liquidations of Subsidiary Corporations Under Section 332
By virtue of section 337(c) (2), sales and exchanges by a sub-
sidiary in conjunction with a section 332 liquidation (tax-free liqui-
dation of an 80 per cent subsidiary) are not covered by the non-
recognition rule of section 337(a), except for the limited class of
section 332 liquidations subject to the statutory Kimbell-Diamond
provision.l82 Section 337(a) is apparently made inapplicable to
the normal section 332 liquidation because the liquidation itself is
not a taxable event, so that if section 337(a) were applicable, gain
on a sale of appreciated property by the subsidiary would not be
recognized by either the subsidiary or the parent. Because section
337(a) does not apply, however, gain on a sale of the subsidiary's
recognizing gain, invest the proceeds in other property and distribute the newly lIcquired
property under section 333. Unless the transaction was regarded as, in substance, a dis-
tribution of money (which does not qualify for nonrecognition under section aaa), the
shareholders would avoid a tax at the shareholder level except to the extent of the
corporation's earnings and profits, which would have been increased by the sale.
182 For this limited type of section 332 liquidation, section 337 is applicable, in effect,
only to the preacquisition appreciation in value; if the subsidiary sells its assets for
more than the parent paid for the stock, that part of the gain is taxable. Seo Reg.
§ 1.337-4. See generally United States Holding Co., 44 T.C. 323 (1965), aoq.
See also Rev. Rul. 69-172, 1969-1 C.B. 99, for liquidations by parent subsidiary
chains, pointing out the continuing Court Holding Co. risk in this area if tho liquida-
tions and sales occur in the wrong order.
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assets will be recognized either by the subsidiary (if it makes the
sale or if a sale by the parent is attributed to it under the 001.trt
Holding 00. case) or by the parent, which must carry over the sub-
sidiary's basis under section 334(b)(1) (if the sale is within the
OU1nberland Public Service 00. case). Similarly, losses on the sale
of depreciated property will be taken by the subsidiary or by the
parent, according to the circumstances of the transaction.l83
Until 1958, the denial of section 337 to liquidations under section
332 contained the possibility of unfairness for minority sharehold-
ers, who were faced with the prospect of a tax at the corporate
level as well as at the shareholder level if the corporation sold
the assets. The Technical Amendments Act of 1958, however,
added section 337(d) to the Code, providing that a minority share-
holder shall treat his share of the corporate tax as though it had
been (1) distributed to him in liquidation and (2) paid by him as
a tax. The effect of section 337 (d) is to increase the shareholder's
gain (or decrease his loss) on the liquidation by his share of the
corporation's tax, and to treat the same amount as a down pay-
ment by him on his income tax for the year, with the result that
the minority shareholder will be in the same position, in most
cases, as though section 337 had applied to the liquidation.
Nonliquidating Distributions~ Partial Liquidations
and Stock Redemptions
Since section 337 applies only if the corporation distributes
its assets in complete liquidation, sales in conjunction with non-
liquidating distributions, partial liquidations and stock redemp-
tions are not within the ambit of section 337(a). Sales by the
shareholders of property received in such distributions will be
imputed to the corporation or not according to the nonstatutory
rules developed under the Oourt Holding 00. and Oumberland Pub-
lic Service 00. cases. Undue weight will continue to be accorded
the formalities of the transaction, and these cases will remain "a
183 Thus it is not possible to avoid completely the risk of Court Holding Co. treatment
in the case of liquidations qualifying under section 332. In this connection, sco also
the discussion of the Fairfield 8.8. Corp. case, text at note 60 supra, for another pos:aible
attack where the parent contemplates an immediate sale of llSScts acquired on liquidation
of its 80 percent subsidiary. 8ee cUso :Rev. Rut 69-172,1969-1 C.B. 99.
United States Rolding Co., 44 T.e. 323 (1965), acq., offers an interesting e:mmple
of the working of section 337(c) (2): there, the subsidinry was held entitled to section
337(c)(2)(B) nonrecognition with respect to sales of various asscts at a gain, while
losses on sales of other assets were allowed as deductions because of the generol rnle
of section 337(c) (2) (A).
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trap for the unwary," to use the language of the Senate report on
the 1954 Code.1M
SECTION 337 AND REINCOBPORATIONS OR OTHER
REORGANIZATIONS
Section 337(a) demands a complete liquidation of the corpora-
tion as a condition to nonrecognition of its gain or loss on the sale
of qualified assets. What if a corporation sells its assets to a cor-
poration owned by its shareholders, taking cash or notes in pay-
ment; and then distributes the cash or notes to its shareholders in
exchange for their stock~ The transaction fits within the statutory
language of section 337, which does not require the assets to be
sold to an unrelated buyer; but the net effect of the transaction is
substantially identical with a liquidation reincorporation effected
by distributing the assets in kind to the shareholders so that they
can transfer them to a new corporation controlled by them. As
with such a liquidation reincorporation, the section 337 plan just
described-if accepted at face value-would give the second cor-
poration a basis for the assets equal to their fair market value and
wipe out the earnings and profits account of the original corpora-
tion, and the shareholders would get all this in a transaction creat-
ing capital gain (or possibly loss) equal to the difference between
their adjusted basis for their stock of the original corporation and
the fair market value of the assets.
The Internal Revenue Service has endeavored to discourage
transactions of this type by refusing to issue rulings on the appli-
bility of section 337 if assets are sold to.a corporation in which the
shareholders of the liquidating corporation own more than a nom-
inal amount of stock.18G
The legal status of section 337 reincorporations cannot be dis-
cussed except in the context of the reorganization provisions. Itmay
be suggested here, however, that use of section 337 in conjunction
with a reincorporation does not seem to justify special treatment:
If a reincorporation following a distribution of assets in kind is
treated as a reorganization, a section 337 sale to a corporation
184 See McNair Realty Co. v. United States, 188 F. SUPI>. 451 (D. Mont. 1960).
See also section 311 (d), added by the Tax Reform Act of 1969, taxing tho corporation
on distributions of appreciated property in a section 302 redemption of its stock.
lS5 See Rev. Proc. 64-31, 1964-2 C.B. 947. Revenue Procedure 69-6, 1969-1 a.B. 390,
now holds that 20 per cent or less common ownership by shareholders of the buying and
selling corporation is nominal, so that use of section 337 will be permitted in such cases.
For an earlier, more relaxed view, see Revenue Ruling 56-541, 1956-2 a.B. 189 (salo
to corporation owned to the extent of 45 per cent by shareholdors of tho solling cor-
poration; held, section 337 applies), revoked by Revenue Ruling 61-156, 1961-2 a.B. 62.
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controlled by the shareholders of the liquidating corporation de-
serves the same treatment; conversely, if a reincorporation of as-
sets distributed in kind is accepted at face value, there is little
reason for a refusal to honor a section 337 sale to a related cor-
poration.ISG
One point that bears special comment in this context, however,
is the question of whether section 337 is preempted by the reorgllIli-
zation rules if the transaction is held to constitute a reorganization
rather than a liquidation. With respect to transfers by one con-
trolled corporation to another, section 337 is preempted by the
reorganization provisions; moreover, it has been held that section
337 is ousted of jurisdiction even over sales made to outsiders in
a liquidation occurring in the course of a reorganization.18i
THE LIQUIDATrNG CORPORATION'S DEDUCTIONS
Just as the process of liquidation creates a number of problems
in determining the liquidating corporation's income, so it has
ramifications in the area of corporate deductions. The principal
issues are (1) whether any adjustment is required with respect to
expenditures that would ordinarily be deductible, if the corpora-
tion liquidates before the economic benefit thereof has been fully
reflected in its income stream; (2) conversely, whether expendi-
tures that were not fully deducted in past years because they were
expected to have a continuing economic benefit can be deducted
when the fact of liquidation terminates their usefulness; and (3)
whether the expenses of effecting the liquidation itself cnn be de-
ducted by the corporation and its shareholders.
Adjustment for Expenditures With Continuing
Economic Benefit
The Internal Revenue Service has endeavored to require a corpo-
ration liquidating in midstream to report its potential income by
invoking assignment of income principles, section 446(b) (account-
ing method must clearly reflect income), and the tax benefit doc-
trines and-with less success-by disallowing as deductions to the
liquidating corporation those expenses which are attributable to
J.86 Rev. Bul. 70-240, 1970-20 L:R.B. 17 (May 18). See also American Mfg. Co., liS
T.C. No. 21 (1970).
J.81 See, e.g., Bev. Rul. 70-271, 1970-22, I.B.B. 9 (June 1) (distributions to creditors
of transferor corporation in a type C reorgnnizntion, even shnreho1der creditors, result
in taxable gain or loss) ; :Ralph O. Wilson, 46 T.O. 334 (19lili); BetnU Propertie!l, !nil.,
23 T.O.M. 1463 (1964); Werner Abegg, 50 T.O. 145 (19liB), aif'il, 429 F.2d 1209 (2d
Cir.1970).
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its unreported potential income items, on the ground that they are
not ordinary and necessary expenses of carrying on a trade or
business.
A related development is the attempt of the Service to apportion
or allocate expenses incurred during the corporation's final tax
period, if related to property distributed in lond to its sharehold-
ers, between the corporation and the shareholders, under the clear
reflection of income language of sections 446 (b) and 482. For ex-
ample, Revenue Ruling 62-45 188 holds that real estate taxes for the
year of liquidation must be apportioned on a pro rata basis betweon
the liquidating corporation and its distributee shareholders by vir-
tue of section 482, a result that is explicitly required by section
164(d) if the property is sold. This approach was upheld in Ten-
nessee Life Ins. Co. v. Phinney/89 but in Simon J. Murphy Co. v.
Commissioner 190 the liquidating corporation was allowed to deduct
such taxes without apportionment. It is difficult to determine the
extent to which deductions can be apportioned between the corpo-
ration and its shareholders under section 482 on a distribution in
kind, or limited on a pro rata basis under section 446(b) on a sale
of the property for whose benefit the expenditure was incurred.l9l
It would seem that deductions which accrue ratably over a fixed pe-
riod of time (such as interest, rent, property taxes and the lilee)
should be prorated to the date when the liquidating corporation's
assets are distributed or sold, at least where the corporation is on
the accrual method of accounting; this approach is somewhat less
appropriate for cash basis taxpayers, who can deduct their ex-
penses when paid, but it might be insisted on even here, especially
if the expenditure creates a benefit beyond the year in payment.
Proration in these cases would merely reflect the fact that the liqui-
dating corporation has not sustained the entire burden of these
expenses, having terminated its operations prior to completion of
the period to which they relate.
Unamortized Deferred Deductions
Different considerations may apply, however, when the corpora-
1.881962-1 C.B. 27.
1.89280 F.2d 38 (5th air.), em. denied, 364 U.S. 914 (1960).
1.90231 F.2d 639 (6th air. 1956).
1.91. See also Wmer v. Comm'r, 371 F.2d 684 (1st Oir. 1967) ; Bird Management, Inc.,
48 T.C. 586 (1967).
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tion has previously capitalized long-term expenses (such as pre-
paid rent, insurance premiums or supplies) and is amortizing these
items over the period to which they relate. In practice, these de-
ferred expense items may be reflected on the corporate books as
assets, although from a tax viewpoint it is more accurate to view
them merely as deferred deductions. If the unexpired benefits of
these expenditures inure to the benefit of the shareholders on a
distribution in kind or the purchaser on the sale of a going busi-
ness, the unamortized cost should not be deductible by the trans-
feror corporation since it has been transferred as part of the as-
sets. If the unused benefits from such expenditures expire with the
taxpayer's liquidation (e.g., if the taxpayer's leases or insurance
policies are cancelled without refund of the prepaid rent or pre-
miums), however, deductions should be allowed for the unamor-
tized portions of these expenses in the liquidating corporation's
final return. In effect, this is the taxpayer's last clear chance to
take account of the previous expenditure of funds for these items,
which it was required to defer over a ratable period of time, but
which nevertheless constituted a cost of doing business. This prin-
ciple was applied to corporate organizational expenses and similar
items by Koppers 00., Inc. v. United States,102 on the ground that
the corporation on liquidation "lost or abandoned something for
which it had paid" ; the liquidation antedated the enactment of sec-
tion 248, permitting the corporation to amortize such expenses over
a 60 month period, but the principle is equally applicable if the cor-
poration elects not to amortize or elects to do so but liquidates be-
fore the amortization period expires.lo3 On the other hand, the liqui-
dating corporation is not allowed to deduct the expenses incurred
on issuing its capital stock or stock dividends (e.g., legal fees,
printing cost, underwriters' commissions, et cetera), although a
retirement of its bonds or other debts at the time of liquidation
192278 F.2d 946 (Ct. Cl. 1960).
193 See also Hollywood Baseball Ass'n, 42 T.O. 234 (1964) (deduction allowed for
"promotional" shares issued for organization services). It may be necl!2.Sm"Y to decide
whether the corporation has been liquidated or merged, since in the latter caEe n de-
duction may be disallowed because the expenses inure to the benefit of n successor
corporation, and will be deductible only when the latter is liquidated. SCD Kingsford
Corp., 41 T.C. 646 (1964), acq.
In Frank .T. Longo, 27 T.C.Y. 1075 (1968) the corporation ,,;as nllowed deduction
for abandonment of goodwill on liquidation where business was not cODtinued by
shareholders. But see George C. Carlson, 26 T.C.Y. 537 (1967) (unnmortized portion of
expense not allowed as deduction where continuing benefit to distributee shareholder).
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entitles it to deduct any previously unamortized discount or a pre-
mium paid on a prematurity retirement.l°4
Liquidation Expenses
The cost of preparing and effectuating a plan of complete liqui-
dation and dissolution under section 332 can be deducted by the
corporation as an ordinary and necessary business expense, even
though it involves a termination, rather than a carrying on, of the
corporate enterprise; and this principle seems equally applicable
to section 333 and section 337 transactions.lO;j If the liquidation
transaction is part of a tax-free merger or other reorganization of
the disappearing corporation, however, only the costs properly al-
locable to the liquidation aspect of the transaction are deductible.lou
Moreover, expenses related to sales of property by the liquidating
corporation may have to be treated as selling expenses which offset
the proceeds received on the sale, notwithstanding the liquidation
context of the dispositions.197
Corporate expenses incurred in effecting a partial liquidation, or
similar contraction in the corporate enterprise, have caused more
difficulty, although the more recent decisions have shown a tend·
ency to allow the deduction here for those costs that are shown to
be attributable to the partial liquidation feature of the transaction,
as opposed to expenses attributable to a change in corporate capi.
tal structure.lDS Once again, accurate record keeping and itemized
194 On bond discount and premium, see Reg. § 1.61-12 (c)(3) ; Longviow lIilton lIotol
Co.,9 T.C. 180 (1947), acq.; Nassau Lens Co., Inc. v. Comm'r, 308 F.2d 31l (1M Cir.
1962); Roberts & Porter, Inc. v. Corom'r, 307 F.2d 745 (7th Cir. 1962). All to tho
expense of issuing stock, see Pacific Coast Biscuit Co., 32 B.T.A. 39 (1935), ClC'1.. (non-
deductible).
But section 249, added by the Tax Reform Act of 1969, denies a doduction for rotiro.
ment premium on convertible debt to the extent such premium is attributable to tllO
conversion feature rather than the debt feature of the obligation, thus overruling tho
Roberts .f Porter decision.
195 See Pacific Coast Biscuit Co., 32 B.T.A. 39 (1935), acq. (complote liquidation);
Koppers Co., Inc. v. United States, 278 F.2d 946 (Ct. Cl. 1960) (section 332 liquida-
tion); Pridemark, Inc. v. Comm'r, 345 F.2d 35 (4th Cir. 1965) (section 337); Gravoill
Planing Mill Co. v. Comm'r, 299 F.2d 199 (8th Cir. 1962) (partial liquidation). Soo
generalty Carruthers, How to Treat the Expenses 01 Organization, Rcorganiaation, and
Liquidation, 24 N.Y.U. mST. 1055 (1966); Maier, Ded11ctibiZtiy 01 Expenses Incllrrca
in Oorporate Reorganization ana Liquidations, 1968 S. CALIF. INST. 253.
196 See Kingsford Corp., 41 T.O. 646 (1964), acq.
191 For the cases, which are not harmonious, see note 175 supra.
198 See Gravois Planing :Mill 00. v. Comm'r, 299 F.2d 199 (8th Cir. 1962) (dolllimUlt
aspect of transaction a partial liquidation, not a recapitalization; expenses deductiblo) ;
United States v. General Bancshares Corp., 388 F.2d 184 (8th Cir. 1968) (exponses of
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professional bills are essential in order to determine what portion
of the costs is attributable to the partial liquidation feature of the
transaction, and hence deductible, and what portion is attributable
to the nondeductible capital structure adjustment component.
According to Revenue Ruling 67-125/03 corporate expenses at-
tributable to distributions in redemption of stock under section 302
(which do not constitute a partial liquidation) are nondeductible
capital structure adjustment expenditures. The distinction between
a partial liquidation and a section 302 stock redemption as the
touchstone for deductibility seems dubious, and contrary to the
spirit, if not the holding, of Geneml Bancs7zares Oorp.':YJo and other
decisions allowing a deduction for similar expenses which did not
"add anything of value to the corporation's capital structure."
As the court pointed out in General Bancs7zares, the distribution
did not result in the creation of additional corporate rights or as-
sets, nor did it add anything of value to its corporate structure;
rather, all that occurred from the distribution was a pro tanto con-
traction in the value of its shares. This language seems equally
applicable to a section 302 stock redemption distribution, or, for
that matter to an ordinary dividend distribution, whether in cash
or in property.
Shareholder expenses incurred in effecting a partial or com-
plete liquidation of their corporation ordinarily constitute capital
expenditures which enter into the computation of gain or loss aris-
ing from the distribution,201 although curiosities can be found even
here.202 Expenses of resisting liquidation, however, may be allowed
as a deduction under section 212(2) as an expense for the conserva-
tion of income producing property.203 Moreover, the possibility of
deducting under section 212(3) any professional fees attributable
divesting unwanted nonbanking assets deductible as partin! liquidation expenses, even
though divestiture tax-free; expenses of changing corporate structure not deductible);
United States v. Trans3Il1erica Corp., 392 F.2d 522 (9th Gr. 1908); E.L du Pont de
Nemours & Co. v. United States, 296 F. Supp. 823 (D. DeL 1969), rCD'il, 70-2 U.S.T.O.
~ 9645 (3d Oir. 1970).
199 1967-1 O.B. 31.
200388 F.2d 184 (8th 0ir.1968).
201See, e.g., Rev. Rul. 67-411, 1967-2 O.B. 124; Third Nationnl Bank in Nashrllle
v. United States, 427 F.2d 343 (6th Oir. 1970); Helgerson v. United States, 4!lG FJld
1293 (8th Oil. 1970); Estate of McGlothlin v. Comm'r, 370 F.2d 729 (5th air. 1967).
202 See Comm'r v. Doering, 335 F.2d 738 (2d Oir. 1904) (shareholder's e:q)(:1!So of
collecting a contingent corporate claim distributed in liquidation; held deductible).
203 Allied Chemical Corp. v. United States, 305 F.2d 433 (Ct. OL 1902) (Btochholder's
costs in opposition to SEC proceedings to dissolve corporation in which m:rpayer was
a major shareholder allowed as section 162 business expense).
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to advice as to the tax consequences of the transaction should not
be overlooked.204
THE LIQUIDATING OORPORATION'S INDEBTEDNESS
The indebtedness of a liquidating corporation must either be
paid off before the final distribution of its assets to shareholders
or assumed by them or by some other person (e.g., a purchaser of
its assets); failing a formal arrangement for a discharge or as-
sumption of the debt, the shareholders will be liable as transferees.
Payment of the debt may generate a deduction for unamortized
discount or a retirement premium; and, if appreciated or depre-
ciated property is used instead of cash, the corporation will realize
gain or loss under familiar principles.205 (The gain or loss may go
unrecognized under section 337(a), however, if the property is
transferred after the plan of liquidation is adopted.) A discharge
for less than the face amount of the debt will generate cancellation
of indebtedness income; although income so arising is not covered
by section 337 because it is not attributable to a sale or exchange
by the corporation of property, it is possible that an election to
exclude it from income under section 108 and section 1017 would
be efficacious, at least if the property whose basis is reduced under
section 1017 is to be sold. Unless section 337 is applicable, a sale
after such an election would produce an increased amount of gain
or a reduced loss, which is the normal consequence of the election;
and if section 337 applies, the fact that the reduction of basis would
be ineffectual because the gain or loss is not recognized might be
regarded as irrelevant.206 If the property is to be distributed in
204 Kaufmann v. United States, 227 F. Supp. 807 (W.D. Mo. 1963).
205 See generally Eustice, Cancellation of Indebtedness and tho Fedoral Incomo Tax:
..4 Problem of Creeping Confusion, 14 TAX L. REV. 225 (1959). For a recent illustration
of corporate recognition of gain or loss on payment of its debts in kind, S60 Revonue
Ruling 70-271, 1970-22 I.R-B. 9 (June 1).
206 For possible analogies, see Otto F. Ruprecht, 20 T.O.M. 618 (1961) (reduction
of sales proceeds by selling expenses, despite application of section 337), and cases cited
note 175 supra (expenses attributable to gain unrecogni2ed under section 337 deductiblo,
despite section 265). See Leon R. Myer, 46 T.O. 65 (1966), rev'a, 383 F.2d SS3 (8th Gir.
1967) (effect of cancellation of debt in bankruptcy proceedings on earnings and profits).
See also John Town, Inc., 46 T.e. 107 (1966), aff'iJ per curiam, 67-1 U.S.T.O. U9402
(7th Cir. 1967).
A use of appreciated or depreciated property to discharge the corporation's debt will
have the effect described in the text even though the debt is held by tho sharoholders;
section 336 provides for nonrecognition of gain or loss only if property is distributed in
partial or complete liquidation, and this seems limited to a distribution in cancellation
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kind, however, it is more difficult to justify a reduction in the cor-
poration's basis; and the same can be said of an attempt to elect
under section 108 after the corporate assets have been distributed,
so that none remain to absorb the basis reduction.::07
If the corporation's debt is assumed by a purchaser of the assets
instead of being paid off, the amount thereof will be taken into ac-
count in computing the gain or loss realized by the corporation on
the sale. Unless the sale falls outside section 337, however, the gain
or loss will not be reflected in the corporation's tax liability. Al-
though an assumption of corporate debt by the shareholders on a
distribution of assets to them might have the legal effect of a dis-
charge of the corporation's liability, and this in turn might be re-
garded as a transfer pro tanto by the corporation of appreciated or
depreciated property in payment of its debt, it is highly unlikely
that this theory would be advanced by the Service or entertained
by the courts. The transfer of assets by a liquidating corporation
to its shareholders, under an agreement by which they assume its
liabilities, is so customary that it is reasonable to regard it as a
"distribution of property in ... complete liquidation" within the
nonrecognition rule of section 336.208
EARNINGS AND PROFITS OF THE LIQUIDATING
CORPORATION
In. an ordinary complete liquidation, to which the general rule
of section 331(a)(1) applies, it is not necessary to determine the
effect of liquidation on the corporation's earnings and profits, be-
cause the corporation has no successor and its earnings and profits
do not affect the shareholder's tax on the liquidation. In an elective
one month liquidation under section 333, however, the corpora-
tion's earnings and profits must be determined "as of the close of
of stock. See section 33l(a); Reg. § 1.3il-l(e); Rev. Rul. 7o-:l7I, 197o-~2 U.B. 9
(June 1).
207 Revenue Ruling 67-200, 1967-1 C.B. 15, states thnt debtor will realize ordinnry
income if there is no property basis upon which the section 1017 ndjusbnent cnn operate.
208 A contrary result could not be easily reconciled with the fact that the assumption
of debt by shareholders on a nonliquidnting distribution in kind creates income nt
the corporate level only if the liability exceeds its basis for the property. A contrary
result would also perpetuate the Court Holding Co.-Cumberlanil Public Scn:fco Co.
dichotomy, since the recognition of income could be avoided by selling the assets nt the
corporate level and distributing the proceeds. Sce also Longview Hilton Hotel Co., 9
T.C. 180 (1947), acq. (deduction allowed for unamorti2ed debt discount on i1nnl return
of liquidating corporation).
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the month in which the transfer in liquidation occurred," in order
to determine what part, if any, of the shareholder's gain shall be
recognized under section 333(e) (1) or (f) (2). Similarly, when a
subsidiary corporation is liquidated under section 332, its earnings
and profits must be determined because they are inherited by the
parent corporation under sections 381(a)(1) and (C)(2).200
An accurate determination of the liquidating corporation's earn-
ings and profits will also be necessary if it is a controlled foreign
corporation or a foreign investment company since the sharehold-
er's gain on the liquidation of such a corporation may be taxed as
ordinary income rather than capital gain to the extent of his rata-
ble share of its post-1962 earnings and profits.
BOOTSTRAP ACQUISITIONS AND THE LIQUIDATING
CORPORATION
In many cases, the purchaser of a corporate business is unwilling
or unable to acquire all the assets of the selling company. One set
of techniques for slimming the assets down to fit the size of the
buyer's purse is through stock redemptions. A complete liquida-
tion can sometimes be used for the same purpose, and it may also
serve to step up the basis of the operating assets to their fair
market value and to eliminate corporate earnings and profits, re-
sults that are not achieved by the stock redemption route, since the
latter entails (at least in its simplest form) a preservation of the
original corporate shell.
Thus, if X Corporation has some properties that are wanted by
the buyer and others that he does not want, the wanted assets can
be sold to him in a transaction qualifying under section 337; and
the sale proceeds together with the unwanted assets can then be
distributed to X's shareholders. The buyer will obtain the assets
with a basis equal to their fair market value; if he utilizes a corpo-
ration to acquire them, it will be free of earnings and profits; and
X's shareholders will report capital gain (or loss, depending on
their basis for their stock) on the liquidation.
At times, however, the parties may have grander aims, as in a
transaction recently sanctioned by the Supreme Court, where the
transferred business was to be purchased by use of its future earn-
ingS.210 Briefly stated, this arrangement involved the following
209 See Nesson, Earnings and PrOfits Discontinuities Under The 1954 Oode, 77 HAItV.
L. REV. 450 (1964).
210 Co='r v. Brown, 380 U.S. 563 (1965).
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steps: (1) the sale of corporate stock to a tax-exempt charity; (2)
liquidation by the charity of the acquired corporation; (3) a lease
of the operating assets by the charity to a newly created corpora-
tion, the rent being dependent on the future profits of the business;
and (4) payments by the charity on its purchase money obligations
solely out of the rent received by it, it having no personal liability
to the seller, and having invested only a nominal down payment
at the time of purchase.
The Commissioner, understandably, was unhappy with these re-
sults, and launched his major attack at the capital gain treatment
claimed by the seller of the stock. But the Olay Brown, case upheld
the disposition as a bona fide sale, despite the seller's continued eco-
nomic interest in the profits of the business, stating that this was
merely a method of financing the sale. The Court rejected the Com-
missioner's argument that the economic incidents of ownership
(i.e., risk of loss and expectation of profits from the business, to-
gether with effective control over the operation thereof during the
payout period of the sale contract) remained with the seller; the
majority opinion felt that a true shift of economic ownership, and
hence a sale, had been effected so that the taxpayer was entitled to
capital gain treatment for the deferred payment proceeds.~u
The Tax Reform Act of 1969 took most of the magic out of Olay
BrowfJ'b charitable bootstrap deals by providing in section 514 that
the charity purchaser will have to include, as unrelated business in-
come, a portion of its receipts from the property corresponding to
the ratio between the acquisition indebtedness and the adjusted
basis of the property. In. short, to the extent that its earnings from
the property are financed by borrowed funds, the charity will be
taxed as an ordinary business corporation.
The Olay Brown pattern continues to offer tax shelter possibil-
ties outside the charitable area, however, as where the bootstrap
purchaser is a corporation with net operating loss carryovers that
can be offset against the income of the acquired business. There
211 For discussious of the Brown case, see articles by Dauber, .Tewell, Hnll, EUasberg &;
Kinsey, 23 .T. TAXATION 2, 42, nnd 68 (1965). See also Moore &; Dohnn, SalC.'J, Chllrc'hC.'J,
anil 'Monkeyshines, 11 TAX L. REV. 87 (1956); Comment, Tile TlIree.Party Salo and
Lease-BM];, 61 :MImr. L. REV. 1140 (1963); Kinsey, Bootstraps and CapitaZ Gain-A
Participant's View of Commissioner 'l1. Clay Brown, 64 :MIOIL L. REV. SSl (1900).
Note that section 483 (the imputed interest provision), added by the Revenue Act of
1964, w.ill dilute the capital gain benefits from this type of deferred payment snle
trnnsaction, and that sections 1245 nnd 1250 mtly require the liquidating corporation on
the distribution of its depreciable assets to recognize some ordinary income.
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are possible limitations on this device under section 269, or the
Libson Shops decision.212
Another form. of bootstrap acquisition is the purchase by one
corporation of the stock of another corporation for bonds, deben-
tures or notes, servicing the debt with wholly or substantially
tax-free dividends from the acquired corporation because of sec-
tion 243.
212 Libson Shops, Inc. v. Koehler, 353 U.S. 382 (1957). Bee also Comm'r v. Wntcr·
man S.S. Co., 430 F.2d 1185 (5th Cir. 1970).
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